Last updated: September 29, 2026 at 8:42 AM UTC
All 891 Vulnerability 357 Breach 144 Threat 383 Defense 7

Polish intelligence says hackers attacked control systems at Polish water treatment plants

Polish intelligence service ABW announced Wednesday that hackers attacked the industrial control systems at multiple Polish water treatment plants. The Record reports the targeting profile is consistent with state-aligned activity - patient reconnaissance, careful access, no data destruction. Polish authorities have not formally attributed the attack but the timing (alongside Russia-Ukraine conflict and Russia's interest in Polish infrastructure as a NATO frontline state) is unmistakable. Similar incidents have been reported in Germany, Austria, and the Netherlands over the past 12 months. No service disruption was reported, but the access establishes pre-positioning.

Check
If you run water, electric, gas, or transport infrastructure, audit your industrial control system (ICS) and SCADA networks for unfamiliar VPN connections, new remote access tool installations, or anomalous outbound traffic since January.
Affected
Water utilities, power grid operators, and other critical infrastructure operators in NATO frontline states (Poland, Baltic states, Romania, Finland) and adjacent countries. Acute risk for utilities running internet-reachable HMI or engineering workstations. Smaller municipal water utilities without dedicated OT security staff are most exposed because they cannot detect patient state-actor reconnaissance.
Fix
Air-gap or one-way-data-diode-isolate ICS networks from corporate IT where possible. Inventory and remove any unauthorized remote-access tools (TeamViewer, AnyDesk, ScreenConnect) on engineering workstations. Apply CISA's water utility cyber guidance and Poland's CERT.PL recommendations. Conduct a tabletop exercise focused on prolonged ICS reconnaissance scenarios.

North Korean hackers built a fake Korean game platform to spread Android spyware targeting ethnic Koreans living in China

ScarCruft (also called APT37 or Reaper) built a fake online gaming platform in Korean to spread BirdCall, a previously undocumented Android malware aimed at ethnic Koreans living in China. The Record reports the platform impersonated legitimate Korean-language game communities. BirdCall harvests device information, contacts, SMS, call logs, photos, and microphone audio - capabilities consistent with surveillance of diaspora communities rather than financial gain. ScarCruft has historically targeted North Korean defectors and journalists with similar Android malware lures.

Check
If your organization works with Korean-language communities or journalists covering North Korea, check Android devices for unfamiliar Korean game apps installed since early 2026. Review app permissions for SMS, contacts, and microphone access.
Affected
Android users in ethnic Korean communities in China, North Korean defectors, journalists covering North Korea, human-rights organizations, and South Korean policy researchers. Diaspora communities are the primary target. Organizations supporting diaspora communities or refugee networks face downstream risk through their constituents.
Fix
On managed Android devices: enforce Google Play Protect, block sideloading of APKs from unknown sources, and require MDM approval for any Korean-language gaming app. For at-risk individuals: reset Android devices that may have installed the fake platform, and use only verified Google Play apps. Follow Citizen Lab guidance for journalists working on North Korea topics.

Iranian hackers used Microsoft Teams chat to social-engineer victims, then dressed up their espionage as a Chaos ransomware attack to throw off blame

Rapid7 disclosed an Iranian state-sponsored intrusion that disguised itself as a Chaos ransomware attack to mask the real goal: cyber-espionage. The threat actor (assessed with moderate confidence as MuddyWater, linked to Iran's Ministry of Intelligence and Security) initiated chat requests through Microsoft Teams, walked employees into screen-sharing sessions, then captured credentials and manipulated MFA prompts. Some victims were asked to type their passwords into local text files during the call. Persistence came from a custom backdoor (Game.exe) deployed alongside DWAgent, AnyDesk, and RDP. The fake ransomware note and Chaos leak-portal entry concealed the espionage.

Check
Search Microsoft Teams logs for external chat invitations from unknown Entra tenants since January. Hunt endpoints for DWAgent, AnyDesk, ms_upd.exe, or Game.exe processes installed without IT approval.
Affected
Organizations allowing external Microsoft Teams chats by default - the campaign starts with chat invitations from attacker-controlled tenants. Acute risk for sectors MuddyWater historically targets: government, defense, telecoms, energy, and Israeli organizations. The 'IT Support' impersonation pattern works against any helpdesk-heavy enterprise. Iranian APT activity has been increasing through early 2026.
Fix
Restrict external Microsoft Teams chat to allowlisted partner tenants only. Block external screen-sharing requests by default. Brief staff that real IT support never asks them to type passwords into local files or read out MFA codes during a Teams call. Block Rapid7's published Stagecomp/Darkcomp code-signing certificate at the EDR layer.

Hackers bought Google ads pointing to a fake GoDaddy WordPress login page - any site manager who clicked saw their credentials stolen

BleepingComputer reports a phishing campaign that bought Google Ads to push a fake GoDaddy ManageWP login page to the top of search results. ManageWP is GoDaddy's centralized dashboard for managing multiple WordPress sites - so a successful phish gives the attacker simultaneous access to dozens or hundreds of sites under one account. The fake page is a near-perfect clone of managewp.com hosted on a typosquat domain; victims who enter credentials are redirected to the real site to mask the theft. Same Google Ads abuse template used recently against AWS, Notion, and other developer-tool brands.

Check
Brief staff who manage WordPress sites that they should never click Google Ads for login pages. Search proxy logs for visits to ManageWP-themed domains other than managewp.com over the past 30 days.
Affected
GoDaddy ManageWP customers, particularly agencies and freelancers managing multiple client WordPress sites under one account. Acute risk: small WordPress agencies whose ManageWP credentials enable simultaneous access to 50-500+ client sites. Anyone using GoDaddy hosting for WordPress.
Fix
Enable two-factor authentication on ManageWP accounts immediately. Reset ManageWP passwords for any user who recently clicked a Google Ads result for the brand. Add a corporate browser policy to suppress Google Ads on developer-tool searches. For agencies: rotate WordPress site credentials linked through ManageWP. Watch for unfamiliar admin user creation across managed sites.

Chinese hackers slipped a backdoor into the official DAEMON Tools installer for a month - thousands of computers in 100+ countries running tainted software signed with the real developer certificate

Kaspersky disclosed yesterday that the official DAEMON Tools installer - a popular Windows disk-image utility - has been distributing a backdoor since April 8. The trojanized versions (12.5.0.2421 through 12.5.0.2434) are downloaded from the legitimate vendor website and signed with valid AVB Disc Soft certificates. Thousands of infections recorded across 100+ countries, but follow-on payloads went to about a dozen targets in retail, scientific, government, and manufacturing sectors in Russia, Belarus, and Thailand. Kaspersky attributes the attack to Chinese-speaking actors and says it remains active. Detection took roughly a month - similar timeline to the 2023 3CX supply-chain attack.

Check
Search Windows endpoints for DAEMON Tools versions 12.5.0.2421-12.5.0.2434, and verify file hashes of DTHelper.exe, DiscSoftBusServiceLite.exe, and DTShellHlp.exe. Search proxy logs for env-check.daemontools.cc since April 8.
Affected
Windows endpoints with DAEMON Tools versions 12.5.0.2421 through 12.5.0.2434 installed since April 8, 2026. Compromised binaries are DTHelper.exe, DiscSoftBusServiceLite.exe, and DTShellHlp.exe in the DAEMON Tools install directory. Acute risk for organizations in Russia, Belarus, and Thailand and in retail, scientific, government, or manufacturing sectors - Kaspersky observed targeted second-stage payloads only on these.
Fix
Uninstall trojanized DAEMON Tools versions and reinstall from a verified clean release. Block env-check.daemontools.cc at the DNS resolver. Treat machines that ran trojanized versions as compromised: rotate credentials, hunt for QUIC RAT, and reimage if any second-stage payload is found. Apply application allowlisting to prevent vendor-signed but compromised binaries from running.

New Linux malware called 'Quasar Linux' targets developer laptops to steal credentials for npm, GitHub, AWS, and Docker - barely detected by antivirus

Trend Micro disclosed Quasar Linux (QLNX), a previously undocumented Linux remote access trojan designed for developer workstations and DevOps environments. The malware harvests credentials for npm, PyPI, GitHub, AWS, Docker, and Kubernetes - then uses them to publish trojanized packages to public registries. QLNX runs entirely fileless and in-memory, dynamically compiling its rootkit and PAM backdoor on the target host using gcc, then loading them via /etc/ld.so.preload for system-wide interception. Capabilities include a 58-command RAT, dual-layer rootkit, keylogging, SSH lateral movement, and peer-to-peer mesh networking. Only four security tools detect the binary as malicious.

Check
Hunt Linux developer machines and CI runners for /etc/ld.so.preload entries you didn't put there, /tmp/.X*-lock files outside legitimate X server use, and gcc invocations on hosts that don't normally compile code.
Affected
Linux developer workstations and DevOps environments with credential access to npm, PyPI, GitHub, AWS, Docker, or Kubernetes. Acute risk for organizations with developers running root-capable Linux desktops, particularly those whose CI/CD pipelines pull dependencies from public registries. Compromised credentials enable supply-chain attacks against the organization's own published packages.
Fix
Deploy Linux EDR with eBPF visibility on every developer machine and CI runner - QLNX hides from userland tools but eBPF-aware sensors detect the kernel-level rootkit. Restrict /etc/ld.so.preload modifications via auditd alerts. For high-risk developers: use ephemeral build environments (containers, VMs) that don't carry persistent credentials. Trend Micro published IoCs.

Phishing campaign hit 80+ companies by getting employees to install legitimate remote-access software disguised as a Social Security letter

Securonix tracked a phishing campaign called VENOMOUS#HELPER that has hit 80+ organizations (mostly in the US) since April 2025 by getting employees to install legitimate remote-monitoring software they think is a Social Security Administration document. The lure is a fake SSA email asking the recipient to download their statement; the link points to a compromised Mexican business website hosting a SimpleHelp installer. Once installed, the attackers gain SYSTEM-level access, then quietly install ConnectWise ScreenConnect as a backup channel. The pattern aligns with initial-access broker activity: quiet persistence, then sale or hand-off to ransomware operators.

Check
Hunt every Windows endpoint for SimpleHelp and ConnectWise ScreenConnect installs not authorized by IT. Search proxy logs for connections to gruta.com.mx since April 2025.
Affected
Windows endpoints in organizations without strict application allowlisting. 80+ confirmed victims, mostly US, across multiple sectors. Acute risk: companies whose staff regularly receive government correspondence (SSA, IRS, state tax) where 'verify and download' lures feel routine. Initial access brokers run these campaigns to sell footholds, so any compromised host becomes a potential ransomware launchpad weeks later.
Fix
Enforce application allowlisting on Windows endpoints to block unapproved RMM software. Remove unauthorized SimpleHelp, ScreenConnect, PDQ Connect, LogMeIn Resolve, N-able, or Fleetdeck installs and treat the host as compromised. Block Securonix's published indicators (gruta.com.mx, server.cubatiendaalimentos.com.mx) at the network egress layer. Rotate credentials on affected hosts.

China-linked group is sending 1,600 fake tax-audit emails to Indian and Russian companies, then dropping a brand-new backdoor called ABCDoor

Kaspersky tracked a China-based group called Silver Fox running a tax-themed phishing campaign against organizations in India, Russia, Indonesia, Japan, and South Africa. Phishing emails impersonate the Indian Income Tax Department or Russian tax service with subjects about audits or 'lists of tax violations.' Inside the attached archive sits a modified Rust loader that pulls down a known backdoor called ValleyRAT, plus a brand-new Python-based backdoor called ABCDoor. ABCDoor handles screen recording, keystroke control, clipboard theft, and file operations. Kaspersky logged 1,600+ phishing emails between January and February 2026 across industrial, consulting, retail, and transportation sectors.

Check
Search proxy and DNS logs for connections to abc.haijing88.com since December 2025. Hunt endpoints for pythonw.exe processes initiating outbound HTTPS to unfamiliar destinations.
Affected
Organizations in India, Russia, Indonesia, Japan, and South Africa, particularly in industrial, consulting, retail, and transportation sectors. Finance and accounting staff who routinely receive tax correspondence are the highest-risk role. Multinationals with operations in any of these regions face the same risk through local subsidiaries.
Fix
Block abc.haijing88.com and related Silver Fox infrastructure at the DNS resolver. Train finance staff that real tax correspondence never arrives as a ZIP or RAR archive of 'violations' to download. Quarantine any host running pythonw.exe with unexpected outbound HTTPS, and remove FFmpeg installations not authorized by IT. Rotate credentials on suspected compromised hosts and reimage.

Attackers are using stolen Amazon keys to send convincing phishing emails directly from Amazon's email service - bypassing every spam filter

Kaspersky reported a sharp rise in phishing campaigns sent through Amazon's Simple Email Service (SES). Because the emails come from Amazon's own infrastructure, they pass SPF, DKIM, and DMARC checks that normally catch fake-brand emails - and reputation-based blocks don't trigger because Amazon's mail servers have legitimate reputation. The pattern starts with attackers harvesting AWS access keys leaked in public GitHub repos, .env files, Docker images, and S3 buckets, then using those keys to send phishing through SES from the victim's own AWS account. Wiz documented similar abuse in 2025 with attackers escalating from sandbox mode (200 emails/day) to production mode (50,000+/day) by issuing PutAccountDetails across all AWS regions in 10 seconds.

Check
Open the SES console in every AWS region (not just your home region) and check sending statistics for unexpected volume. Search CloudTrail for ses:PutAccountDetails calls from unfamiliar IPs.
Affected
Any AWS account where IAM access keys could be exposed - public GitHub repos, .env files committed by mistake, Docker images that bundled credentials, or developer workstations. AWS accounts where SES has never been used legitimately are at acute risk because there's no baseline. Verified domain owners face inbox-reputation damage even if no breach happened on their systems.
Fix
Apply Service Control Policies that block ses:* actions in regions and accounts where SES isn't legitimately used. Replace static AWS access keys with IAM roles using short-lived credentials. Run TruffleHog or git-secrets across your repos to find leaked keys. Rotate any IAM keys older than 90 days. Configure CloudTrail alerts on SES API calls from unfamiliar IPs.

cPanel ransomware attackers are now hunting government agencies and the IT companies that manage them

Update on the cPanel ransomware wave covered May 3: attackers have shifted focus and are now targeting governments and managed service providers exploiting CVE-2026-41940. Security Affairs reports the operation is no longer just opportunistic mass-encryption of small business websites - the actors are deliberately looking for hosting accounts owned by government agencies and IT firms that manage downstream customers. CISA added the cPanel flaw to its KEV catalog Friday with a federal patch deadline of May 21. With 44,000 cPanel hosts already compromised in the initial wave, the secondary phase targeting MSPs has the potential to multiply impact through customer-tenant relationships - much like the 2023 Kaseya VSA campaign.

Check
Audit /var/cpanel/sessions/raw/ for entries created since February 23, 2026. Search for files with the .sorry extension across hosted sites. Check authentication logs for unusual successful logins between February 23 and April 28.
Affected
Government agencies, MSPs, and hosting companies running unpatched cPanel infrastructure. Particularly acute: MSPs whose cPanel instances host downstream customer accounts - a single compromise spreads to many tenants. Federal agencies under BOD 22-01 must patch by May 21. State and local governments without that mandate face the same active threat without the same enforcement.
Fix
Patch cPanel to 11.110.0.97, 11.118.0.63, 11.126.0.54, 11.132.0.29, 11.134.0.20, or 11.136.0.5. Restore from backups predating February 23 rather than just resuming operations. Rotate root, admin, and customer credentials. For MSPs: notify customers proactively before they discover compromise from a ransom note.