Researchers at SafeDep, Socket, StepSecurity, and Upwind reported that LiteLLM version 1.107.0, a popular Python AI gateway, was published with malware through compromised GitHub CLI OAuth tokens belonging to three engineers. A cook.pth file runs a payload whenever the Python interpreter starts, even before LiteLLM is imported. The first stage, calling itself privcollect, harvests cloud tokens, developer credentials, private keys, AI tooling credential files, browser data, environment variables, and the proxy's saved keys and model config, exfiltrating over HTTP to litellm[.]dev/healthcheck. A second payload is a backdoor that fetches and runs further commands. The PyPI package and Docker images were pulled, and users should pin to 1.106.2.
A researcher found more than 300 malicious Tor exit relays, at their October 4 peak about 7.46 percent of exit capacity, rerouting SSH connections to twelve interception servers. The attackers edited relay torrc files to allow port 22, and each hijacked exit presented its own host key before connecting onward to the real server, so sessions worked while passwords typed by users who accepted the key were captured. Key-based logins could not be relayed. The operator of the largest affected relay family traced the root cause to the Ebury backdoor and a reused plaintext password with SSH password authentication left enabled. Tor flagged the relays by October 5.
Socket, StepSecurity, and GitGuardian reported a resurgence of the GhostAction supply chain campaign, in which more than 500 GitHub accounts committed a credential-stealing workflow to tens of thousands of repositories since October 7. The attacker likely used maintainer personal access tokens leaked in infostealer logs, starting with the author of the pyxel game engine and spreading to other accounts. The injected workflow, disguised as a security audit, scans the working tree and full git history against 13 secret patterns, including AWS, Anthropic, OpenAI, and GitLab keys, and exfiltrates them over plain HTTP to a hardcoded address. Earlier GhostAction activity hit 772 repositories and thousands of secrets.
Socket and StepSecurity reported that version 0.5.144 of the tensorlake npm package, a TypeScript SDK, was published with obfuscated malware tied to the Shai-Hulud supply chain attack. A preinstall hook launches a loader that runs a worm under the Bun runtime. It harvests npm, GitHub, AWS, Vault, Kubernetes, and SSH credentials, .env files, cryptocurrency wallets, and configuration for Claude, Cursor, and other tools, then enumerates the victim's other packages and republishes them with forged provenance to spread. A PowerShell monitor watches the stolen GitHub token and runs a destructive handler if the victim revokes it, so remove the package before rotating that token.
Microsoft Threat Intelligence detailed a ClickFix variant that pre-fetches malicious scripts into the browser cache, disguised as PNG files, so victims run content already stored locally rather than downloading a remote payload when they paste the attacker's command. The approach conceals the payload and sidesteps the roughly 260-character limit of the Windows Run dialog. The chain uses VBScript to enumerate browser cache files, pulls PowerShell from external servers, and injects .NET assemblies into legitimate processes such as timeout.exe to steal browser and device credentials before fetching further in-memory stages. The cache enumeration specifically references Firefox, and similar tricks have targeted macOS Terminal users.
The maintainers of the official Model Context Protocol Python SDK disclosed a flaw that lets a malicious MCP server trick an application built on the SDK into handing over the OAuth credentials it uses to log in to a real service. Affected versions sent the client secret, authorization code, and PKCE proof key to an attacker-controlled token endpoint, because the SDK did not always verify where the authorization server was. Cycode, which reported it, exchanged the stolen material for a valid access token carrying the app's permissions, and noted the long-lived client secret keeps working until rotated. Fixes are in versions 1.30.0 and 2.2.0.
Cryptocurrency exchange Bitget said the attacker who stole about 388 million dollars gained access through a vulnerability in a third-party security product the exchange used. The attacker exploited the flaw to obtain high-level internal credentials, then on September 24 used them to reach an internal management system and insert fraudulent withdrawal commands into wallet backend services, where they were treated as legitimate. The stolen funds came from Bitget's hot and warm wallets, while its offline cold wallets were unaffected. CEO Gracy Chen described the incident publicly, confirming the earlier statement that a critical wallet backend system had been compromised and used to spoof transaction data and trigger approvals.
Socket reported that two GitHub Actions, actions-cool/issues-helper and actions-cool/maintain-one-comment, were disabled a second time after their repositories became accessible again on September 16, months after being compromised in the May Mini Shai-Hulud campaign. When the repositories returned, their release tags were not cleaned up and still pointed to the malicious content introduced on May 18, so any workflow referencing either action by a version tag resumed downloading and executing the payload on its next run. The original May 18 compromise ran code that harvested credentials from CI/CD pipelines and exfiltrated them, activity linked to the Mini Shai-Hulud cluster through a shared exfiltration domain. GitHub has again disabled both repositories.
ReversingLabs detailed a malicious npm package, tw-pkgprobe-7731, that masquerades as an authorized Twilio bug-bounty research probe while harvesting developer data. Uploaded in mid-August by an account that no longer exists, it shipped eleven versions within about 45 minutes. Comments inside describe it as an authorized HackerOne probe that runs only inside Twilio's serverless sandbox and takes no destructive action. On execution it first checks for a Twilio developer environment and exits otherwise, then collects environment variables plus system details like mounts and temporary folders and exfiltrates them through a webhook. Later versions specifically target developers using Twilio APIs by searching for folders tied to particular Twilio account identifiers, sharpening the credential theft.
Varonis Threat Labs detailed a post-compromise technique it calls TrustSink, in which an attacker holding a highly privileged Microsoft Entra account registers a rogue External Authentication Method as an external MFA provider. During normal sign-ins, Entra redirects users to the rogue provider to complete the second factor, and the attacker inserts a convincing Microsoft password prompt that captures the password in plaintext before returning a valid signed token, so the login completes with no error. In testing, every sign-in succeeded while the attacker server logged passwords with source IPs. Resetting a captured password does not remove the rogue provider, which persists in the configuration and works against any external provider model.