Last updated: September 29, 2026 at 8:42 AM UTC
All 891 Vulnerability 357 Breach 144 Threat 383 Defense 7

Anthropic to give EU cybersecurity agency ENISA access to Mythos via Project Glasswing - first non-US/UK entity, terms still negotiating

Anthropic is set to give the EU's cybersecurity agency ENISA access to its restricted Mythos model through Project Glasswing - making ENISA the first EU institution and first entity outside the US and UK to join. The move, communicated to the European Commission over the weekend, ends a weeks-long standoff after euro-area finance ministers, the ECB, and member states demanded access on learning Mythos had found flaws in systems European banks, governments, and critical infrastructure rely on. Terms covering data sovereignty, sharing findings with member states, and the scope of systems ENISA may test are still being negotiated. BNP Paribas and Mistral continue building a European alternative.

Check
EU-based organizations: track ENISA's Mythos access as a future channel for coordinated vulnerability findings affecting European infrastructure. Factor frontier-AI vulnerability discovery into your patch-SLA planning.
Affected
European banks, governments, and critical-infrastructure operators whose systems Mythos has already flagged but whose findings were not previously visible to any EU institution until ENISA's access.
Fix
Compress patch cycles in anticipation of AI-surfaced vulnerability disclosures. Engage national CERTs and ENISA channels as they mature. Assume similarly capable models will broaden access over coming months.

Dutch police dismantle 17-million-device botnet linked to Asocks proxy service, seize 200+ servers at local hosting provider

Dutch authorities have taken offline a botnet of at least 17 million infected computers, tablets, and smartphones, seizing more than 200 servers at a Netherlands-based hosting provider. The action was led by the National Police with the National Cyber Security Centre (NCSC). Local media link the infrastructure to Asocks, a service that advertises itself as a universal residential-proxy provider - the kind of proxy network used to launder malicious traffic, run credential-stuffing and ad fraud, and anonymize attacks. The hosting provider took the botnet offline once it was confirmed to be supporting criminal activity. Authorities have not formally named the botnet or announced arrests.

Check
Check whether your network egress or fraud logs show traffic to or from Asocks residential-proxy exit nodes. Review IoT and endpoint fleets for proxyware infections feeding such services.
Affected
17 million compromised devices (computers, tablets, smartphones) conscripted into the proxy botnet. Organizations targeted via proxied credential-stuffing, ad fraud, and anonymized attacks routed through residential IPs.
Fix
Block known Asocks infrastructure once IoCs are published. Hunt for proxyware and residential-proxy SDKs on managed devices. Add residential-proxy ASNs to fraud-scoring and bot-detection rules.

WithSecure: Russia-linked GREYVIBE targets Ukraine with AI-assisted malware via PhantomMail, PhantomRelay RAT, and ClickFix fake-CAPTCHA chains

WithSecure has attributed persistent attacks against Ukraine and Ukraine-related entities since at least August 2025 to GREYVIBE, a previously undocumented Russian-speaking group operating in the Russian time zone and aligned with Kremlin intelligence interests. Victims span military, government, civilian, and business organizations. The group uses spear-phishing (PhantomMail, delivering JavaScript loaders from Google Drive and 4sync), a PowerShell RAT called PhantomRelay, and ClickFix-style fake-CAPTCHA pages (PhantomClick) impersonating Zoom and a fake adult-club site (PrincessClub). WithSecure describes GREYVIBE as low-to-moderately sophisticated, hampered by repeated OPSEC mistakes, but increasingly relying on generative AI and LLMs to accelerate malware development. Some members have ties to the broader Russian cybercrime ecosystem.

Check
Hunt for PhantomRelay PowerShell RAT activity and JavaScript loaders from Google Drive or 4sync links. Block known GREYVIBE ClickFix domains impersonating Zoom. Apply WithSecure IoCs.
Affected
Ukrainian military, government, civilian, and business organizations and Ukraine-related entities. Delivery via spear-phishing, fake CAPTCHA pages, and fraudulent adult-club websites since August 2025.
Fix
Block GREYVIBE C2 and loader-hosting domains per WithSecure. Restrict PowerShell for standard users. Train staff against ClickFix fake-CAPTCHA 'paste this command' prompts. Monitor Google Drive/4sync archive downloads.

Google Chrome rolls out Device Bound Session Credentials to all users, binding cookies to TPM/Secure Enclave against theft

Google has made Device Bound Session Credentials (DBSC) generally available in Chrome, rolling it out to all users to blunt session-cookie theft. First announced in 2024 and in beta since April, DBSC cryptographically binds session cookies to a specific device using the hardware security chip - the TPM on Windows or the Secure Enclave on macOS. Because the public/private keys are generated inside the security chip and never leave it, stolen cookies become useless on any other machine, defeating the infostealer-to-account-takeover pipeline that bypasses MFA. Google frames it as a shift from reactive detection to proactive prevention. The protection is most effective where sites adopt the DBSC server-side protocol.

Check
Confirm managed Chrome fleets are updated to the DBSC-capable release. For your own web properties, evaluate adopting the server-side DBSC protocol to bind user sessions to device hardware.
Affected
Organizations relying on session cookies without device binding remain exposed to infostealer-driven account takeover that bypasses MFA. DBSC only protects sessions where both browser and server support it.
Fix
Roll out DBSC-capable Chrome via policy. Implement the DBSC server-side protocol on high-value web apps. Pair with phishing-resistant MFA and short session lifetimes for defense in depth.

Signal phishing campaign impersonates Support to steal backup recovery keys from journalists and activists, enabling full message decryption

Security researchers are warning of a phishing campaign that impersonates Signal Support over text message to steal users' backup recovery keys, specifically targeting journalists and activists. Once an attacker obtains the recovery key, they can decrypt the victim's entire message-history backup. The campaign relies purely on social engineering - there is no flaw in Signal's cryptography - tricking targets into handing over the secret that protects their encrypted backups. The targeting of journalists and activists points to surveillance-motivated actors rather than financially-driven crime. Signal users should treat any unsolicited 'Support' contact requesting recovery keys or codes as hostile, since Signal never asks for them.

Check
Brief journalists, activists, and high-risk staff that Signal never requests backup recovery keys. Treat any 'Signal Support' text asking for keys or codes as a phishing attempt and report it.
Affected
Signal users - particularly journalists and activists targeted by surveillance-motivated actors. The attack is pure social engineering; Signal's encryption is not broken, but a handed-over recovery key decrypts all backups.
Fix
Never share Signal recovery keys or codes with anyone. Enable registration lock. For high-risk users, store recovery keys offline and verify any support contact through official Signal channels only.

Anthropic confirms public Mythos rollout in 'coming weeks' - claimed more powerful than Opus 4.8, guardrails developed during preview

Anthropic has confirmed it will roll out Claude Mythos-class models to the general public in the coming weeks. Mythos was originally announced in April as a restricted preview available only to select security researchers and partners; Anthropic cited significant security risks if released too broadly. The company now says it has developed sufficient guardrails. Anthropic frames the trade-off as compressing the attacker advantage: 'in the short term, this could be attackers, if frontier labs aren't careful... in the long term, defenders will more efficiently direct resources and use these models to fix bugs.' Pricing and tier availability are not yet disclosed.

Check
Update internal AI-tool governance policies to cover Mythos-class capability tier. Identify which teams (security research, code audit, IR) would benefit from access once it ships.
Affected
Organizations with patch SLAs measured in weeks. Mythos-class models may surface unpatched flaws at attacker-tool speed; defenders need to compress SLAs to keep pace.
Fix
Tighten patch cycles on internet-facing services. Enroll qualifying security researchers in Anthropic's Cyber Verification Program. Draft internal disclosure policy before broad enablement.

JINX-0164 targets crypto firms with LinkedIn recruiter lures and macOS AUDIOFIX malware - lateral move into CI/CD code distribution

Wiz has documented JINX-0164, a previously undocumented financially-motivated threat actor targeting cryptocurrency firms via recruitment-themed social engineering and bespoke macOS malware since at least mid-2025. The chain starts with credible LinkedIn profiles offering virtual meetings; victims are steered to a rogue teleconference page that delivers a malicious 'meeting client.' A bash script then pulls AUDIOFIX, a Python-based macOS infostealer and RAT, from apple.driver-store[.]com. The payload is architecture-aware (Intel and Apple Silicon), saved as ChromeUpdater, masquerades as the system audio daemon coreaudiod, and persists via launchctl. AUDIOFIX moves laterally from developer laptops into code-distribution and CI/CD infrastructure, modifying source code to steal wallets at scale.

Check
Train developer and finance teams against LinkedIn recruiter approaches followed by 'meeting client' downloads. Hunt macOS endpoints for ChromeUpdater, coreaudiod imposters, and launchctl-loaded LaunchDaemons.
Affected
Cryptocurrency firms and crypto-adjacent developers using macOS, especially with access to CI/CD or code-distribution infrastructure. LinkedIn recruitment lures are the dominant initial vector.
Fix
Apply Wiz IoCs including apple.driver-store[.]com. Restrict launchctl persistence to known LaunchDaemons. Require strong identity attestation before any new meeting-client install. Audit CI/CD signing keys.

Malicious 'Sicoob.Sdk' NuGet steals Brazilian banking PFX certificates via hardcoded Sentry endpoint - amplified by Google Search AI Mode

Socket has flagged a malicious NuGet package, Sicoob.Sdk (versions 2.0.0-2.0.4), that masquerades as a C# SDK for Sicoob, one of Brazil's largest cooperative financial systems, and steals PFX certificates used to authenticate businesses with Sicoob's banking APIs. When a developer instantiates SicoobClient, the package reads the PFX file from disk, Base64-encodes it, and exfiltrates the client ID, PFX password, and encoded certificate to a hardcoded third-party Sentry endpoint. It also captures raw Boleto API responses. The package was downloaded ~500 times and the publisher has 11 other NuGet packages with ~6,000 combined downloads. Google Search AI Mode reportedly amplified the package as legitimate.

Check
Inventory C# projects for Sicoob.Sdk versions 2.0.0-2.0.4 and the publisher's 11 other packages. Search outbound traffic to the attacker Sentry endpoint identified in Socket's IoCs.
Affected
C# developers integrating with Sicoob banking APIs in Brazil. Any project that pulled Sicoob.Sdk via NuGet had PFX certificates, client IDs, and Boleto data harvested.
Fix
Remove all 12 affected NuGet packages and rotate every Sicoob PFX certificate and client credential reachable from affected hosts. Verify NuGet package signatures match expected GitHub source going forward.

Kimsuky (Velvet Chollima) targets South Korean military and corporate orgs with HTTPSpy, HelloDoor, and VS Code Tunnels backdoor

ENKI has attributed fresh attacks on South Korean military and corporate entities through March-April 2026 to the North Korean state-sponsored Kimsuky group (also Velvet Chollima). The actor spoofs security-software installation pages (nProtect Online Security and AhnLab Safe Transaction) to deliver nos-setup.exe and astx-setup.exe, which launch a MemLoader.dll payload via regsvr32.exe and establish persistence through scheduled tasks. A separate April campaign used a fake Cisco Webex page that prompted victims to run a script 'to fix camera access,' delivering an encrypted ZIP archive. Kimsuky's expanded toolset now includes the HTTPSpy variant, HelloDoor backdoor, and abuse of VS Code remote tunnels for C2.

Check
Hunt Windows endpoints for nos-setup.exe, astx-setup.exe, and MemLoader.dll loaded via regsvr32.exe. Audit scheduled tasks for unfamiliar persistence. Block VS Code Tunnels at egress where not needed.
Affected
South Korean military and corporate organizations - Kimsuky's primary targets. Messaging administrators were specifically singled out via spoofed B2B messaging-service installation pages.
Fix
Block known Kimsuky C2 and HTTPSpy IoCs published by ENKI. Restrict VS Code remote tunnels to allowlisted developer accounts. Train staff against fake security-software install prompts.

FBI warns of fake FIFA World Cup 2026 sites (fiffa.com, alt-TLDs) collecting payment data ahead of June 11 kickoff

The FBI has issued a public service announcement warning of hundreds of fake FIFA-themed phishing and fraud sites ahead of the 2026 World Cup running June 11 to July 19 in the US, Canada, and Mexico. Domains include fiffa[.]com and alternative TLDs (.org, .xyz, .live, .sale) plus fake employment portals like jobs-fifa[.]com and fifa-hiring[.]com. The fraudulent sites collect names, addresses, phone numbers, and banking/payment details; the data is used for fake-ticket sales, hospitality-package scams, identity theft, and fraudulent account creation. Group-IB and Bitdefender confirmed parallel malvertising via Google Search, Facebook, Telegram, and WhatsApp, with one major operation attributed to a Chinese-speaking gang.

Check
Add FIFA-themed lookalike domains (fiffa.com, fifa-*[.]com, fifa with alt-TLDs) to email and web filters. Brief staff that the only official site is fifa.com - any other is suspicious.
Affected
Anyone considering buying World Cup tickets, hospitality packages, or FIFA-related employment ahead of June 11. Chinese-speaking gangs and Russian-speaking operations target English, Spanish, and Portuguese speakers.
Fix
Source tickets only via fifa.com or authorized partner sites. Pay via credit card or escrow for chargeback protection. Report fake FIFA sites to FBI IC3. Apply Group-IB and Bitdefender IoCs.