OpenSourceMalware disclosed that Anthropic's official Claude Code extension was trojanized on the Cursor Marketplace, with a 66-line malicious loader inserted before the legitimate code in versions 2.1.312 and 2.1.313 for Windows and macOS. Anthropic's systems were not compromised; an actor used marketplace access to publish the tampered build. The backdoor adds an attacker SSH key labeled svc-telemetry to authorized_keys, tries to enable SSH and open a reverse tunnel to 134.209.82.225, and persists via scheduled task, crontab, and LaunchAgent, beaconing host details over plain HTTP. The malicious version was live about twelve hours on October 29, and Cursor says up to 5,000 users were affected.
Hudson Rock and Ohey reported that attackers hijacked DebugBear, a real user monitoring vendor whose page-speed script Polymarket loaded, by compromising its DNS through the domain registrar rather than breaching DebugBear itself. A malicious server answered for DebugBear's addresses and served code that reused a signed-in trader's session to read stored trading API keys and move positions to the attacker, selling at worsening prices for email-login accounts. Polymarket says 726 wallets were affected and about 2.64 million dollars in POL reached the attacker within an hour, and it is returning 3.9 million dollars in total. No keys or seed phrases were exfiltrated.
OpenAI's Codex Security team reported CVE-2026-111497, a memory corruption flaw in Google's Brotli decoder that Google rates 9.2, where crafted compressed data overwrites past a buffer and can crash, leak memory, or run attacker code. Because the vulnerable C code is bundled widely, every program shipping it inherits the bug, including Node.js, Bun, .NET, Envoy, Istio, Python Brotli bindings, the Ruby gem, and others, with FFmpeg, ClickHouse, and Apache Arrow also affected. Each project needs its own update, such as Node.js 24.22.1 or Bun 1.4.4. Imperva demonstrated code execution on Node.js 24, calling it Node2Shell, but no in-the-wild exploitation is reported.
Wiz detailed Gheist, an automated campaign that uses stolen GitHub tokens to push a sync-check.yml workflow to a short-lived ci-sync branch, then reads the job's secrets from the run log. The workflow base32-encodes every secret the job can access, defeating GitHub's log masking, downloads the log through the API, and deletes the run seconds later, so nothing leaves through an attacker server. Since September 15, Wiz recovered more than 13,500 planted branches across more than 850 compromised accounts, succeeding in private repositories and GitHub Enterprise, where GitHub's hold on suspicious runs does not apply. Rotate every reachable secret, since deleting branches does not undo exposure.
Forever Security caught an attempt on a customer's machine to subvert an AI coding agent through a planted instructions file. Coding agents read AGENTS.md or CLAUDE.md files in a folder and follow them, and a web page can drop such a file into Downloads without a click. The disguised file told OpenAI Codex to register a server in its global config and install the npm package function-color, part of the MALFEX campaign, which pulls a Windows payload. Against Claude Code, a CLAUDE.md tried to set ANTHROPIC_BASE_URL to an attacker server to leak the login token. Researchers say there is nothing for vendors to patch.
Researchers at SafeDep, Socket, StepSecurity, and Upwind reported that LiteLLM version 1.107.0, a popular Python AI gateway, was published with malware through compromised GitHub CLI OAuth tokens belonging to three engineers. A cook.pth file runs a payload whenever the Python interpreter starts, even before LiteLLM is imported. The first stage, calling itself privcollect, harvests cloud tokens, developer credentials, private keys, AI tooling credential files, browser data, environment variables, and the proxy's saved keys and model config, exfiltrating over HTTP to litellm[.]dev/healthcheck. A second payload is a backdoor that fetches and runs further commands. The PyPI package and Docker images were pulled, and users should pin to 1.106.2.
TeamUpdraft disclosed that attackers breached its website over the October 17 weekend and reached its customer database, obtaining names, emails, hashed passwords, 2FA settings, and the UpdraftCentral connection keys that let them push backdoor plugins to connected WordPress sites. UpdraftPlus, a backup plugin with over four million installs, ships an UpdraftCentral client in every copy. Patchstack saw signed plugin.upload_plugin commands over an 18-hour window and 99 backdoor plugin names, and one backdoor creates a persistent data-ops43 editor account that survives plugin removal. Fixes are in UpdraftPlus 1.26.13 and 2.26.13, which disconnect pre-incident UpdraftCentral connections. Site owners should rotate keys and hunt for rogue accounts.
OVHcloud disclosed that five releases of its open-source command-line tool, versions 0.11.0 through 0.15.0, were backdoored on GitHub to steal secrets from disk. An attacker who had controlled a developer's GitHub account for more than half a year modified the existing releases because GitHub release immutability was disabled, uploading locally built malware without touching the CI/CD pipeline, and planted a hidden preinstall.js loader. OpenSourceMalware linked it to the GlassWorm campaign. The malicious builds covered macOS, Linux, and Windows and were live from 14:47 to 16:21 UTC on October 19. Source builds and Docker images were unaffected, and users should revoke secrets.
Huntress observed attackers abusing a compromised Microsoft 365 OAuth credential for ConnectWise Cloud Backup, formerly SkyKick, to sign in to 173 partner and customer tenants. The credential works against every tenant the app is consented in, letting attackers obtain Microsoft Graph tokens and reach mailboxes, files, and directory data. In at least one tenant, a ConnectWise app added itself to the Global Administrator role and created new client secrets. Token acquisition came from a single IP on October 15, moving through tenants in sorted order. ConnectWise closed Cloud Backup access until all credentials are reset, and issued tokens stay valid for up to 90 minutes.
Bloom Security disclosed a flaw in npm's Trusted Publishing, which binds a package to a GitHub repository and workflow. npm recorded the binding by repository slug rather than GitHub's permanent numeric IDs, so once a bound repository or owner was renamed, transferred, or deleted, an attacker could claim the freed slug, add a matching workflow, and receive a publish credential, even forging a valid provenance attestation. Bloom counted more than 1,500 exposed packages with over 10 million total downloads. GitHub, notified in June through HackerOne, shipped a fix in October so unvalidated configurations expire after 48 hours. It is unknown whether anyone exploited the weakness in the wild.