The Incus project reported, and Canonical confirmed, CVE-2026-112816, a flaw rated 10.0 in LXD and MicroCloud that lets an attacker with network access to the HTTPS API impersonate any trusted client. The server checked each certificate the client sent against the trust store, but a TLS connection only proves the client holds the private key for the leaf certificate, so an attacker can attach a trusted client's non-secret public certificate behind their own and be accepted as that client. Fixes are in LXD 6.10.1, 5.21.9, 5.0.11, and 4.0.15, MicroCloud 3.4.1 and 2.1.5, and Incus 7.6.0. No exploitation is reported, and a standalone LXD server does not expose the API by default.
OpenSourceMalware disclosed that Anthropic's official Claude Code extension was trojanized on the Cursor Marketplace, with a 66-line malicious loader inserted before the legitimate code in versions 2.1.312 and 2.1.313 for Windows and macOS. Anthropic's systems were not compromised; an actor used marketplace access to publish the tampered build. The backdoor adds an attacker SSH key labeled svc-telemetry to authorized_keys, tries to enable SSH and open a reverse tunnel to 134.209.82.225, and persists via scheduled task, crontab, and LaunchAgent, beaconing host details over plain HTTP. The malicious version was live about twelve hours on October 29, and Cursor says up to 5,000 users were affected.
Drupal disclosed CVE-2026-118539, a highly critical missing-authorization flaw in Drupal Commerce Core that it says is actively exploited in the wild. The advisory states the module does not sufficiently protect certain routes and entity fields, leading to an access bypass that may financially impact the vendor, though Drupal gave no detail on the attacks. It affects Commerce Core versions up to 2.41 and from 3.0.0 through 3.3.13, with fixes in Commerce Core 3.3.13 for the 3.x line and 8.x-2.41 for earlier versions. Store operators should update immediately and review orders and permissions for signs of abuse.
Wordfence blocked 62,969 attacks in 24 hours against a WordPress Core remote code execution flaw, rated 8.1 and tracked under GitHub advisory GHSA-4w3m-c66w-69mg with no CVE assigned. The flaw stems from predictable, web-accessible staging paths used during full-package core upgrades: new files, including the WordPress installer, are unpacked into a predictable wp-content/upgrade directory, and an unauthenticated attacker who requests the installer at the right moment can reach PHP code execution by winning a narrow race condition. It affects WordPress 4.7 through 7.1.3 and is fixed in 7.1.4, released October 28. Attackers are polling paths such as setup-config.php.
CISA added two more Ivanti Connect Secure flaws to its Known Exploited Vulnerabilities catalog, CVE-2026-111357, a missing-authentication privilege escalation rated 8.8, and CVE-2026-118527, a predictable-identifier file upload rated 4.3. They are part of the same chain the actor UTA0576 weaponized earlier in October with the authentication bypass CVE-2026-104935 to reach unauthenticated root, as documented by Volexity. The two new flaws are fixed in Ivanti Connect Secure 25.1.1.3 and 22.8R2.6. Federal agencies must patch CVE-2026-111357 by November 2 and CVE-2026-118527 by November 13, and other operators should treat exposed appliances as urgent.
Hudson Rock and Ohey reported that attackers hijacked DebugBear, a real user monitoring vendor whose page-speed script Polymarket loaded, by compromising its DNS through the domain registrar rather than breaching DebugBear itself. A malicious server answered for DebugBear's addresses and served code that reused a signed-in trader's session to read stored trading API keys and move positions to the attacker, selling at worsening prices for email-login accounts. Polymarket says 726 wallets were affected and about 2.64 million dollars in POL reached the attacker within an hour, and it is returning 3.9 million dollars in total. No keys or seed phrases were exfiltrated.
The Bytecode Alliance patched two critical flaws in Wasmtime's Cranelift compiler, CVE-2026-115889 affecting all architectures and CVE-2026-115893 affecting ARM64, both rated 9.9, that let a user-controlled WebAssembly module escape the sandbox and run arbitrary code. CVE-2026-115889 came from 24-bit value-tracking fields that overflowed silently and produced incorrect machine code, and CVE-2026-115893 let an oversized br_table jump to the wrong location on ARM64. Fixes are in versions 36.0.19, 48.0.7, 49.0.4, and 50.0.0, released October 20, which also refuse to compile a br_table with more than 65,520 targets. No exploitation has been reported.
OpenAI's Codex Security team reported CVE-2026-111497, a memory corruption flaw in Google's Brotli decoder that Google rates 9.2, where crafted compressed data overwrites past a buffer and can crash, leak memory, or run attacker code. Because the vulnerable C code is bundled widely, every program shipping it inherits the bug, including Node.js, Bun, .NET, Envoy, Istio, Python Brotli bindings, the Ruby gem, and others, with FFmpeg, ClickHouse, and Apache Arrow also affected. Each project needs its own update, such as Node.js 24.22.1 or Bun 1.4.4. Imperva demonstrated code execution on Node.js 24, calling it Node2Shell, but no in-the-wild exploitation is reported.
Cyberdione Labs researcher Erica Windisch published lab research called Tailworm showing that Tailscale SSH port forwarding could let an already-compromised device escalate to root on other servers in a tailnet. Tailscale SSH authorizes by device rather than user credentials, and with port forwarding enabled the researcher connected the root-level Tailscale process to privileged system sockets, then used a race condition to capture a device-enrollment key and enroll a rogue server, a step blocked by Tailnet Lock. She tested Tailscale 1.104.2 and headscale 0.29.5. No CVE or fix existed at publication on October 25, no in-the-wild attacks are reported, and Tailscale is working on fixes.
Wiz detailed Gheist, an automated campaign that uses stolen GitHub tokens to push a sync-check.yml workflow to a short-lived ci-sync branch, then reads the job's secrets from the run log. The workflow base32-encodes every secret the job can access, defeating GitHub's log masking, downloads the log through the API, and deletes the run seconds later, so nothing leaves through an attacker server. Since September 15, Wiz recovered more than 13,500 planted branches across more than 850 compromised accounts, succeeding in private repositories and GitHub Enterprise, where GitHub's hold on suspicious runs does not apply. Rotate every reachable secret, since deleting branches does not undo exposure.