Forever Security caught an attempt on a customer's machine to subvert an AI coding agent through a planted instructions file. Coding agents read AGENTS.md or CLAUDE.md files in a folder and follow them, and a web page can drop such a file into Downloads without a click. The disguised file told OpenAI Codex to register a server in its global config and install the npm package function-color, part of the MALFEX campaign, which pulls a Windows payload. Against Claude Code, a CLAUDE.md tried to set ANTHROPIC_BASE_URL to an attacker server to leak the login token. Researchers say there is nothing for vendors to patch.
Bloom Security disclosed a flaw in npm's Trusted Publishing, which binds a package to a GitHub repository and workflow. npm recorded the binding by repository slug rather than GitHub's permanent numeric IDs, so once a bound repository or owner was renamed, transferred, or deleted, an attacker could claim the freed slug, add a matching workflow, and receive a publish credential, even forging a valid provenance attestation. Bloom counted more than 1,500 exposed packages with over 10 million total downloads. GitHub, notified in June through HackerOne, shipped a fix in October so unvalidated configurations expire after 48 hours. It is unknown whether anyone exploited the weakness in the wild.
Socket and StepSecurity reported that version 0.5.144 of the tensorlake npm package, a TypeScript SDK, was published with obfuscated malware tied to the Shai-Hulud supply chain attack. A preinstall hook launches a loader that runs a worm under the Bun runtime. It harvests npm, GitHub, AWS, Vault, Kubernetes, and SSH credentials, .env files, cryptocurrency wallets, and configuration for Claude, Cursor, and other tools, then enumerates the victim's other packages and republishes them with forged provenance to spread. A PowerShell monitor watches the stolen GitHub token and runs a destructive handler if the victim revokes it, so remove the package before rotating that token.
CloudSEK and Checkmarx detailed MALFEX, a campaign they attribute to a lone actor who has published eight malicious npm packages downloaded 40,767 times in total, with function-flag alone accounting for 37,419. The Windows-focused packages deliver three payloads: Overlord, an open-source Go remote access trojan that pulls its command-and-control address from Solana transactions; a Node.js stealer that targets Discord, browsers, Telegram, and cryptocurrency wallets; and a downloader. Lifecycle and postinstall hooks fetch and run remote executables, with one package saving a hidden node.exe to the AppData directory. Three packages, function-flag, function-color, and cdn-img-fetch, were still live on npm at publication.
ReversingLabs detailed a malicious npm package, tw-pkgprobe-7731, that masquerades as an authorized Twilio bug-bounty research probe while harvesting developer data. Uploaded in mid-August by an account that no longer exists, it shipped eleven versions within about 45 minutes. Comments inside describe it as an authorized HackerOne probe that runs only inside Twilio's serverless sandbox and takes no destructive action. On execution it first checks for a Twilio developer environment and exits otherwise, then collects environment variables plus system details like mounts and temporary folders and exfiltrates them through a webhook. Later versions specifically target developers using Twilio APIs by searching for folders tied to particular Twilio account identifiers, sharpening the credential theft.
Checkmarx found an ongoing npm campaign built around indexed-btree, a package impersonating the popular sorted-btree library that has amassed two million weekly downloads. Instead of using preinstall or postinstall scripts, the malware hides its loader inside the BTree.prototype.set method that applications call constantly, so it executes at runtime rather than install time. This sidesteps the npm approval gates GitHub added in June to block lifecycle scripts, and installation looks clean to static scanners. Once triggered, it fingerprints the host, exfiltrates details over hardcoded Slack and Telegram channels, and polls an Ethereum Sepolia smart contract for encrypted second-stage commands.
Researchers at GitGuardian found that a recent variant of the self-spreading Shai-Hulud npm worm has expanded its credential theft to scan 469 distinct locations on infected developer machines. The targets now span developer environments, continuous integration and deployment tooling, cloud configuration files, and even the configuration of AI tools. That breadth turns a single compromised package into a wide net for secrets, from cloud and registry credentials to keys held by developer and AI tooling. It reflects how supply-chain worms are industrializing secret collection, treating any credential a developer's machine can reach as fair game once malicious code runs during installation or use.
Researchers at OX Security found a campaign using two dozen npm packages as free phishing infrastructure rather than as malware aimed at developers. Each package is just a single HTML page, harmless to install, but once served through npm content-delivery mirrors like unpkg it becomes a live, fully rendered fake Cloudflare CAPTCHA page hosted on a trusted domain. The page then redirects victims to ClickFix-style phishing infrastructure, and while it currently forwards to a legitimate site, it can be reconfigured to deliver any phishing payload. The trick is not infecting people who install the packages, but abusing the registry and its mirrors as validated, reputable storage for attacker content.
Trend Micro found 14 malicious npm packages that pose as working calendar and streak utilities while secretly installing a Linux backdoor from the commercial RedC2 4.0 toolkit. The packages function as advertised, but on load they locate a bundled binary disguised as a math accelerator, mark it executable, and run it as a detached background process. No install script is needed, so a single import anywhere in the dependency graph, even a transitive one, triggers execution. RedC2 is sold on criminal forums as an evasion-focused command-and-control framework with surveillance, credential theft, tunneling, in-memory payload execution, and AI-assisted command features. It shows how import-time execution keeps making package registries an easy delivery route.
A self-propagating worm named ChainDrop tore through the npm registry on August 4, poisoning packages that huge parts of the software world depend on. It began by hijacking the GitHub account behind keyv, a caching library pulled in about 150 million times a week, then spread to sibling and downstream packages, reaching over 1,300 poisoned versions with billions of monthly downloads within hours. A preinstall script harvests credentials from developer and continuous integration environments, including AI agent tokens, cloud keys, and self-hosted CI secrets, then uses stolen npm publishing access to poison more packages. A descendant of the earlier Shai-Hulud worm, it even forged valid-looking build provenance.