SilentPush has detailed DriveSurge, a threat actor running large-scale malware-distribution campaigns by compromising thousands of websites and using ClickFix and FakeUpdates social engineering. ClickFix tricks visitors into copying and running malicious commands under the pretense of fixing a technical issue; FakeUpdates uses fraudulent browser-update prompts. DriveSurge operates primarily as an initial-access broker on a pay-per-install model, enabling follow-on attacks by other criminals. Compromised-site visitors are routed through a Traffic Distribution System called zTDS that profiles them before redirecting to malware-delivery infrastructure. The model lets DriveSurge monetize hijacked traffic at scale while downstream actors deploy infostealers, loaders, or ransomware. The campaign overlaps with the broader ClickFix surge across the ecosystem.
ReliaQuest researchers say initial access broker KongTuke has shifted from web-based ClickFix and FileFix lures to Microsoft Teams social engineering, taking as little as five minutes to gain persistent access. The attacker reaches employees from one of five rotating Microsoft 365 tenants, uses Unicode whitespace tricks to make the display name look like internal IT help desk, then talks the victim through pasting a PowerShell command. That command downloads a ZIP from Dropbox containing a portable WinPython runtime and a Python-based RAT called ModeloRAT. The new ModeloRAT variant adds a five-server C2 pool with automatic failover, self-update, and randomized URL paths, and several major EDR products did not detect it.
Securonix tracked a phishing campaign called VENOMOUS#HELPER that has hit 80+ organizations (mostly in the US) since April 2025 by getting employees to install legitimate remote-monitoring software they think is a Social Security Administration document. The lure is a fake SSA email asking the recipient to download their statement; the link points to a compromised Mexican business website hosting a SimpleHelp installer. Once installed, the attackers gain SYSTEM-level access, then quietly install ConnectWise ScreenConnect as a backup channel. The pattern aligns with initial-access broker activity: quiet persistence, then sale or hand-off to ransomware operators.
TrustStrike Labs