Last updated: August 19, 2026 at 1:47 AM UTC
All 741 Vulnerability 286 Breach 129 Threat 319 Defense 7

Netherlands seizes 800 servers of Stark Industries successor WorkTitans/THE.Hosting - links to NoName057(16) Russian hacktivists

The Dutch Financial Crime Investigation Service (FIOD) has arrested two men and seized 800 servers during raids on data centers in Dronten and Schiphol-Rijk that hosted infrastructure for cyberattacks, disinformation, and influence operations tied to sanctioned Russian and Belarusian entities. The 57-year-old company director and a 39-year-old connectivity provider face charges of indirectly providing economic resources to EU-sanctioned parties. The web hosting company Stark Industries was sanctioned by the EU last May; investigators say its infrastructure was simply transferred to a newly created Dutch company called WorkTitans B.V., trading under THE.Hosting. Mirhosting, which provided physical colocation and connectivity, denies knowingly supporting illegal operations.

Check
Search egress logs for connections to Stark Industries or THE.Hosting / WorkTitans IP ranges since 2022. Cross-reference with NoName057(16) DDoS infrastructure published by national CERTs.
Affected
Targets of pro-Russian disinformation, DDoS, and influence operations - particularly EU government, banking, and critical-infrastructure sectors. NoName057(16) frequently targets Ukrainian allies.
Fix
Block known Stark Industries / WorkTitans / Mirhosting IP ranges at the perimeter where there is no legitimate business need. Refresh DDoS protection runbooks for NoName057(16) campaigns.

Calypso (Red Lamassu) Chinese APT hits APAC and Middle East telcos with Showboat Linux SOCKS5 backdoor and JMFBackdoor Windows RAT

Lumen Black Lotus Labs and PwC Threat Intelligence have detailed a Chinese cyber-espionage campaign tied to the Calypso group (also tracked as Red Lamassu) that has been hitting telecommunications providers across Asia Pacific and parts of the Middle East since mid-2022. The operators run a Linux post-exploitation framework called Showboat (or kworker) that doubles as a SOCKS5 proxy and port-forwarder, plus a Windows RAT called JMFBackdoor delivered via DLL-sideloading of fltMC.exe + FLTLIB.dll. Showboat retrieves a 'hide' command from public dead-drops like Pastebin to mask its process. The tooling appears to be shared across multiple China-aligned clusters targeting distinct victim sets.

Check
Hunt telco environments for processes named kworker or fltMC.exe with anomalous DLL loads (FLTLIB.dll). Inspect outbound traffic for SOCKS5 traffic to unexpected destinations. Check Pastebin requests.
Affected
Telecommunications providers across Asia Pacific and the Middle East. Multiple China-aligned clusters share the Showboat and JMFBackdoor tooling and certificate-generation patterns across distinct victim sets.
Fix
Block dead-drop dependencies by restricting Pastebin and similar code-paste domains at egress. Hunt for fltMC.exe sideloaded with non-Microsoft FLTLIB.dll. Apply Lumen Black Lotus Labs and PwC IoCs.

First VPN service taken offline by Europol - 33 servers in 27 countries seized, Ukrainian operator questioned, used in ransomware

A joint operation between French, Dutch and 14 other authorities, coordinated by Europol and Eurojust, has taken down First VPN, a privacy-focused VPN service that was advertised on cybercrime forums as a no-logs option that ignored law enforcement requests. Authorities seized 33 servers across 27 countries, took down the 1vpns.com, 1vpns.net, 1vpns.org domains and the onion mirrors, and questioned a Ukrainian suspect. Investigators infiltrated the infrastructure before takedown and pulled the user database, sharing 506 user identifications and 83 intelligence packages internationally. Europol says the service name turned up in nearly every major cybercrime investigation it has supported in recent years.

Check
Search VPN allowlists and detection alerts for users connecting from First VPN exit IPs in the last two years. Check 1vpns.com / 1vpns.net / 1vpns.org references in firewall and proxy logs.
Affected
Investigators or threat hunters whose historical IoC sets included First VPN exit IPs. 506 specific users have been internationally referred; affected parties should expect law-enforcement contact.
Fix
Refresh detection rules with seized First VPN exit IPs once Europol shares them. If your historical attacker IoCs included First VPN nodes, re-correlate against the freshly identified users.

Alleged Kimwolf IoT botmaster 'Dort' arrested in Ottawa, charged in US and Canada - swatting attacks against researchers cited

Krebs on Security reports that Jacob Butler, the 18-year-old Ottawa resident allegedly known online as 'Dort,' has been arrested and charged in both the US and Canada with running the Kimwolf IoT botnet. KrebsOnSecurity unmasked Butler as the operator on February 28 by tying together his email addresses, forum registrations, and public Telegram and Discord posts. Dort later threatened and swatted researchers including Synthient's Ben Brundage. Ontario Provincial Police executed a search warrant in Ottawa on March 19 and seized devices. Kimwolf competed with Aisuru, JackSkid, and Mossad for the same vulnerable-IoT population. Butler faces up to 10 years if extradited and convicted in the US.

Check
Search EDR and netflow telemetry for outbound connections from IoT devices to known Kimwolf, Aisuru, JackSkid, and Mossad C2 sets. Inventory unpatched IoT devices on residential and SMB networks.
Affected
IoT devices - mostly routers, NVRs, and consumer IP cameras - vulnerable to the unpatched flaws Kimwolf was using to spread. Synthient helped patch the underlying weakness earlier this year.
Fix
Update firmware on all IoT and network-edge devices and disable WAN-side admin interfaces. Block known Kimwolf C2 ranges. Monitor for the lateral spread patterns documented by Synthient.

Underminr domain-fronting attack hijacks brand reputations via CDN trust - 42% of websites globally, 51% in US, vulnerable

ADAMnetworks researchers have disclosed Underminr, a domain-fronting attack that abuses how major content delivery networks resolve HTTP requests, letting an attacker route malicious traffic so it appears to come from trusted brand domains. Protective DNS filters see the DNS lookup for the legitimate site and wave it through. ADAMnetworks estimates 42% of websites globally are vulnerable, 51% in the US, around one-third in Eastern Europe, and under 9% in China's heavily-regulated internet. The researchers say attackers are already using the technique. Boutique security-focused CDNs that perform domain verification are not vulnerable; the larger general-purpose providers carry most of the exposure.

Check
Inventory CDN providers and check whether each performs domain verification (validates Host header at edge). Search egress logs for traffic resolving a trusted domain but landing on attacker infrastructure.
Affected
Roughly 42% of websites worldwide, 51% in the US, hosted on CDNs that do not perform strict Host-header verification. Boutique CDNs that verify ownership are not vulnerable.
Fix
Move sensitive properties to CDNs that perform strict domain verification. Audit Protective DNS allowlists and pair them with TLS SNI or HTTP-Host inspection downstream. Treat domain-only allowlists as weak.

Hunt.io: Saudi Telecom hosts 72% of Middle East C2 servers; 1,350+ servers across 98 providers in 14 countries

Hunt.io has mapped 1,350+ command-and-control servers spread across 98 providers in 14 Middle Eastern countries over three months. Saudi Telecom Company (STC) hosts 981 of them - 72.4% of all observed regional C2 - the largest single-provider concentration the researchers have seen globally. Most of STC's hosting appears to be compromised customer systems rather than deliberate bulletproof hosting, but the effect is the same. Other heavy hosts include SERVERS TECH FZCO (UAE), OMC (Israel), Türk Telekom, and Iraqi provider Regxa, which Hunt.io flags as the highest bulletproof-hosting profile observed. Named campaigns hosted on this infrastructure include Eagle Werewolf espionage, DYNOWIPER attacks on Poland's energy sector, and RondoDox.

Check
Add STC, SERVERS TECH FZCO, OMC, Türk Telekom, and Regxa to your provider-level egress monitoring and threat-intel correlation. Pull Hunt.io's published IoC list for the named campaigns.
Affected
Any organization whose users or systems communicate with Middle Eastern infrastructure. Provider-level visibility (versus per-IP) is now the more durable signal as attackers rotate domains and IPs daily.
Fix
Shift detection rules from per-IP IoCs to provider/ASN-level monitoring where business-justified. Block known bulletproof providers like Regxa at egress. Add Cobalt Strike, AsyncRAT, Mirai, and Sliver beacon hunts.

Webworm Chinese APT adds EchoCreep (Discord C2) and GraphWorm (MS Graph API C2) backdoors, targets European governments

ESET has documented Chinese-aligned threat actor Webworm adding two new custom backdoors to its toolset: EchoCreep, which uses a Discord channel for command-and-control, and GraphWorm, which routes C2 through the Microsoft Graph API and uploads exfiltrated files to OneDrive. Webworm is staging tools out of a GitHub repository disguised as a WordPress fork and has been observed targeting government organizations in Belgium, Italy, Serbia, Poland, Spain, and a university in South Africa. The earliest EchoCreep Discord commands date to March 21, 2024; about 433 messages have been sent through the channel. Initial access is still unclear, but dirsearch and nuclei are involved.

Check
Search outbound traffic and EDR logs for connections to Discord webhook and CDN domains and Microsoft Graph API endpoints from unexpected hosts. Look for SoftEther VPN binaries on European-government endpoints.
Affected
Government organizations in Belgium, Italy, Serbia, Poland, Spain, and a South African university - Webworm's known European targets. The Graph and Discord C2 patterns also apply to other Chinese APTs.
Fix
Block Webworm GitHub staging repos and ESET-published IoCs. Restrict outbound Discord and Graph API usage where not a legitimate business need. Hunt for dirsearch and nuclei scan signatures.

Ukraine cyber-police identifies 18-year-old Odesa infostealer operator linked to 28,000 stolen accounts and $721K California fraud

Ukrainian cyberpolice working with US law enforcement have identified an 18-year-old man from Odesa as the suspected operator of an infostealer operation that ran from 2024 through 2025 against customers of a California online retailer. The malware harvested 28,000 customer accounts; the operators used about 5,800 of them to make $721,000 in unauthorized purchases, leaving the retailer with around $250,000 in direct losses including chargebacks. The suspect ran the back-end infrastructure for processing and selling stolen session tokens. Police searched two residences and seized computers, phones, and bank cards. No arrest has been announced yet.

Check
Search HIBP and stealer-log marketplaces for your domain. If you run e-commerce, audit accounts with card-not-present orders that didn't match the legitimate user's device fingerprint in 2024-2025.
Affected
Customers of an unnamed California online retailer; 28,000 accounts harvested, 5,800 used in $721K of unauthorized purchases. Operation linked to a single 18-year-old in Odesa, Ukraine.
Fix
For affected users: rotate passwords, revoke active sessions, check card statements. For retailers: deploy session-binding device fingerprinting and require re-authentication for high-value card-not-present orders.

B1ack's Stash dark-web carding marketplace dumps 4.6 million credit-card records for free as 'punishment' for seller misconduct

B1ack's Stash, a dark-web carding marketplace operating since at least 2023, has released roughly 4.6 million stolen credit-card records as a free download. The market frames the dump as punishment for sellers caught reselling its data on rival platforms; SOCRadar says the marketplace also suspended about 8 million additional CVV2 records. The records include full PAN, CVV2, expiration date, billing address, full name, email, phone number, and IP address, which makes them directly usable for card-not-present fraud and account-opening fraud. This is the third free dump B1ack's Stash has used as a customer-acquisition tactic since its 2024 emergence.

Check
Run BIN lookups across the leaked card ranges (via SOCRadar or Recorded Future feeds your IR partner provides) for your issued cards. Increase card-not-present fraud monitoring for 30-60 days.
Affected
Roughly 4.6 million cardholders in the dump - mostly US, Canada, UK, Australia, Puerto Rico per historical B1ack's Stash regional distribution. Direct fraud-of-card risk for all holders.
Fix
For impacted issuers: pre-emptive reissue of cards seen in the dump. For consumers: monitor card statements, enable transaction notifications, and freeze cards if anomalous transactions appear. Phishing risk also elevated.

Shai-Hulud wave: 600+ npm @antv packages compromised in one hour, GitHub Action 'actions-cool' tag hijack linked

Between 01:56 and 02:56 UTC on May 19, a Shai-Hulud-flavored attack published 639 malicious versions across 323 npm packages, mostly in the @antv chart and graph namespace, after compromising the maintainer account 'atool.' Affected libraries include @antv/g2, @antv/g6, echarts-for-react, timeago.js, and jest-canvas-mock (still 10M monthly downloads despite three years dormant). A linked attack hijacked 15 tags of the 'actions-cool' GitHub Action and replaced them with a credential stealer that reads runner memory and exfils to t.m-kosche[.]com - the same domain as the @antv campaign. Socket and Aikido say there are now 2,900+ GitHub repos generated by this wave.

Check
Audit package lockfiles and CI logs for installs of any @antv/* package or timeago.js, size-sensor, jest-canvas-mock, echarts-for-react published on May 19. Search workflows for 'actions-cool/maintain-one-comment@<tag>' references.
Affected
Developers and CI/CD pipelines that installed @antv packages or used the actions-cool GitHub Actions between May 19 01:56 UTC and the npm registry takedown.
Fix
Pin GitHub Actions to full commit SHAs, not tags. Block egress to t.m-kosche.com. Rotate every developer token, npm token, cloud credential, and SSH key on machines that ran affected builds.