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Last updated: May 13, 2026 at 5:42 AM UTC
All 208 Vulnerability 72 Breach 41 Threat 88 Defense 7

Microsoft's May 2026 Patch Tuesday fixes 120 flaws and no zero-days for the first time since June 2024 - but a Word preview-pane bug and DNS Client RCE stand out as the priorities

Microsoft fixed 120 vulnerabilities on Tuesday - 17 Critical, no zero-days for the first time since June 2024. Two Word RCEs (CVE-2026-40361 and CVE-2026-40364) trigger just by viewing a malicious document in Outlook's Preview Pane and are rated 'Exploitation More Likely.' Windows DNS Client (CVE-2026-41096) lets an attacker-controlled DNS server execute code on any Windows machine resolving a hostile name - echoing SigRed. Other priorities: Netlogon RCE (CVE-2026-41089) and Microsoft SSO Plugin for Jira and Confluence (CVE-2026-41103, CVSS 9.1).

Check
Check Windows patch status for the May 2026 cumulative update. Confirm whether Outlook's Word Preview Pane is enabled - that's the exposure path for CVE-2026-40361 and 40364.
Affected
Unpatched Windows clients and servers. Priority targets: Outlook/Word (Preview Pane RCEs CVE-2026-40361/40364), domain controllers (Netlogon CVE-2026-41089), DNS-facing servers (CVE-2026-41096).
Fix
Deploy May 2026 cumulative updates fleet-wide. Prioritize DCs (Netlogon), DNS servers, and Outlook hosts. Disable Word Preview Pane as a compensating control until patched.

Fortinet patches critical unauthenticated RCE flaws in FortiSandbox and FortiAuthenticator - identity and threat-detection products that protect everything else (CVE-2026-26083, CVE-2026-44277)

Fortinet patched two critical RCE flaws Tuesday. CVE-2026-44277 in FortiAuthenticator (Fortinet's IAM/MFA platform) lets unauthenticated attackers execute code via crafted requests. CVE-2026-26083 (CVSS 9.1) in FortiSandbox's web UI lets unauthenticated attackers run code via HTTP requests. Neither is confirmed exploited yet, but Fortinet products have a long exploitation history - CISA flagged FortiClient EMS as actively exploited in April. FortiSandbox is the threat-detection backbone for many Fortinet-centric SOCs; FortiAuthenticator gates MFA and SSO.

Check
Inventory FortiAuthenticator and FortiSandbox versions. Confirm management UIs aren't internet-reachable. Check logs for unfamiliar admin sessions since early May.
Affected
FortiAuthenticator before 6.5.7, 6.6.9, 8.0.3. FortiSandbox 5.0.0-5.0.1, 4.4.0-4.4.8. FortiAuthenticator Cloud (FortiTrust Identity) is not affected.
Fix
Upgrade FortiAuthenticator to 6.5.7, 6.6.9, or 8.0.3. Upgrade FortiSandbox to 5.0.2+, 4.4.9+, or 5.0.6+ (Cloud). Restrict management UIs to trusted IPs.

SAP patches two critical CVSS 9.6 flaws in Commerce Cloud and S/4HANA - the ERP and e-commerce platforms behind most large retailers and global enterprises (CVE-2026-34263, CVE-2026-34260)

SAP's May Patch Day included two CVSS 9.6 critical flaws. CVE-2026-34263 in Commerce Cloud is a missing authentication check from improperly ordered Spring Security rules - unauthenticated attackers can upload configurations and inject code. CVE-2026-34260 in S/4HANA is a SQL injection in the ABAP Enterprise Search component that lets low-privilege authenticated users steal sensitive database records. Both land less than two weeks after four SAP npm packages were hit in the Mini Shai-Hulud attack, putting SAP customers under compounding patch pressure.

Check
Inventory SAP Commerce Cloud and S/4HANA instances. Check note application status in Solution Manager or SAP Support Portal. Search application logs for unusual configuration upload attempts.
Affected
SAP Commerce Cloud (all on-prem before patch) - CVE-2026-34263, CVSS 9.6. S/4HANA with ABAP Enterprise Search enabled - CVE-2026-34260, CVSS 9.6. Internet-facing Commerce Cloud is at acute risk.
Fix
Apply SAP Security Notes 3733064 (Commerce Cloud) and 3724838 (S/4HANA). Restrict Commerce Cloud admin endpoints to trusted IPs. Audit Enterprise Search query logs for SQL injection signatures.

TeamPCP supply-chain worm 'Mini Shai-Hulud' hits TanStack, Mistral AI, UiPath, OpenSearch, and Guardrails AI - 170 packages, 401 malicious versions, 518 million weekly downloads (CVE-2026-45321)

TeamPCP launched its largest supply-chain attack to date on May 11, compromising 170+ npm and PyPI packages with 518 million combined weekly downloads. The attackers chained three GitHub Actions vulnerabilities to publish 401 malicious versions carrying valid SLSA Build Level 3 attestations - cryptographically indistinguishable from legitimate releases. Affected packages include TanStack, Mistral AI (npm and PyPI), UiPath, OpenSearch, and Guardrails AI. The worm installs a persistent gh-token-monitor daemon that triggers 'rm -rf ~/' if tokens get revoked, and includes a probabilistic full-disk-wipe routine for Israeli and Iranian locales.

Check
Audit lockfiles for @tanstack/* (84 affected versions), @uipath/* (66 versions), @mistralai/*, opensearch-project/opensearch 3.5.3-3.8.0, guardrails-ai 0.10.1, mistralai 2.4.6.
Affected
Any Node.js or Python environment that installed compromised packages between May 11 and registry takedown. CI/CD pipelines, developer workstations, AI/ML environments. Crypto wallets and password managers (1Password, Bitwarden) are primary exfil targets.
Fix
Remove gh-token-monitor daemon BEFORE revoking tokens (~/Library/LaunchAgents macOS, ~/.config/systemd/user/ Linux) - removal first prevents triggering the wipe. Pin lockfiles to clean versions. Rotate all npm tokens, GitHub PATs, cloud credentials, and crypto wallet seeds.

Foxconn confirms cyberattack on North American factories - Nitrogen ransomware crew claims 8 TB stolen including Apple, Intel, Google, Dell, and Nvidia project files

Foxconn confirmed Tuesday that a cyberattack hit several North American factories, with its Wisconsin Mount Pleasant facility halting production for a week starting May 1. Workers were told to power off computers and revert to paper timesheets. Nitrogen ransomware group claimed responsibility, posting 8 TB of stolen data covering 11 million files - allegedly including project documentation tied to Apple, Intel, Google, Dell, AMD, and Nvidia. Foxconn says production is resuming. This is the fourth ransomware attack on a Foxconn entity since 2020.

Check
If your organization is a Foxconn customer sharing technical documentation, audit which projects had files staged at the Mount Pleasant facility between January and May.
Affected
Foxconn customers with data at the Wisconsin facility - Apple, Intel, Google, Dell, AMD, Nvidia, Cisco, Microsoft. Acute: organizations whose chip architecture or data center topology documents were shared for server or AI infrastructure production.
Fix
Contact Foxconn directly to confirm what was exfiltrated. Treat any technical documentation shared with Mount Pleasant since 2024 as potentially exposed. Rotate credentials, API keys, or signing certificates Foxconn held.

Instructure paid ShinyHunters' ransom to stop the 3.65TB Canvas data leak, and the US Congress launched an inquiry the same day

Update on the Canvas breach covered May 4, 8, and 12: Instructure paid an undisclosed ransom to ShinyHunters on Tuesday to stop publication of the 3.65 TB dataset covering 8,809 educational organizations and 275 million students and staff. Hours later, the US House Education Committee launched a formal inquiry requesting testimony from Instructure leadership about the breach and the decision to pay. This is the largest known education-sector ransom payment. The FBI's 'don't pay' guidance now collides with Congressional scrutiny of the payment decision.

Check
Contact Instructure for written confirmation your school's data is off the leak schedule. Check Canvas API logs for bulk exports between February and April.
Affected
8,809 schools, universities, and training organizations on Canvas. K-12 districts face state student-privacy obligations (NY 2-d, SOPIPA, ~130 statutes) independent of payment. Universities face FERPA obligations.
Fix
Issue COPPA and FERPA notifications per state timelines regardless of ransom payment - the data was already exposed before the deal. Rotate Canvas API keys and re-authorize integrations.

Checkmarx Jenkins AST plugin backdoored by TeamPCP - third Checkmarx supply chain hit since late March

TeamPCP, the group behind the March Trivy breach and Shai-Hulud npm worm, used credentials stolen in that March attack to publish a backdoored version of Checkmarx's Jenkins AST plugin to the Jenkins Marketplace. This is the third Checkmarx supply-chain hit since late March. The rogue version 2026.5.09 went up on May 9, outside Checkmarx's normal release process - no git tag, no GitHub release. Checkmarx says its GitHub repos are isolated from customer production and no customer data is stored there, but anyone who installed the bad plugin should assume their CI credentials are compromised, rotate them all, and hunt for lateral movement.

Check
Check whether your Jenkins instances have the Checkmarx AST plugin installed. If yes, verify the running version - anything dated 2026.5.09 in the version string is the malicious build.
Affected
Any Jenkins instance running the rogue Checkmarx Jenkins AST plugin version 2026.5.09, which was published to the Jenkins Marketplace on May 9, 2026, between then and Checkmarx's takedown. The plugin was outside Checkmarx's normal release pipeline and lacked both a git tag and a GitHub release.
Fix
Roll back to version 2.0.13-829.vc72453fa_1c16 published December 17, 2025, or any earlier officially-tagged build. Rotate every credential the Jenkins host had access to, including cloud API keys, source-repo tokens, deployment keys, and signing certificates. Hunt for lateral movement from the Jenkins host. Pull Checkmarx's published IoC list from their Support Portal and run it across your environment.

Google says hackers used AI to build first known zero-day for 2FA bypass in unnamed web admin tool

Google's Threat Intelligence Group says it caught the first known case of a real attacker using a large language model to find and weaponize a zero-day - a 2FA bypass in a popular but unnamed open-source web-based system administration tool. Google has high confidence the Python exploit was AI-generated, citing textbook code structure, abundant educational docstrings, and a hallucinated CVSS score in the script. The flaw was a high-level logic bug, the kind LLMs excel at spotting, rather than a memory corruption issue. Google rules out Gemini and warns that AI-assisted exploit development is being industrialized via account-pooling and proxy relays for premium models.

Check
Audit open-source web-based system administration tools your team self-hosts (Webmin, Cockpit, ISPConfig, etc). Check whether 2FA is the only barrier protecting admin access, and review recent admin logins for anomalies.
Affected
The specific affected product remains undisclosed - Google notified the developer and the attack was disrupted pre-mass-exploitation. Generally, any popular open-source web-based system administration tool with a 2FA implementation that relies on a semantic logic check rather than tightly-bound session validation is exposed to this class of AI-discovered logic bug.
Fix
Wait for vendor disclosure when Google's reporting names the product. In the meantime, layer additional controls in front of any web admin panel: place it behind a VPN or zero-trust gateway, require source-IP allowlisting, and rotate admin credentials. Treat 2FA-only protection on internet-exposed admin tools as a single point of failure regardless of the vendor.

Identity governance vendor SailPoint discloses GitHub repository breach - third-party app flaw to blame

SailPoint, the identity governance vendor used by many large enterprises, disclosed in a SEC 8-K filing that attackers gained unauthorized access to a subset of its GitHub repositories on April 20. The company's incident response team contained the intrusion the same day. SailPoint says no customer data in production or staging was accessed and its services were not interrupted. The root cause was a vulnerability in a third-party application, which has been remediated. SailPoint notified affected customers directly and says no further customer action is needed. The company has not disclosed what data was actually in the impacted repos.

Check
If you use SailPoint (IdentityNow, IdentityIQ, or related products), check whether you received a direct notification dated after April 20, 2026, and review the scope details in your account portal.
Affected
SailPoint customers who received a direct breach notification dated on or after April 20, 2026. The company has not publicly disclosed which products, repositories, or customer subsets were specifically named in the notifications. No customer data in production or staging environments was accessed per SailPoint's SEC filing.
Fix
Follow guidance in your direct SailPoint notification. As a precaution, rotate any API tokens or service-account credentials issued for SailPoint integration over the past 12 months. Review SailPoint integration audit logs for unexpected activity from April onward. Ask SailPoint for the name of the third-party application whose flaw caused the intrusion - your organization may use it elsewhere.

UK water company hit by Cl0p had hackers hidden in its network for nearly 2 years - ICO fines South Staffordshire Water 964K

The UK Information Commissioner fined South Staffordshire Water 963,900 pounds over a 2022 Cl0p ransomware breach that exposed 633,887 customer and employee records. The penalty notice reveals attackers were inside the network nearly two years before discovery - initial access happened September 2020 via a malicious email attachment, but they were not detected until July 2022 when IT performance issues triggered an investigation. The ICO found basic security failures: an unpatched ZeroLogon flaw on two domain controllers, no principle of least privilege, an outsourced SOC monitoring just 5 percent of the IT estate, and Windows Server 2003 boxes still running in production.

Check
Pull your most recent domain-controller vulnerability scan. If nothing exists in the last 90 days, that is itself a finding. Verify ZeroLogon (CVE-2020-1472) is patched on every DC.
Affected
Any organization where domain controllers run unpatched, where the outsourced SOC monitors less than the full IT estate, where legacy systems like Windows Server 2003 remain in production, or where vulnerability scanning has not been performed in over 90 days. Critical national infrastructure and regulated industries face especially harsh penalties for these gaps.
Fix
Patch ZeroLogon (CVE-2020-1472) on every domain controller now if not already done. Confirm your SOC contract requires monitoring coverage of 100 percent of in-scope assets, with endpoint telemetry and authentication logs integrated. Run quarterly internal and external vulnerability scans and retain the reports for regulator inspection. Retire any Windows Server 2003 boxes still in production - extended support ended July 2015.