ENKI has attributed fresh attacks on South Korean military and corporate entities through March-April 2026 to the North Korean state-sponsored Kimsuky group (also Velvet Chollima). The actor spoofs security-software installation pages (nProtect Online Security and AhnLab Safe Transaction) to deliver nos-setup.exe and astx-setup.exe, which launch a MemLoader.dll payload via regsvr32.exe and establish persistence through scheduled tasks. A separate April campaign used a fake Cisco Webex page that prompted victims to run a script 'to fix camera access,' delivering an encrypted ZIP archive. Kimsuky's expanded toolset now includes the HTTPSpy variant, HelloDoor backdoor, and abuse of VS Code remote tunnels for C2.
Symantec's Threat Hunter Team detailed a global cyber-espionage campaign by MuddyWater (a.k.a. Seedworm, Static Kitten, Temp Zagros), an APT linked to Iran's Ministry of Intelligence and Security. The group hit at least nine organizations on four continents in Q1 2026 - including a major unnamed South Korean electronics manufacturer where attackers maintained access from February 20 to 27. They abused signed legitimate binaries fmapp.exe (a Fortemedia audio utility) and sentinelmemoryscanner.exe (a SentinelOne component) to sideload malicious DLLs called fmapp.dll and sentinelagentcore.dll, both carrying the ChromElevator post-exploitation tool that lifts data from Chrome-based browsers. Stolen files were staged through public file-transfer service sendit[.]sh to blend in.
Acronis researchers have spotted a new variant of LOTUSLITE, a backdoor associated with the Chinese nation-state group Mustang Panda, now distributed via lures tied to India's banking sector and, in a parallel campaign, impersonating figures from South Korea's Korean-peninsula-policy community. The shift is notable: prior LOTUSLITE activity targeted U.S. government and policy entities with U.S.-Venezuela geopolitical decoys, but this wave pivots the targeting while keeping the delivery playbook intact. The infection chain starts with a Compiled HTML (CHM) file - a legacy Microsoft help-file format that can embed executables and scripts - containing a legitimate signed binary, a rogue DLL, and an HTML pop-up that asks the user to click 'Yes.' Clicking it silently fetches JavaScript malware from cosmosmusic[.]com, which extracts and runs the DLL side-loading chain (trusted EXE loads attacker-supplied DLL) using dnx.onecore.dll as the malicious payload. The backdoor talks HTTPS to editor.gleeze[.]com over dynamic DNS, with remote shell access, file operations, and session management - a classic espionage toolkit. The Indian campaign uses HDFC Bank-themed pop-ups masquerading as legitimate banking software; the South Korean campaign uses spoofed Gmail accounts and Google Drive staging to impersonate a prominent Korean peninsula policy figure. This is active, tailored, human-operated espionage, not a commodity campaign.