Last updated: November 2, 2026 at 1:20 PM UTC
All 957 Vulnerability 399 Breach 144 Threat 407 Defense 7

Trojanized Claude Code extension on Cursor Marketplace installed a persistent SSH backdoor on developer machines

OpenSourceMalware disclosed that Anthropic's official Claude Code extension was trojanized on the Cursor Marketplace, with a 66-line malicious loader inserted before the legitimate code in versions 2.1.312 and 2.1.313 for Windows and macOS. Anthropic's systems were not compromised; an actor used marketplace access to publish the tampered build. The backdoor adds an attacker SSH key labeled svc-telemetry to authorized_keys, tries to enable SSH and open a reverse tunnel to 134.209.82.225, and persists via scheduled task, crontab, and LaunchAgent, beaconing host details over plain HTTP. The malicious version was live about twelve hours on October 29, and Cursor says up to 5,000 users were affected.

Check
Identify machines that installed or auto-updated the Claude Code extension 2.1.312 or 2.1.313 from the Cursor Marketplace, then isolate them and preserve evidence.
Affected
Developers who got the trojanized extension from the Cursor Marketplace had an attacker SSH key and persistence written, even when the reverse tunnel failed without admin rights.
Fix
Remove the svc-telemetry SSH key and persistence entries, update to 2.1.314 from a trusted marketplace, rotate credentials, and note uninstalling alone leaves the artifacts behind.

Hijacked DebugBear monitoring script drains about 2.7 million dollars from Polymarket trader wallets

Hudson Rock and Ohey reported that attackers hijacked DebugBear, a real user monitoring vendor whose page-speed script Polymarket loaded, by compromising its DNS through the domain registrar rather than breaching DebugBear itself. A malicious server answered for DebugBear's addresses and served code that reused a signed-in trader's session to read stored trading API keys and move positions to the attacker, selling at worsening prices for email-login accounts. Polymarket says 726 wallets were affected and about 2.64 million dollars in POL reached the attacker within an hour, and it is returning 3.9 million dollars in total. No keys or seed phrases were exfiltrated.

Check
Inventory third-party scripts on pages that handle signing or trading, pin them with Subresource Integrity, and remove any not strictly needed.
Affected
Sites loading third-party scripts on authenticated trading or signing pages can have those scripts swapped via vendor DNS compromise to hijack sessions and move funds.
Fix
Enforce a strict content security policy and Subresource Integrity, pin and sandbox third-party scripts, and have users reject unexpected signing requests.

Gheist campaign uses stolen GitHub tokens to leak private repository secrets through Actions logs

Wiz detailed Gheist, an automated campaign that uses stolen GitHub tokens to push a sync-check.yml workflow to a short-lived ci-sync branch, then reads the job's secrets from the run log. The workflow base32-encodes every secret the job can access, defeating GitHub's log masking, downloads the log through the API, and deletes the run seconds later, so nothing leaves through an attacker server. Since September 15, Wiz recovered more than 13,500 planted branches across more than 850 compromised accounts, succeeding in private repositories and GitHub Enterprise, where GitHub's hold on suspicious runs does not apply. Rotate every reachable secret, since deleting branches does not undo exposure.

Check
Hunt for ci-sync branches containing only a sync-check.yml workflow and runs deleted shortly after finishing, and rotate every secret those repositories could access.
Affected
Private GitHub repositories and Enterprise servers reachable with a stolen token can have all their accessible secrets leaked through a planted workflow's run logs.
Fix
Rotate repository, organization, and environment secrets, revoke the tokens that pushed commits, prefer short-lived fine-grained tokens, and require reviewers on environments holding production secrets.

Planted instructions file tries to trick AI coding agents into installing malicious npm package

Forever Security caught an attempt on a customer's machine to subvert an AI coding agent through a planted instructions file. Coding agents read AGENTS.md or CLAUDE.md files in a folder and follow them, and a web page can drop such a file into Downloads without a click. The disguised file told OpenAI Codex to register a server in its global config and install the npm package function-color, part of the MALFEX campaign, which pulls a Windows payload. Against Claude Code, a CLAUDE.md tried to set ANTHROPIC_BASE_URL to an attacker server to leak the login token. Researchers say there is nothing for vendors to patch.

Check
Do not run coding agents in the Downloads folder, and read any AGENTS.md or CLAUDE.md you did not write before letting an agent act on it.
Affected
Developers whose coding agent reads an attacker-planted instructions file can have it install malicious npm packages or redirect its base URL to leak login tokens.
Fix
Keep agent approval prompts and sandboxes on, inspect config files like the Codex config and project settings for unexpected changes, and rotate tokens if a planted file is found.

Microsoft 365 token-replay campaign compromises 97 accounts across 79 organizations despite MFA

Huntress detailed a Microsoft 365 adversary-in-the-middle campaign that ran from July to September, capturing sign-in sessions behind fake login pages and replaying the stolen tokens from attacker devices within minutes, a technique it calls token spraying. From over 200,000 login attempts the attackers achieved 497 successful sign-ins, compromised 97 accounts across 79 organizations, and registered 48 rogue Entra devices. In at least 19 organizations they removed existing MFA methods and registered their own within three hours, and planted hidden inbox rules hiding payroll and deposit emails. Defenders should revoke sessions, audit Entra devices and MFA methods, and restrict the device-code workflow with Conditional Access.

Check
Hunt Microsoft 365 for rogue Entra device registrations, unexpected MFA-method changes, and hidden inbox rules, and revoke sessions for any suspected compromise.
Affected
Microsoft 365 users phished through an adversary-in-the-middle page have their post-login tokens replayed from attacker devices, bypassing MFA without reusing the password.
Fix
Reset credentials and revoke sessions, audit Entra devices and MFA methods, block legacy device-code flows with Conditional Access, and require MFA for all users and apps.

LiteLLM 1.107.0 compromised in supply chain attack delivering credential stealer and GitHub-controlled backdoor

Researchers at SafeDep, Socket, StepSecurity, and Upwind reported that LiteLLM version 1.107.0, a popular Python AI gateway, was published with malware through compromised GitHub CLI OAuth tokens belonging to three engineers. A cook.pth file runs a payload whenever the Python interpreter starts, even before LiteLLM is imported. The first stage, calling itself privcollect, harvests cloud tokens, developer credentials, private keys, AI tooling credential files, browser data, environment variables, and the proxy's saved keys and model config, exfiltrating over HTTP to litellm[.]dev/healthcheck. A second payload is a backdoor that fetches and runs further commands. The PyPI package and Docker images were pulled, and users should pin to 1.106.2.

Check
Check whether LiteLLM 1.107.0 was installed from PyPI or Docker, and if so revoke and replace all reachable credentials from a clean machine, then pin to 1.106.2.
Affected
Systems that installed LiteLLM 1.107.0 ran a credential stealer and backdoor on Python startup, exposing cloud tokens, keys, browser data, and the LiteLLM proxy's saved secrets.
Fix
Pin LiteLLM to 1.106.2 by digest, rotate every exposed credential, remove the cook.pth persistence, and block outbound traffic to the litellm.dev healthcheck exfiltration endpoint.

Attackers hijack over 300 Tor exit relays to intercept SSH sessions and steal passwords

A researcher found more than 300 malicious Tor exit relays, at their October 4 peak about 7.46 percent of exit capacity, rerouting SSH connections to twelve interception servers. The attackers edited relay torrc files to allow port 22, and each hijacked exit presented its own host key before connecting onward to the real server, so sessions worked while passwords typed by users who accepted the key were captured. Key-based logins could not be relayed. The operator of the largest affected relay family traced the root cause to the Ebury backdoor and a reused plaintext password with SSH password authentication left enabled. Tor flagged the relays by October 5.

Check
If you used SSH over Tor between October 1 and 5 and accepted a changed host key, treat typed passwords as stolen and rotate them immediately.
Affected
Users who sent SSH password logins through a hijacked Tor exit relay and accepted the interceptor's host key had their passwords and session activity captured.
Fix
Use key-based SSH rather than passwords, verify host keys, rotate any exposed credentials, and have relay operators check torrc files and hosts for the Ebury backdoor.

Attackers abuse stolen UpdraftCentral keys to install backdoor plugins on connected WordPress sites

TeamUpdraft disclosed that attackers breached its website over the October 17 weekend and reached its customer database, obtaining names, emails, hashed passwords, 2FA settings, and the UpdraftCentral connection keys that let them push backdoor plugins to connected WordPress sites. UpdraftPlus, a backup plugin with over four million installs, ships an UpdraftCentral client in every copy. Patchstack saw signed plugin.upload_plugin commands over an 18-hour window and 99 backdoor plugin names, and one backdoor creates a persistent data-ops43 editor account that survives plugin removal. Fixes are in UpdraftPlus 1.26.13 and 2.26.13, which disconnect pre-incident UpdraftCentral connections. Site owners should rotate keys and hunt for rogue accounts.

Check
Update UpdraftPlus to 1.26.13 or 2.26.13, delete the UpdraftCentral connection key, and check WordPress sites for unknown admin or editor accounts and plugins.
Affected
WordPress sites connected to cloud UpdraftCentral could receive attacker-pushed backdoor plugins and a persistent data-ops43 account that survives plugin removal and normal login unless 2FA blocks it.
Fix
Apply the fixed UpdraftPlus release, rotate UpdraftCentral and storage keys, remove rogue accounts and plugins including must-use plugins, and restore from a pre-October-17 backup if needed.

Attackers backdoor five OVHcloud CLI releases on GitHub to steal developer secrets from disk

OVHcloud disclosed that five releases of its open-source command-line tool, versions 0.11.0 through 0.15.0, were backdoored on GitHub to steal secrets from disk. An attacker who had controlled a developer's GitHub account for more than half a year modified the existing releases because GitHub release immutability was disabled, uploading locally built malware without touching the CI/CD pipeline, and planted a hidden preinstall.js loader. OpenSourceMalware linked it to the GlassWorm campaign. The malicious builds covered macOS, Linux, and Windows and were live from 14:47 to 16:21 UTC on October 19. Source builds and Docker images were unaffected, and users should revoke secrets.

Check
Identify machines that ran OVHcloud CLI versions 0.11.0 through 0.15.0, remove or update the binary, clean the systems, and revoke all secrets they could reach.
Affected
Developers who installed the backdoored OVHcloud CLI releases on macOS, Linux, or Windows had secrets stolen from disk by locally built malware uploaded to GitHub.
Fix
Update to a clean OVHcloud CLI release, rotate all exposed secrets, enable GitHub release immutability on your own repositories, and inspect hosts for the preinstall.js loader.

Threat actors abuse open-source Cairn AI agent platform to autonomously breach over 100 organizations

AI security firm Norforge reported that multiple threat actors abused Cairn, an open-source engine that coordinates AI agents and can act as an autonomous penetration testing tool, after some operators left their control panels exposed. One Chinese-language cluster ran over 1,100 attack projects against e-commerce and payment infrastructure in the US, Japan, and Australia, seeking persistent webshell access, and Reuters reported more than 100 breached companies including John Deere and SharkNinja. Other clusters targeted payment card and cryptocurrency theft. Norforge found roughly a 10 percent success rate and hundreds of harvested secrets. Named indicators of compromise are in Norforge's primary report rather than the summary coverage.

Check
Watch for autonomous-agent attack patterns against public web and payment apps, hunt for unexpected webshells and admin-panel access, and pull indicators from Norforge's report.
Affected
Internet-facing e-commerce, payment, and admin applications are being targeted at scale by AI agent platforms that deploy webshells and harvest secrets for persistent access.
Fix
Harden and monitor public web applications, enforce least privilege on admin panels, rotate exposed secrets, and apply the detection indicators in Norforge's primary report.