Last updated: September 29, 2026 at 8:42 AM UTC
All 891 Vulnerability 357 Breach 144 Threat 383 Defense 7

SideCopy (APT36) Operation XENOFISCAL hits Afghanistan Finance Ministry with Pashto-lure Xeno RAT via mshta.exe and Edge-mimicking persistence

Seqrite Labs has documented Operation XENOFISCAL, a campaign by the Pakistan-linked SideCopy group (under the Transparent Tribe / APT36 umbrella) targeting Afghanistan's Ministry of Finance, provincial revenue and finance directorates, and Pashto-speaking government officials. The attack opens with spear-phishing delivering a ZIP archive containing a malicious LNK file bearing a Pashto-language filename - a deliberate choice reflecting familiarity with Afghan government circles. The LNK uses mshta.exe to fetch a remote HTA from a compromised Afghan education domain, running obfuscated in-memory JavaScript. It establishes Registry persistence mimicking Microsoft Edge and drops Xeno RAT 1.8.7 plus a decoy document via a DLL loader. Xeno RAT supports keylogging, screenshots, and SOCKS5 tunneling.

Check
Hunt for LNK files with Pashto filenames, mshta.exe fetching remote HTA, Edge-mimicking Registry persistence, and Xeno RAT 1.8.7 TCP C2. Apply Seqrite IoCs in South Asia government environments.
Affected
Afghanistan's Ministry of Finance, provincial revenue/finance directorates, and Pashto-speaking government officials. SideCopy (APT36 umbrella) uses language-tailored spear-phishing reflecting deep target familiarity.
Fix
Block ZIP-with-LNK email attachments and restrict mshta.exe for standard users. Hunt for Xeno RAT scheduled-task persistence and SOCKS5 tunneling. Monitor compromised education-domain callbacks.

WeedHack malware-as-a-service infostealer infects 116,000+ Minecraft systems via YouTube and SEO-poisoned fake mods and cheat clients

McAfee has detailed WeedHack, a malware-as-a-service infostealer campaign that has infected more than 116,000 systems since January by targeting Minecraft players. The malware spreads through malicious Minecraft mods, clients, cheats, and utilities promoted via YouTube videos (some with voice-over narration and thousands of views) and SEO poisoning of keywords matching popular clients like Meteor, Wurst, LiquidBounce, and Impact. WeedHack averages 2,000-3,000 infections daily, mostly in the US, Germany, India, and the UK, across 240+ distribution URLs and 3,820 unique malicious JAR files. It offers customers a dashboard to view stolen credentials and victim data. Some fake sites even link to legitimate GitHub repos to fabricate credibility.

Check
Brief staff and family-device users that Minecraft mods, cheats, and clients from YouTube links or search results frequently carry infostealers. Hunt endpoints for the 3,820 known WeedHack JAR hashes.
Affected
Minecraft players (often younger users on shared/home devices) installing third-party mods, cheats, and clients. 116,000+ infected since January, mostly US, Germany, India, UK. MaaS dashboard tracks victims.
Fix
Source Minecraft tools only from official project pages. Apply McAfee WeedHack IoCs and block known distribution URLs. Rotate credentials on any system that ran an untrusted JAR.

FBI-flagged Kali365 phishing-as-a-service expands reach - Microsoft 365 OAuth device-code consent abuse grows beyond April campaigns

Dark Reading reports that Kali365 - the phishing-as-a-service platform the FBI flagged for fueling Microsoft 365 attacks in April - is expanding its reach. Rather than stealing passwords, Kali365 captures OAuth access and refresh tokens by tricking victims into completing attacker-initiated Microsoft device-login requests, granting immediate mailbox access. The service generates branded lures impersonating Adobe, DocuSign, and SharePoint in many languages and sells in tiers from $250 for 30 days to $2,000 annually. Its continued growth signals that OAuth device-code consent phishing remains a high-yield technique, and that defenders should prioritize blocking device-code flows for non-mobile platforms and enforcing phishing-resistant MFA across Microsoft 365 tenants.

Check
Search Microsoft 365 logs for unfamiliar device-login completions and OAuth consent grants. Hunt for inbox rules hiding security alerts. Block Adobe/DocuSign/SharePoint-themed device-code lures.
Affected
Microsoft 365 tenants where users can complete attacker-initiated device-login flows. Kali365's branded multi-language lures and tiered pricing keep OAuth device-code phishing scalable and growing.
Fix
Block device-code flow in Conditional Access for non-mobile platforms. Enforce phishing-resistant FIDO2 MFA. Train users to verify device-login codes. Audit OAuth-granted apps regularly.

Red Hat @redhat-cloud-services npm namespace compromised with 'Miasma' Shai-Hulud variant - 30+ packages, 117K weekly downloads, steals dev and cloud secrets

More than 30 npm packages under Red Hat's @redhat-cloud-services namespace were backdoored in a supply-chain attack distributing a new Shai-Hulud variant dubbed 'Miasma.' Aikido and OX Security found dozens of package versions laced with malware that steals developer credentials, cloud secrets, SSH keys, and CI/CD tokens. Aikido says the compromised packages pull roughly 117,000 weekly downloads. Red Hat told BleepingComputer it removed the affected packages after becoming aware of the incident and that the compromise was limited to internal development tooling, with no impact on production products or services. The Miasma variant continues the self-propagating worm behavior that made the original Shai-Hulud campaign so disruptive.

Check
Inventory projects pulling @redhat-cloud-services npm packages. Check package-lock.json for backdoored versions since the compromise. Rotate developer, cloud, SSH, and CI/CD credentials reachable from build hosts.
Affected
30+ @redhat-cloud-services npm packages (~117K weekly downloads) backdoored with the Miasma Shai-Hulud variant. Red Hat says impact is limited to internal development tooling, not production products.
Fix
Remove affected package versions and pin to known-clean releases via lockfile. Rotate all secrets reachable from affected developer and CI hosts. Apply Aikido and OX Security IoCs.

codexui-android npm steals OpenAI Codex auth tokens for a month - non-expiring refresh_token exfiltrated to fake Sentry endpoint

Aikido Security has disclosed that codexui-android, an npm package advertised as a remote web UI for OpenAI Codex with over 29,000 weekly downloads, has been silently exfiltrating users' Codex authentication tokens for the past month. Unlike a typosquat, the malware was embedded into a functional, actively-developed package roughly a month after publication to build trust; the GitHub repo stayed clean. The code reads ~/.codex/auth.json and ships the access_token, refresh_token, id_token, and account ID to sentry.anyclaw[.]store, a server masquerading as Sentry. The non-expiring refresh_token lets an attacker silently impersonate the developer indefinitely with full Codex account access. The package remains available; the npm account is 'friuns.'

Check
Inventory developer machines for the codexui-android npm package. If present, treat ~/.codex/auth.json as compromised. Search egress for traffic to sentry.anyclaw[.]store.
Affected
Developers who installed codexui-android (29K weekly downloads, still live). Stolen non-expiring Codex refresh_tokens give attackers persistent, silent impersonation of the victim's OpenAI Codex account.
Fix
Remove codexui-android. Revoke and re-issue OpenAI Codex sessions; the refresh_token does not expire, so rotation is mandatory. Pin dependencies and audit AI-tooling packages before install.

DriveSurge initial-access broker hijacks thousands of sites for ClickFix and FakeUpdates, routes victims through zTDS pay-per-install network

SilentPush has detailed DriveSurge, a threat actor running large-scale malware-distribution campaigns by compromising thousands of websites and using ClickFix and FakeUpdates social engineering. ClickFix tricks visitors into copying and running malicious commands under the pretense of fixing a technical issue; FakeUpdates uses fraudulent browser-update prompts. DriveSurge operates primarily as an initial-access broker on a pay-per-install model, enabling follow-on attacks by other criminals. Compromised-site visitors are routed through a Traffic Distribution System called zTDS that profiles them before redirecting to malware-delivery infrastructure. The model lets DriveSurge monetize hijacked traffic at scale while downstream actors deploy infostealers, loaders, or ransomware. The campaign overlaps with the broader ClickFix surge across the ecosystem.

Check
Hunt web properties for unauthorized injected redirect scripts and zTDS-related indicators. Train staff that browser-update prompts and 'paste this command to fix' pages are ClickFix/FakeUpdates lures.
Affected
Visitors to thousands of compromised websites redirected through DriveSurge's zTDS. Any organization whose users browse compromised sites can receive infostealers, loaders, or ransomware via pay-per-install.
Fix
Apply SilentPush IoCs and block known zTDS infrastructure. Deploy script-integrity monitoring on your own sites. Disable clipboard-to-terminal workflows; train users never to run commands a webpage supplies.

WordPress malware hides C2 in Steam profile comments using invisible Unicode - ~1,980 sites infected since July 2025

GoDaddy has documented a WordPress malware campaign that hides command-and-control data inside Steam Community profile comments, abusing Valve's platform to avoid running separate C2 infrastructure and evade detection. Around 1,980 WordPress sites have been infected since July 2025. The first-stage malware loads a Steam profile on each page view and extracts text from benign-looking comments that conceal a payload encoded with six invisible Unicode characters such as zero-width joiners. The decoder maps the invisible characters to bytes, reconstructs a URL to hello-mywordl[.]info, and injects JavaScript disguised as a legitimate library into every frontend page. The final stage is a backdoor that responds to POST requests carrying a specific authentication cookie.

Check
Audit WordPress sites for injected first-stage loaders calling Steam Community profiles and frontend JavaScript from hello-mywordl[.]info. Check admin accounts, FTP/SFTP credentials, and theme/plugin integrity.
Affected
WordPress sites compromised via stolen admin logins, weak FTP/SFTP credentials, or vulnerable themes/plugins. ~1,980 sites infected since July 2025 using Steam profile comments as a covert C2 channel.
Fix
Remove injected scripts and the POST-triggered backdoor. Rotate all WordPress admin and FTP/SFTP credentials. Patch themes/plugins. Block hello-mywordl[.]info and monitor web-server requests to Steam profile pages.

Dashlane locks out users after external brute-force attack triggers automated account suspensions; no system compromise, accounts restored

Password manager Dashlane locked out multiple users after an external brute-force attack triggered its automated account-suspension defenses. Affected users received emails about suspicious access requests and device-registration codes from foreign locations they did not initiate, prompting confusion about whether the messages were themselves phishing. Dashlane confirmed the suspensions were a built-in security response to credential-stuffing-style login attempts and said there is no evidence its systems were compromised. The company opened an investigation on May 31 at 15:19 UTC and marked it resolved by 22:30 UTC, with all affected accounts unsuspended. The episode shows account-lockout defenses working as designed, though the user-experience and phishing-confusion fallout is real.

Check
If your team uses Dashlane and saw lockouts, confirm accounts are restored and that the device-registration emails were legitimate, not phishing. Verify no unauthorized devices were registered.
Affected
Dashlane users targeted by external credential-stuffing/brute-force. No Dashlane system compromise reported; risk is account-takeover attempts and phishing confusion from legitimate-but-unexpected security emails.
Fix
Enable the strongest available MFA on Dashlane. Use a unique high-entropy master password. Treat unexpected device-registration codes as suspicious and verify via Dashlane's status page, not email links.

Operation Dragon Weave: China-aligned spear-phishing hits Czech and Taiwan officials with Rust RUSTCLOAK loader and Azure-hosted AdaptixC2

Seqrite Labs has documented Operation Dragon Weave, a China-aligned cyber-espionage campaign targeting government, research, academic, technology, and financial-services organizations in the Czech Republic and Taiwan. Spear-phishing emails carry ZIP attachments that trigger one of two infection chains: a malicious LNK file masquerading as a PDF that runs PowerShell, or a self-contained Rust dropper launched directly. Both extract RuntimeBroker_update.exe, which DLL-sideloads a malicious UnityPlayer.dll to deploy a Rust loader called RUSTCLOAK. RUSTCLOAK decrypts and runs the final payload, an AdaptixC2 agent codenamed AZUREVEIL that uses Microsoft Azure Blob Storage for command-and-control. The use of legitimate cloud services for C2 and Rust tooling complicates detection.

Check
Hunt for LNK files masquerading as PDFs, RuntimeBroker_update.exe, and DLL side-loading of UnityPlayer.dll. Search egress for AdaptixC2 traffic to Azure Blob Storage endpoints. Apply Seqrite IoCs.
Affected
Government, research, academic, technology, and financial-services organizations in the Czech Republic and Taiwan - Dragon Weave's named targets. Spear-phishing with ZIP attachments is the delivery vector.
Fix
Block ZIP-with-LNK email attachments at the gateway. Restrict PowerShell for standard users. Hunt for RUSTCLOAK and AZUREVEIL indicators. Monitor anomalous outbound Azure Blob Storage connections.

Hackers social-engineer Meta's new AI account-recovery bot to hijack high-value Instagram handles; MFA-enabled accounts were unaffected

Krebs on Security reports that attackers social-engineered Meta's newly-deployed conversational AI account-recovery assistant to hijack high-value, short Instagram handles allegedly worth over half a million dollars. Meta had rolled out the AI layer to reduce friction in common recovery workflows - relinking emails, triggering password resets, verifying ownership - that previously required weeks of back-and-forth with automated ticketing. Just as human support staff can be tricked into granting unauthorized access, the AI assistant proved equally eager to help and vulnerable to manipulation. Meta pushed an emergency patch over the weekend and says no back-end database was breached. Critically, the exploit failed against any account with MFA enabled.

Check
For high-value social accounts, enable phishing-resistant MFA (passkey or security key) now. Review whether any platforms you depend on use AI bots for sensitive account-recovery workflows.
Affected
High-value Instagram accounts without MFA. More broadly, any platform deploying AI chatbots for account recovery creates a social-engineerable attack surface, just like human support staff.
Fix
Enable the strongest MFA available - even SMS codes blocked this exploit. Treat AI-driven account-recovery flows as a new attack surface and require step-up verification for high-value account changes.