RSS
Last updated: May 13, 2026 at 5:42 AM UTC
All 208 Vulnerability 72 Breach 41 Threat 88 Defense 7

TeamPCP supply-chain worm 'Mini Shai-Hulud' hits TanStack, Mistral AI, UiPath, OpenSearch, and Guardrails AI - 170 packages, 401 malicious versions, 518 million weekly downloads (CVE-2026-45321)

TeamPCP launched its largest supply-chain attack to date on May 11, compromising 170+ npm and PyPI packages with 518 million combined weekly downloads. The attackers chained three GitHub Actions vulnerabilities to publish 401 malicious versions carrying valid SLSA Build Level 3 attestations - cryptographically indistinguishable from legitimate releases. Affected packages include TanStack, Mistral AI (npm and PyPI), UiPath, OpenSearch, and Guardrails AI. The worm installs a persistent gh-token-monitor daemon that triggers 'rm -rf ~/' if tokens get revoked, and includes a probabilistic full-disk-wipe routine for Israeli and Iranian locales.

Check
Audit lockfiles for @tanstack/* (84 affected versions), @uipath/* (66 versions), @mistralai/*, opensearch-project/opensearch 3.5.3-3.8.0, guardrails-ai 0.10.1, mistralai 2.4.6.
Affected
Any Node.js or Python environment that installed compromised packages between May 11 and registry takedown. CI/CD pipelines, developer workstations, AI/ML environments. Crypto wallets and password managers (1Password, Bitwarden) are primary exfil targets.
Fix
Remove gh-token-monitor daemon BEFORE revoking tokens (~/Library/LaunchAgents macOS, ~/.config/systemd/user/ Linux) - removal first prevents triggering the wipe. Pin lockfiles to clean versions. Rotate all npm tokens, GitHub PATs, cloud credentials, and crypto wallet seeds.

Checkmarx Jenkins AST plugin backdoored by TeamPCP - third Checkmarx supply chain hit since late March

TeamPCP, the group behind the March Trivy breach and Shai-Hulud npm worm, used credentials stolen in that March attack to publish a backdoored version of Checkmarx's Jenkins AST plugin to the Jenkins Marketplace. This is the third Checkmarx supply-chain hit since late March. The rogue version 2026.5.09 went up on May 9, outside Checkmarx's normal release process - no git tag, no GitHub release. Checkmarx says its GitHub repos are isolated from customer production and no customer data is stored there, but anyone who installed the bad plugin should assume their CI credentials are compromised, rotate them all, and hunt for lateral movement.

Check
Check whether your Jenkins instances have the Checkmarx AST plugin installed. If yes, verify the running version - anything dated 2026.5.09 in the version string is the malicious build.
Affected
Any Jenkins instance running the rogue Checkmarx Jenkins AST plugin version 2026.5.09, which was published to the Jenkins Marketplace on May 9, 2026, between then and Checkmarx's takedown. The plugin was outside Checkmarx's normal release pipeline and lacked both a git tag and a GitHub release.
Fix
Roll back to version 2.0.13-829.vc72453fa_1c16 published December 17, 2025, or any earlier officially-tagged build. Rotate every credential the Jenkins host had access to, including cloud API keys, source-repo tokens, deployment keys, and signing certificates. Hunt for lateral movement from the Jenkins host. Pull Checkmarx's published IoC list from their Support Portal and run it across your environment.

TrickMo Android banker hides command-and-control inside Telegram's TON blockchain network to dodge takedowns

The TrickMo Android banking malware now routes its command-and-control through The Open Network (TON), the decentralized peer-to-peer network originally built around Telegram, making the C2 infrastructure much harder to identify or take down. ThreatFabric (which tracks this variant as Trickmo.C) has been watching it since January in campaigns hitting users in France, Italy, and Austria. The malware disguises itself as TikTok or streaming apps and steals banking credentials and crypto wallet keys via phishing overlays, keylogging, SMS interception, OTP suppression, and live screen recording. The new variant also adds SSH tunneling, port forwarding, and SOCKS5 proxy commands, turning infected phones into a pivot point.

Check
Check MDM logs for users in France, Italy, or Austria who side-loaded apps masquerading as TikTok or streaming services since January 2026. Flag corporate phones showing outbound TON network traffic.
Affected
Android devices belonging to users in France, Italy, and Austria that side-loaded apps disguised as TikTok or streaming services. Banking and cryptocurrency-wallet credentials, SMS-delivered OTPs, screen contents, and keystrokes are all at risk. The TON-based C2 means traditional domain blocking and DNS-based filters will miss this malware family entirely.
Fix
Confirm Google Play Protect is active and side-loading is blocked on all managed Android devices. For potentially infected users, perform a full factory reset, reinstall apps only from Google Play, and reset banking and cryptocurrency credentials from a known-clean device. Add TON .adnl traffic to egress monitoring - while you cannot decrypt it, unusual volumes from corporate networks are a signal.

GhostLock proof-of-concept abuses Windows file-sharing API to disrupt file access without encryption

A researcher at Israel Aerospace Industries published a proof-of-concept tool called GhostLock that uses a legitimate Windows API call to make files unreadable without encrypting anything. The technique abuses the dwShareMode parameter of CreateFileW - setting it to 0 grants the calling process exclusive access, so every other user or app trying to open the file gets a sharing violation. GhostLock automates this recursively across SMB shares from a standard domain user account, no elevation required. Researcher Kim Dvash frames it as a disruption attack, not destructive - data is not lost, but operational downtime can mirror a ransomware incident.

Check
Review your EDR and SIEM detection rules for behavior-based ransomware indicators. Verify they cover sharing-violation spikes and ShareAccess=0 file-open counts, not just mass file write or encryption activity.
Affected
Windows file servers and SMB shares in environments where any standard domain user account can authenticate. No CVE has been assigned - GhostLock abuses intended Windows file-sharing behavior, not a flaw. Behavioral detection systems focused on mass writes or encryption operations will not flag this attack pattern; the attack also requires no elevation.
Fix
Implement detection at the file server layer: monitor per-session open-file counts with ShareAccess=0 - the reliable signal Dvash identifies, which lives in storage platform management interfaces, not Windows event logs or EDR telemetry. Pull the SIEM queries and NDR rule from the GhostLock whitepaper as a detection template. Limit which domain user accounts have read or write access to critical shares.

Mr_Rot13 actor exploits cPanel CVE-2026-41940 to deploy cross-platform 'Filemanager' backdoor

QiAnXin XLab has tied the ongoing exploitation of cPanel's CVE-2026-41940 to a previously-quiet threat actor it tracks as Mr_Rot13, who has been operating since at least 2020. The attack chain exploits the cPanel and WHM authentication bypass to drop a Go-based infector that adds an attacker SSH key, plants a PHP web shell, and serves a fake login page to steal cPanel credentials (ROT13-encoded, exfiltrated to wrned[.]com). The final payload is a cross-platform backdoor called Filemanager that runs on Windows, macOS, and Linux. XLab counts over 2,000 attacker source IPs currently scanning for this flaw.

Check
Search cPanel and WHM authentication logs for unusual successful logins since April 28. Check /root/.ssh/authorized_keys on every cPanel host for unknown public keys, and search web roots for unfamiliar PHP files.
Affected
Any cPanel or WHM installation that was not patched against CVE-2026-41940 between disclosure on April 28, 2026, and now. Indicators of Mr_Rot13 compromise include the SSH public key added under root, the wrned[.]com credential exfiltration domain, the cp.dene[.]de[.]com infector source, and the wpsock[.]com Filemanager delivery domain.
Fix
If still unpatched, install the cPanel fix for CVE-2026-41940 immediately. On any host that was internet-exposed and unpatched, assume compromise: remove unknown SSH keys from root, sweep for unfamiliar PHP web shells, block the indicator domains wrned[.]com, cp.dene[.]de[.]com, and wpsock[.]com at egress, rotate cPanel and WHM root credentials, and check bash_history for evidence of attacker reconnaissance.

Mac malware campaign uses Google ads and 'Apple Support' Claude.ai chats to install infostealer

Hackers are buying Google ads that look like they go to claude.ai - and they do go to a real claude.ai page. But the page is a shared Claude chat dressed up as 'Apple Support' walking users through installing Claude on a Mac. The instructions tell people to paste a command into Terminal that quietly downloads MacSync, a Mac infostealer that grabs saved browser passwords, cookies, and contents of macOS Keychain (where Mac stores logins and keys). Because both the ad and the page are real claude.ai links, there is no fake domain to spot. Researcher Berk Albayrak first reported the campaign; BleepingComputer found a second active variant.

Check
Check macOS endpoint logs for Terminal executions of curl or base64 piped to bash in the last 7 days, and review who clicked sponsored Google results for 'Claude mac download'.
Affected
macOS users who searched Google for 'Claude mac download' or similar terms and ran a Terminal command from a shared Claude.ai chat attributed to 'Apple Support'. Two payload variants seen: a MacSync infostealer that exfiltrates Keychain and browser secrets, and a polymorphic in-memory shell payload that profiles the host and delivers a second stage via osascript.
Fix
Rotate browser-saved passwords and macOS Keychain credentials for any user who may have run the malicious command. Sign out and re-authenticate browser sessions to invalidate stolen cookies. Block the indicator domains customroofingcontractors[.]com and bernasibutuwqu2[.]com at network egress. Reinforce with users that they should never install software from chat or terminal instructions - only from official vendor download pages.

Hackers replaced installers on the official JDownloader website with a Windows remote access trojan - third 'trusted software website hijack' in a month

JDownloader's official website was compromised between May 5-7 and the alternative Windows installer plus the Linux shell installer were replaced with malware. The Windows payload is a Python-based remote access trojan; the Linux installer establishes root persistence and pulls additional binaries. Attackers exploited an unpatched flaw in the website's CMS that let them change download links without authentication. macOS downloads, Flatpak/Winget/Snap packages, and the main JDownloader.jar weren't touched. Third 'trusted software site' hijacked in 30 days after CPUID (CPU-Z, HWMonitor) in April and DAEMON Tools last week.

Check
Audit endpoints for JDownloader installations made between May 5 23:55 UTC and May 7. Check Programs and Features for publishers signed by 'Zipline LLC' or 'The Water Team' rather than 'AppWork GmbH'.
Affected
Windows endpoints that downloaded JDownloader through 'Download Alternative Installer' between May 5 23:55 UTC and May 7. Linux endpoints that ran the shell installer in the same window. Acute risk: any host running the malicious installer should be considered fully compromised. Unaffected: macOS users, Flatpak/Winget/Snap installs, in-app updates, and the main JDownloader.jar.
Fix
Reinstall the operating system on any host that ran a malicious JDownloader installer - the developers explicitly recommend this rather than scan-and-clean. Reset every credential entered on the host since installation: browser-stored passwords, SSH keys, cloud tokens. For corporate fleets running JDownloader: switch to Winget or Flatpak distribution channels.

A fake OpenAI repository on Hugging Face reached the trending #1 spot before getting caught - 244,000 downloads delivered an infostealer that grabs browser passwords, crypto wallets, and Discord tokens

HiddenLayer disclosed a malicious Hugging Face repository called Open-OSS/privacy-filter that typosquatted OpenAI's legitimate Privacy Filter project. The repo copied the original model card almost verbatim and shipped a loader.py file that, on Windows, fetched and executed an infostealer. The repo briefly hit Hugging Face's trending list at #1 and accumulated 244,000 downloads before the platform pulled it on May 7. The loader runs in an invisible PowerShell window, escalates privileges, adds itself to Microsoft Defender exclusions, and deploys Sefirah - a Rust-based infostealer that targets browser credentials, Discord tokens, cryptocurrency wallets, and SSH keys.

Check
Search proxy and DNS logs for connections to Hugging Face repository 'Open-OSS/privacy-filter' or downloads of 'loader.py' tied to it since April. Hunt Windows endpoints for sefirah.exe and unfamiliar Microsoft Defender exclusions.
Affected
Windows machines whose users downloaded from Open-OSS/privacy-filter between late April and May 7. AI/ML developers are the highest-risk role. Acute risk: developers whose machines hold cryptocurrency wallets, Discord tokens, and SSH keys to production. Cryptocurrency holders specifically targeted by Sefirah's wallet-extraction modules.
Fix
Block Open-OSS/privacy-filter at the network egress layer. For machines that may have run the loader: rotate every browser-stored credential, Discord token, SSH key, and cryptocurrency wallet seed. Enforce signature verification for Hugging Face models pulled into production. Treat all Hugging Face repositories as untrusted by default. Apply HiddenLayer's published Sefirah IoCs.

ShinyHunters is now extorting individual schools using stolen Canvas data - thousands of K-12 districts and universities receiving direct ransom demands

Update on the Instructure breach we covered May 4: ShinyHunters has shifted from extorting Instructure itself to extorting individual schools and universities with their own Canvas data. BleepingComputer and Krebs on Security report that 8,800+ institutions have received direct ransom demands referencing real student records, teacher accounts, and gradebook data from their own Canvas tenants. The campaign mirrors the 2025 PowerSchool aftermath. Some schools are receiving demands sized to the institution. Krebs notes affected schools are scrambling to comply with state student-privacy laws while negotiating with attackers.

Check
If your school uses Canvas, check whether you've received any direct extortion communications referencing real Canvas data since May 4. Audit Canvas API access logs for bulk data exports between February and April.
Affected
8,800+ schools, universities, and corporate training organizations using Canvas. K-12 districts face acute risk under state student-privacy laws (NY 2-d, California SOPIPA, ~130 similar statutes) plus COPPA for under-13 student data. Universities face FERPA exposure. Smaller institutions without legal counsel are most likely to pay rather than report.
Fix
Do not respond directly to extortion communications - report to FBI IC3 first and consult legal counsel before any contact. Notify affected students, parents, and faculty per state notification timelines (most require 30-60 days). Issue COPPA and FERPA notifications where applicable. Rotate Canvas API keys and re-authorize integrations. Track Instructure's response separately - many schools report the vendor unresponsive on individual cases.

New Linux backdoor 'PamDOORa' silently steals SSH credentials from every user logging into a compromised server - and erases its tracks from the logs

Group-IB and Flare disclosed PamDOORa, a new Linux backdoor for sale on the Russian-speaking Rehub cybercrime forum at $900 (down from $1,600). PamDOORa hijacks the Linux Pluggable Authentication Module (PAM) framework that handles SSH logins - so it intercepts every legitimate user's password as they authenticate, before any application-level logging fires. The backdoor injects a malicious pam_linux.so module into the authentication stack rather than replacing files. It also tampers with lastlog, btmp, utmp, and wtmp to erase attacker login traces - meaning incident response teams who SSH in to investigate will have their own credentials silently stolen. Group-IB notes the abuse method is not yet in MITRE ATT&CK.

Check
Audit /etc/pam.d/ for unfamiliar pam_*.so modules, particularly pam_linux.so. Compare loaded PAM modules against your distribution's default set. Hunt /tmp for files with random names containing XOR-encrypted credential captures.
Affected
All x86_64 Linux servers running OpenSSH for remote access. PamDOORa is post-exploitation, so attackers must already have root - but once installed it captures every SSH credential and persists invisibly. Acute risk: any Linux server compromised at any point in the past, regardless of remediation - PamDOORa survives standard cleanup unless PAM-specific auditing was performed.
Fix
Enable SELinux or AppArmor in enforcing mode to constrain PAM module loading. Install Auditd with DISA-STIG rules to alert on /etc/pam.d/ changes. Deploy rkhunter or chkrootkit for routine PAM rootkit detection. Treat any compromised Linux server as having fully exposed credentials - rotate every SSH key, password, and token.