CISA confirmed that ransomware groups are now exploiting a Windows Task Host privilege-escalation flaw that has been flagged as actively exploited since April. Tracked as CVE-2025-60710 and scored 7.8, it is a link-following weakness in the component that runs background scheduled tasks as SYSTEM: a local attacker with only basic user rights can use a junction on a user-writable path to make a SYSTEM-level task act on files it should not, escalating to full control. Microsoft patched it in November 2025, and it affects Windows 11 and Server 2025. Privilege escalation like this is exactly what ransomware operators need to disable defenses and spread after gaining an initial foothold.
Huntress detailed an Akira ransomware intrusion that reached in through an exposed SonicWall VPN and then forced Windows into Safe Mode to disable defenses. Because Safe Mode starts only a minimal set of services, the endpoint detection tools and Microsoft Defender did not load, leaving the attacker free to run their encryptor. The twist is that Safe Mode also starves the system of virtual memory, and thirteen seconds after the reboot the encryptor ran out of memory and crashed, so files were not encrypted, though the attacker still stole data. The technique remains a useful evasion play worth detecting even when the payload fails.
A joint advisory from the FBI, CISA, the NSA, the Secret Service, and South Korean police warns that the Gunra ransomware group is exploiting known Fortinet VPN vulnerabilities to bypass multi-factor authentication and break into networks, targeting government agencies and critical infrastructure. Gunra, believed to be built on leaked Conti source code, runs a double-extortion model: it steals data before encrypting, using a custom tool to pull files from Microsoft OneDrive and SharePoint and moving large archives to a file-sharing service with utilities like RClone and 7-Zip. The final payload appends a distinct extension and drops a ransom note. The group has grown into a ransomware-as-a-service operation recruiting access brokers.
Arctic Wolf Labs investigated multiple intrusions in June that began by exploiting an authentication bypass in Palo Alto Networks PAN-OS and ended in Qilin ransomware. CVE-2026-0257 affects the portal and gateway components and lets an unauthenticated remote attacker establish a VPN session without valid credentials, but only where authentication override cookies are enabled alongside specific certificate configurations. That narrow precondition makes it easy to assume you are unaffected without checking. The flaw is patched. Because it grants VPN access rather than code execution, the intrusions look like ordinary remote logins at the start, which delays detection until ransomware is deployed.
Coca-Cola disclosed in a securities filing that a ransomware attack on its Fairlife dairy subsidiary has disrupted operations and temporarily suspended production across the United States. The company said Fairlife detected unauthorized access to some systems, including production-related systems, and that it activated incident response and business continuity plans, brought in outside experts, and notified law enforcement. It says product quality and safety were not affected, and Canadian operations continue. The full impact is still being investigated, and no ransomware group has been named. Ransomware at food and beverage producers has caused weeks-long shutdowns and empty shelves in past incidents.
Symantec detailed GodDamn, a ransomware operation that disables endpoint defenses using PoisonX, a malicious kernel driver its developers managed to get signed by Microsoft, an unusual escalation over the more common tactic of abusing a legitimate vulnerable driver. In an early-June attack, the operators used AnyDesk for remote access and a credential-harvesting toolkit that pulls passwords from browsers, Windows Credential Manager, cached domain credentials, email clients, and network traffic, before deploying the ransomware. Alongside the signed driver, they ran a user-mode tool disguised as a Symantec product to blind security software. Symantec links GodDamn to a developer it tracks as Hyadina and says the group is actively improving its defense-evasion capabilities.
Mount Royal University in Calgary has confirmed that attackers breached its network in June, stole data from its file storage systems, and then deleted the files to hinder recovery, as the hackers now publicly claim the attack. The intrusion, detected around June 18, disrupted phones, the university website, and other systems. The affected storage held academic material such as assignments and research, but the university acknowledges some students and staff may have kept personal information there, and a separate departmental drive was also wiped. Mount Royal is notifying affected individuals and offering credit monitoring to current and recent employees, though not to students.
Arctic Wolf detailed how affiliates of the Anubis ransomware group break in and stay hidden, drawing on intrusions across healthcare, finance, and manufacturing this year. Initial access came from stolen VPN credentials and from exploiting CitrixBleed 2, a NetScaler flaw that leaks session tokens from memory and lets attackers bypass multi-factor authentication. Once inside, the affiliates leaned on legitimate remote-management software such as ScreenConnect, Zoho Assist, and MeshAgent to blend in with normal IT activity, moving through networks with RDP and PsExec toward domain controllers, backups, and storage devices. They stole data using common cloud-transfer tools before encrypting anything, which is exactly where defenders have the best chance to catch them.
A Ransom-ISAC case study, built from a leaked negotiation chat and the blockchain trail, reconstructs how a US government entity quietly paid about $1 million to an extortion group called Kairos to keep stolen files from being published. Notably, Kairos never encrypted anything: there was no locker and no decryption key, just theft and the threat to leak, with special pressure applied to a folder of prosecutors' records. The month-long negotiation fell from a $3 million demand to a $1 million payment. The case reflects a broader shift, with roughly half of recent extortion now skipping encryption entirely, since data theft alone provides enough leverage.
Blackpoint Cyber documented Avalon, a previously undocumented modular malware framework that pulls credential theft, lateral movement, remote access, backup disruption, and ransomware into one toolkit, with its ransomware component named CrownX. The attack starts with a spoofed legal-document email pointing to a password-protected archive on Proton Drive. Inside is an ISO image rather than a direct attachment, which helps it slip past email scanning, and opening a document-themed Windows shortcut inside the mounted image kicks off the infection chain. By combining evasive delivery with a full attack toolkit under one roof, Avalon lets operators run an intrusion from initial access through data theft to encryption.
TrustStrike Labs