Last updated: September 29, 2026 at 8:42 AM UTC
All 891 Vulnerability 357 Breach 144 Threat 383 Defense 7

PCPJack hijacks 230 AWS, Google Cloud, and Azure servers into covert SMTP relay network using Sliver and Chisel, removes TeamPCP

SentinelOne and Hunt.io have detailed PCPJack, a credential-theft framework that hijacks cloud servers across AWS, Google Cloud, and Azure into a covert SMTP relay network - while terminating artifacts of the rival TeamPCP group. Built around a Sliver-integrated SMTP proxy toolkit with Chisel tunneling for multiple Linux architectures, it drops a hidden binary at /var/tmp/.xs and assigns each Sliver beacon a SOCKS5 port derived from an MD5 of its UUID. A deployer script runs an SMTP 'quality gate' probing outbound smtp.gmail.com:587 - hosts that cannot relay email are discarded. A C2-side Python daemon continuously prunes Chisel tunnels for SMTP capability. Around 230 servers were compromised.

Check
Hunt cloud Linux hosts for /var/tmp/.xs, Sliver and Chisel binaries, and outbound SMTP probes to smtp.gmail.com:587. Check for cron or systemd persistence. Apply SentinelOne and Hunt.io IoCs.
Affected
Internet-reachable cloud servers (AWS, Google Cloud, Azure) that attackers can compromise and that have outbound SMTP capability - the criterion PCPJack uses to select hosts for its relay network.
Fix
Block unneeded outbound SMTP (port 587/25) from cloud workloads. Remove Sliver/Chisel artifacts and persistence. Restrict egress, monitor for SOCKS5 tunneling, and rotate credentials on affected hosts.

Hola Browser for Windows compromised in supply-chain attack delivering undeclared Monero miner disguised as HolaMonitorService.exe

The Windows version of the Chromium-based Hola Browser has been compromised in a supply-chain attack that delivered an undeclared cryptocurrency miner. The compromise was caught during AppEsteem certification checks, with Sophos and others finding an uncertified, unsigned, obfuscated executable, me.exe, under C:\Program Files\Hola\. Analysis identified it as a Monero miner: it adds a Windows Defender exclusion, copies itself to Program Files as HolaMonitorService.exe, creates an auto-starting service named hola_monitor_svc, and runs when the machine is idle. Hola - the Israeli company behind Hola VPN, long controversial for turning free users into proxies - confirmed the compromise (independently detected by Sygnia) but says only about 0.1% of users were affected.

Check
Inventory Windows endpoints for Hola Browser installs. Check for me.exe or HolaMonitorService.exe under C:\Program Files\Hola\, the hola_monitor_svc service, and Defender exclusion rules. Hunt for Monero-miner traffic.
Affected
Windows users who installed or updated Hola Browser during the compromise window. The undeclared Monero miner adds a Defender exclusion, persists as a service, and runs when idle.
Fix
Remove Hola Browser and the me.exe / HolaMonitorService.exe miner, delete the hola_monitor_svc service, and remove the malicious Defender exclusion. Block the mining pool and monitor for residual persistence.

FlutterShell macOS backdoor spreads via Google and YouTube ads from verified shell companies - CL-CRI-1089 / TamperedChef adware-to-backdoor

Palo Alto Networks Unit 42 has documented FlutterShell, a Flutter-built macOS backdoor distributed through malicious Google and YouTube ads served by a network of Google-verified shell companies. It is the latest stage of the CL-CRI-1089 cluster and part of the broader TamperedChef / EvilAI campaigns that push trojanized productivity software. The ads lure macOS users in the US, Canada, Australia, France, and Germany into installing fake desktop apps. Beyond adware, FlutterShell supports arbitrary shell-command execution, file-system manipulation, and environment-variable exfiltration, and on launch modifies Chrome config files to force browser traffic through an attacker-controlled intermediary. Activity was seen as recently as March 2026.

Check
Warn macOS users that Google/YouTube ads for productivity apps may be malicious. Hunt for Flutter-built apps that modify Chrome config files. Apply Unit 42 IoCs.
Affected
macOS users in the US, Canada, Australia, France, and Germany lured by malvertised fake desktop apps. FlutterShell adds backdoor command execution and Chrome-hijacking on top of adware.
Fix
Source software only from official vendor sites, not search ads. Apply Unit 42 IoCs and block the ad domains. Restore Chrome config on affected Macs and remove the apps.

Magecart skimmer abuses Stripe API and Google Tag Manager to host payload and exfiltrate cards, bypassing CSP on Magento checkouts

Sansec has discovered a new Magecart card-skimming campaign that abuses Stripe's API infrastructure and Google Tag Manager to host both the skimmer payload and the stolen data. Because online stores trust googletagmanager.com and api.stripe.com by default, the skimmer slips past Content Security Policy rules and network filters that would flag an unknown skimmer domain. Malicious code embedded in a legitimate-looking GTM container activates at checkout, queries a Stripe customer record, reads JavaScript from its metadata, and runs it via new Function(). It targets Magento/Adobe Commerce checkout pages, capturing card number, expiry, CVV, name, billing address, email, and phone, then XOR-obfuscates and stores the data locally before exfiltrating through Stripe.

Check
Audit Magento/Adobe Commerce checkout pages for unfamiliar Google Tag Manager containers and JavaScript reading from api.stripe.com customer-record metadata. Review GTM container change history for unauthorized edits.
Affected
Magento/Adobe Commerce stores using Google Tag Manager. The skimmer hides in GTM containers and routes payload and stolen cards through trusted api.stripe.com, bypassing CSP and network filters.
Fix
Lock down GTM container edit access and review all containers. Apply strict CSP and Subresource Integrity, and monitor checkout pages for unauthorized scripts. Treat trusted-domain traffic as a skimmer vector.

Hackers spied on a stock exchange executive's Outlook mailbox for five months via malicious OAuth app and inbox-rule persistence

Researchers have detailed a cyber-espionage campaign in which attackers maintained access to a global stock exchange executive's Microsoft Outlook mailbox for roughly five months. The intrusion relied on a malicious OAuth application and inbox-rule persistence to quietly read and forward mail while evading detection. By abusing OAuth consent rather than stealing a password, the attackers retained access that survived password changes and looked like routine application traffic in logs. The five-month dwell time on a single high-value executive points to a patient, intelligence-driven operation rather than opportunistic crime. The case reinforces the now-recurring pattern of OAuth-app abuse and malicious inbox rules as the core of stealthy Microsoft 365 mailbox compromise.

Check
Audit Microsoft 365 for unfamiliar OAuth app consents and mailbox inbox rules, especially on executive accounts. Review consent-grant and rule-creation logs for the past six months.
Affected
High-value Microsoft 365 mailboxes, particularly executives. OAuth-consent abuse plus malicious inbox rules grants persistent, password-change-surviving access that blends into normal application traffic.
Fix
Restrict third-party OAuth app consent to admin approval. Alert on new mailbox-forwarding rules. Enforce phishing-resistant MFA and periodically review granted OAuth applications on sensitive accounts.

SafeBreach 'Fake Context Alignment' hijacks Google Gemini on Android via malicious WhatsApp/Slack notifications - no malicious app needed, now patched

SafeBreach's Or Yair has demonstrated Fake Context Alignment, a technique that hijacks Google Gemini's voice assistant on Android through malicious notifications from apps like WhatsApp and Slack - no malicious app on the phone required. Gemini's Utilities feature reads and acts on notification text as if it were instructions, an attack surface Yair calls 'effectively infinite.' The bypass runs two illusions at once: it poses the real authorization question in a language the victim does not speak, defeating Google's post-Invitation prompt-injection mitigations. It can fake a boss's message, open windows, force a Zoom call, or poison long-term memory. Google has patched it; no CVE was assigned.

Check
Advise Android users with Gemini to disable or restrict its Utilities notification-reading feature where not essential. Treat unexpected spoken instructions referencing Drive uploads or calls with suspicion.
Affected
Android users with Google Gemini's notification-reading Utilities enabled. Any app or service that can push a notification could inject instructions; iOS and web are not affected. Now patched.
Fix
Ensure Gemini is updated to the patched version. Limit which apps can post notifications Gemini reads. For sensitive actions, require on-screen confirmation rather than voice-only approval.

Chinese cybercrime actor TA4922 expands to Europe with Atlas RAT and localized payroll/tax lures - likely LLM-accelerated malware

Proofpoint has detailed TA4922, a Chinese-speaking financially-motivated cybercrime group that has expanded from East Asia into Europe, deploying the previously undocumented Atlas backdoor against organizations in Germany, Italy, the UK, and South Africa. Since March its tempo has surged - Proofpoint says TA4922 now runs more unique campaigns than any other cybercrime actor in its data. Lures impersonate payroll notices, tax audits, VAT filings, compliance notices, invoices, and HR communications, with follow-up contact via WhatsApp, LINE, and Microsoft Teams. The group overlaps with activity reported as Silver Fox and Void Arachne. Proofpoint believes the rapidly expanding malware arsenal is being accelerated with LLMs, citing AI-generated code patterns and placeholder values.

Check
Hunt European endpoints for the Atlas backdoor and TA4922 custom loaders. Inspect email for payroll/tax/VAT/invoice lures and unsolicited WhatsApp, LINE, or Teams contact. Apply Proofpoint IoCs.
Affected
Organizations in Germany, Italy, the UK, and South Africa - TA4922's expanded European targets. Finance, HR, and tax-themed lures plus messaging-app outreach are the delivery vectors.
Fix
Apply Proofpoint IoCs and block Atlas RAT C2. Train finance and HR staff against tax/payroll/invoice lures and unsolicited messaging-app contact. Restrict execution of email-delivered loaders and scripts.

CISA, FBI, NSA warn hackers are modifying internet-exposed fuel tank gauge (ATG) systems - prior activity linked to Iran

CISA, the FBI, the NSA, the Department of Energy, and partners have warned that threat actors are targeting internet-exposed automatic tank gauge (ATG) systems used to monitor fuel and liquid storage across the Energy, Chemical, Food and Agriculture, and Transportation sectors. Attackers gain access via authentication-bypass flaws, hardcoded credentials, OS command-execution bugs, SQL injection, and privilege escalation, then modify network settings, product identifiers, tank volumes, and pump controls, and can disable alerts - raising the risk of leaks or equipment failure. The advisory does not formally attribute the activity, but it follows May CNN reporting linking Iranian hackers to similar ATG breaches. Agencies urge removing ATG systems from the internet.

Check
Inventory automatic tank gauge (ATG) systems and confirm none are internet-exposed. Replace default passwords, enable MFA, and review device logs for unauthorized changes to settings, volumes, or pump controls.
Affected
Internet-exposed ATG systems across Energy, Chemical, Food and Agriculture, and Transportation sectors. Access via auth-bypass, hardcoded credentials, command-execution, SQL injection, and privilege-escalation flaws. Prior activity linked to Iran.
Fix
Remove ATG systems from the internet; restrict remote access via firewalls, VPNs, or ACLs. Replace default credentials, enforce MFA, apply updates, and monitor for unauthorized configuration changes.

AI-built ransomware toolkit uses Cursor and Claude Opus agents to automate EDR evasion and Active Directory discovery, Sophos finds

Sophos has detailed a threat actor using an AI-assisted ransomware toolkit that automates Active Directory discovery and EDR evasion. Tool and payload development was aided by Cursor and Claude Opus agents across coding, analysis, and revision, with some agents tasked to scrape security-research posts for fresh bypass techniques; resulting malware was tested in VMs against Sophos, CrowdStrike, and Microsoft EDR. The framework includes Cobalt Strike profiles mimicking legitimate web traffic, a Telegram-bot C2, Python shellcode injectors preserving host-binary functionality, and a Cloudflare Worker front-end redirector. Despite the AI orchestration, the workflow is entirely human-driven. Operator logs and a ransomware-leak-site reference confirmed criminal, not red-team, use.

Check
Hunt endpoints for payloads under C:\Users\*\Documents\test, Telegram-bot C2 traffic, and Cobalt Strike beacons fronted by Cloudflare Workers. Apply Sophos IoCs across EDR-monitored hosts.
Affected
Organizations relying on EDR signatures alone. This toolkit was AI-tuned specifically to bypass Sophos, CrowdStrike, and Microsoft EDR, and routes C2 through Telegram and Cloudflare Workers to blend in.
Fix
Layer behavioral detection and AD-tiering on top of EDR. Block unauthorized Telegram API and anomalous Cloudflare Worker egress. Monitor for AD-discovery patterns and shellcode injection into signed binaries.

Gamaredon (FSB) exploits WinRAR to deliver GammaWorm and GammaSteel against Ukraine - resilient, highly obfuscated modular RAR chain

Sekoia has documented Gamaredon - a Russian state-sponsored intrusion set officially linked to the FSB - exploiting WinRAR via booby-trapped RAR archives to deliver the GammaWorm and GammaSteel malware against Ukrainian targets. The infection chain is described as resilient, massive, and highly obfuscated with a modular design whose configurations operators can update on the fly, making reuse likely. Gamaredon has a long history of targeting Ukrainian government, military, and critical-infrastructure entities through spear-phishing with malicious attachments. The disclosure coincides with related Ukraine-focused activity by UAC-0184 (PassMark BurnInTest LNK lures), UAC-0247 (HTA droppers against drone operators), and APT28's evolving PixyNetLoader delivering a COVENANT implant via CVE-2026-21509.

Check
Hunt for malicious RAR archives and WinRAR exploitation, GammaWorm and GammaSteel indicators, and spear-phishing with RAR attachments in Ukraine-facing operations. Apply Sekoia IoCs.
Affected
Ukrainian government, military, and critical-infrastructure entities - Gamaredon's persistent FSB-linked targets. Spear-phishing with booby-trapped RAR archives delivering modular, frequently-updated payloads is the vector.
Fix
Patch WinRAR to the latest version. Block RAR attachments at the email gateway where feasible. Restrict mshta and script execution. Hunt for GammaSteel exfiltration and GammaWorm persistence.