Microsoft is tracking a financially motivated actor it calls Storm-2949 that abuses the Microsoft 365 Self-Service Password Reset flow to hijack high-value identities and then exfiltrate as much data as possible. The actor socially engineers IT staff and senior leaders, kicks off an SSPR reset, then poses as IT support and convinces the victim to approve the resulting MFA prompt. Once in, Storm-2949 uses Graph API and custom Python to enumerate the tenant, downloads thousands of OneDrive and SharePoint files in single actions, and pivots into Azure - VMs, Key Vaults, SQL, storage - via privileged custom RBAC roles.
Microsoft has refused to issue a CVE for what an outside researcher and the CERT Coordination Center both describe as a privilege escalation in Azure Backup for Azure Kubernetes Service. The flaw lets a user holding only the low-privileged 'Backup Contributor' Azure role gain cluster-admin on AKS clusters, which Microsoft dismissed by saying the attacker 'already held administrator access.' CERT/CC validated the bug and tracked it as VU#284781. The researcher says Microsoft also tried to get MITRE to reject the submission as 'AI-generated content,' then quietly added new permission checks, suggesting a silent patch even as Microsoft says 'no product changes were made.'
Push Security disclosed ConsentFix v3, a new attack that lets criminals take over Microsoft 365 accounts even if the victim has MFA and phishing-resistant passkeys turned on. The trick: instead of stealing a password, the attacker tricks the user into pasting a Microsoft authorization URL into a phishing page during what looks like a routine login. That URL contains a one-time code that the attacker exchanges for permanent access tokens. v3 automates the whole attack with Cloudflare Pages phishing sites, Pipedream webhook automation, and tenant fingerprinting that customizes the lure to each target organization's branding.
TrustStrike Labs