Last updated: November 2, 2026 at 1:20 PM UTC
All 957 Vulnerability 399 Breach 144 Threat 407 Defense 7
Tag: microsoft-365 (17 articles)Clear

Microsoft 365 token-replay campaign compromises 97 accounts across 79 organizations despite MFA

Huntress detailed a Microsoft 365 adversary-in-the-middle campaign that ran from July to September, capturing sign-in sessions behind fake login pages and replaying the stolen tokens from attacker devices within minutes, a technique it calls token spraying. From over 200,000 login attempts the attackers achieved 497 successful sign-ins, compromised 97 accounts across 79 organizations, and registered 48 rogue Entra devices. In at least 19 organizations they removed existing MFA methods and registered their own within three hours, and planted hidden inbox rules hiding payroll and deposit emails. Defenders should revoke sessions, audit Entra devices and MFA methods, and restrict the device-code workflow with Conditional Access.

Check
Hunt Microsoft 365 for rogue Entra device registrations, unexpected MFA-method changes, and hidden inbox rules, and revoke sessions for any suspected compromise.
Affected
Microsoft 365 users phished through an adversary-in-the-middle page have their post-login tokens replayed from attacker devices, bypassing MFA without reusing the password.
Fix
Reset credentials and revoke sessions, audit Entra devices and MFA methods, block legacy device-code flows with Conditional Access, and require MFA for all users and apps.

Compromised ConnectWise Cloud Backup credential lets attackers sign in to 173 Microsoft 365 tenants

Huntress observed attackers abusing a compromised Microsoft 365 OAuth credential for ConnectWise Cloud Backup, formerly SkyKick, to sign in to 173 partner and customer tenants. The credential works against every tenant the app is consented in, letting attackers obtain Microsoft Graph tokens and reach mailboxes, files, and directory data. In at least one tenant, a ConnectWise app added itself to the Global Administrator role and created new client secrets. Token acquisition came from a single IP on October 15, moving through tenants in sorted order. ConnectWise closed Cloud Backup access until all credentials are reset, and issued tokens stay valid for up to 90 minutes.

Check
If you use ConnectWise Cloud Backup, keep the application disabled until credentials are reset, enable Microsoft Graph activity logs, and audit for credentials added since October 13.
Affected
Microsoft 365 tenants that consented to the ConnectWise Cloud Backup app could be accessed with a compromised credential, exposing mailboxes, files, and directory data to attackers.
Fix
Disable the affected ConnectWise applications, review service principal sign-ins for application ID 506e08f9 and IP 144.172.64.128, revoke added secrets, and check for apps granting themselves admin roles.

Passkey-themed phishing hijacks Microsoft 365 accounts to slowly steal cloud data

Microsoft warned that extortion groups including ShinyHunters are running passkey and single-sign-on-themed phishing to break into Microsoft 365 accounts. Attackers impersonate the IT help desk by call, text, or Teams message, urging employees to urgently update a passkey or MFA setting, then send them to fake login pages. The passkey angle is only a lure: the real goal is to capture credentials and session tokens through an adversary-in-the-middle site or a device-code approval that bypasses MFA. Once in, they register their own authentication method for persistence, so a password reset alone will not evict them, then quietly exfiltrate under a thousand files an hour to blend in, spreading through connected single-sign-on services.

Check
Deploy phishing-resistant MFA and require managed devices for sensitive cloud resources, disable device-code authentication if unused, and tell staff to verify urgent passkey or MFA requests through a known internal channel.
Affected
Microsoft 365 organizations whose staff can be socially engineered over passkey or MFA lures; attackers steal session tokens or device-code approvals to bypass MFA and add their own authentication methods.
Fix
Hunt for unusual sign-ins followed by new authentication-method registrations, Graph API reconnaissance, and slow SharePoint or email access; on compromise, revoke sessions and tokens, reset credentials, and remove attacker-added methods.

Voice phishing turns personal devices into a path to Microsoft 365 data

Researchers describe attackers using voice phishing calls to talk employees into granting access from their personal devices, then reaching Microsoft 365 and corporate data through the trust the user extends. The attackers do not hack the device; they convince the person, then use Microsoft's Graph API to identify valuable targets and pass access to extortion groups like ShinyHunters. Because the weakness is the user's decision rather than the hardware, banning personal devices would not stop it. The stronger defense is tightening identity and authentication and limiting what a compromised account can actually do, so that tricking one person yields far less to the attacker.

Check
Train staff to be suspicious of unsolicited support and IT calls that ask them to approve access or run steps, and verify such requests through a known internal channel before acting.
Affected
Organizations where employees can be socially engineered by phone into granting Microsoft 365 access from personal devices; attackers then use built-in cloud interfaces to find targets and hand access to extortion groups.
Fix
Enforce phishing-resistant authentication and conditional access, minimize standing privileges so a hijacked account does little, monitor Graph API and sign-in activity for abuse, and train users specifically against voice-based social engineering.

BigBear phishing service bypassed MFA at 258 organizations and disabled passkeys

Researchers at CloudSEK gained access to the control panel of BigBear, a phishing-as-a-service platform that defeated multi-factor authentication at 258 organizations and stole thousands of Microsoft 365 credentials. It uses an adversary-in-the-middle proxy based on Evilginx to sit between victims and Microsoft's real login, capturing passwords, multi-factor codes, and the session cookie, then replaying the cookie to hijack the already-authenticated session. The panel logged over 5,000 stolen records across 40-plus countries and is rented to multiple affiliates who receive stolen data through Telegram bots. Notably, it runs JavaScript that disables the browser's passkey support, forcing victims off phishing-resistant login onto weaker methods it can intercept.

Check
Enforce phishing-resistant passkeys with conditional access that requires managed devices, so attacker-in-the-middle kits cannot simply capture and replay session cookies or quietly downgrade users to weaker authentication.
Affected
Microsoft 365 organizations relying on passwords plus standard multi-factor authentication; BigBear steals the post-login session cookie to hijack accounts and can disable passkey support in the browser to force weaker login methods.
Fix
Adopt device-bound phishing-resistant authentication, require managed devices through conditional access, revoke sessions and refresh tokens on suspicion, monitor for impossible-travel and residential-proxy sign-ins, and train users on help-desk and login-page lures.

ShinyHunters leaks Questel data taken through a vishing call into Microsoft 365

The extortion group ShinyHunters published data stolen from Questel, a French intellectual-property software and services firm, after a voice phishing call gave attackers access to a Sales SharePoint site in its Microsoft 365 environment. The group claimed more than 21 million records, but the published corpus verified out to about 1.2 million real email addresses, along with names, employers, job titles, physical addresses, and phone numbers, mostly corporate contacts from sales and marketing. Questel confirmed the unauthorized access but has not endorsed the larger figure. It is the same voice-phishing-into-connected-cloud pattern, and the same inflated-claim behavior, seen in other recent ShinyHunters cases.

Check
Harden identity and help desk processes against voice phishing, since a single tricked employee gave attackers access to a cloud collaboration site, and be skeptical of headline record counts in extortion claims.
Affected
Questel corporate contacts whose names, employers, titles, addresses, and phone numbers were leaked, about 1.2 million email addresses; the detailed business profiles support convincing targeted phishing despite the inflated original claim.
Fix
Adopt phishing-resistant authentication, train staff against vishing, tightly control access to Microsoft 365 sites like SharePoint, monitor for unusual data access, and verify breach claims before treating attacker figures as fact.

Mirage2FA phishing service hijacks Microsoft 365 sessions and bypasses two-factor

A commercial phishing-as-a-service toolkit called Mirage2FA has hit around 4,500 organizations by abusing legitimate Microsoft 365 login flows to steal passwords and session cookies and bypass two-factor authentication. Because it captures the session cookie after a real login completes, the attacker inherits an authenticated Microsoft 365 session and any single-sign-on connected services, defeating multi-factor authentication. Researchers at ANY.RUN linked the campaign to more than 9,000 potential compromise events and found that nearly half of targeted addresses may have been affected, with most victims in the United States across technology, manufacturing, and education. Hijacking one session can expand into connected apps and internal workflows.

Check
Move toward phishing-resistant authentication such as passkeys or hardware security keys, since attacker-in-the-middle kits like this defeat ordinary two-factor by stealing the session after login.
Affected
Microsoft 365 organizations relying on passwords plus standard two-factor authentication; Mirage2FA steals the post-login session cookie to hijack authenticated sessions and single-sign-on services, extending access well beyond the first account.
Fix
Adopt phishing-resistant multi-factor authentication, shorten session lifetimes and bind sessions to devices, monitor for anomalous token use and impossible-travel sign-ins, and revoke sessions on suspicion rather than trusting a successful login.

Hidden text in a Word file makes Copilot alter data and spread the payload

A researcher disclosed a prompt-injection technique that turns Microsoft 365 Copilot for Word into a carrier for self-spreading instructions. Malicious commands hidden as tiny white-on-white text in a document are invisible to a reader but read in full by Copilot when the file enters its context during a drafting or editing task. Copilot then follows them, in one example silently altering financial figures in a report, and copies the same hidden instructions into the new document, which becomes a fresh carrier for the next person who uses it. It does not spread on its own, but Microsoft's mitigations over 144 days blocked specific wordings without fixing the underlying class.

Check
Treat documents from outside as untrusted input to AI assistants, and review how Copilot and similar tools are used on shared or externally sourced files that may carry hidden instructions.
Affected
Organizations using Microsoft 365 Copilot for Word on documents from outside sources; hidden instructions can make Copilot tamper with content, such as financial figures, and propagate into newly created files.
Fix
Limit AI drafting on untrusted documents, review AI-edited outputs for unexpected changes, strip hidden text from incoming files, and press vendors for controls that separate document content from instructions.

Chinese APT UNC5221 keeps 18-month Microsoft 365 access with Brickstorm backdoor

Volexity has detailed Chinese espionage group UNC5221 (also VerdantBamboo) maintaining access to a victim's Microsoft 365 environment using the Brickstorm backdoor plus previously undocumented malware named Plenet and AgentPSD. The actor sat on the network at least 18 months before detection and had also compromised the victim's MSP. UNC5221 has exploited edge-device zero-days since at least 2023; Brickstorm began as Golang, later Rust. In this case the group pivoted from a compromised Egnyte Storage Sync system through the victim's SSL VPN, then used Brickstorm proxying and stolen credentials to reach Microsoft 365 - deliberately blending with legitimate traffic to evade Conditional Access. It re-breached the org after remediation.

Check
Hunt for Brickstorm, Plenet, and AgentPSD indicators across edge devices and M365. Review Conditional Access logs for VPN-proxied logins blending with legitimate traffic. Audit MSP access paths into your environment.
Affected
Organizations (and their MSPs) running internet-facing edge devices and Egnyte/SSL-VPN infrastructure. UNC5221 maintains multi-year persistence via Brickstorm proxying and stolen credentials to reach Microsoft 365 undetected.
Fix
Apply Volexity IoCs. Harden Conditional Access against proxied logins, rotate credentials, and scrutinize MSP connections. Assume long dwell time - hunt historically and re-verify after remediation, since the group re-breached.

Hackers spied on a stock exchange executive's Outlook mailbox for five months via malicious OAuth app and inbox-rule persistence

Researchers have detailed a cyber-espionage campaign in which attackers maintained access to a global stock exchange executive's Microsoft Outlook mailbox for roughly five months. The intrusion relied on a malicious OAuth application and inbox-rule persistence to quietly read and forward mail while evading detection. By abusing OAuth consent rather than stealing a password, the attackers retained access that survived password changes and looked like routine application traffic in logs. The five-month dwell time on a single high-value executive points to a patient, intelligence-driven operation rather than opportunistic crime. The case reinforces the now-recurring pattern of OAuth-app abuse and malicious inbox rules as the core of stealthy Microsoft 365 mailbox compromise.

Check
Audit Microsoft 365 for unfamiliar OAuth app consents and mailbox inbox rules, especially on executive accounts. Review consent-grant and rule-creation logs for the past six months.
Affected
High-value Microsoft 365 mailboxes, particularly executives. OAuth-consent abuse plus malicious inbox rules grants persistent, password-change-surviving access that blends into normal application traffic.
Fix
Restrict third-party OAuth app consent to admin approval. Alert on new mailbox-forwarding rules. Enforce phishing-resistant MFA and periodically review granted OAuth applications on sensitive accounts.