Last updated: July 6, 2026 at 12:53 AM UTC
All 559 Vulnerability 199 Breach 107 Threat 246 Defense 7

CISA, FBI, NSA warn hackers are modifying internet-exposed fuel tank gauge (ATG) systems - prior activity linked to Iran

CISA, the FBI, the NSA, the Department of Energy, and partners have warned that threat actors are targeting internet-exposed automatic tank gauge (ATG) systems used to monitor fuel and liquid storage across the Energy, Chemical, Food and Agriculture, and Transportation sectors. Attackers gain access via authentication-bypass flaws, hardcoded credentials, OS command-execution bugs, SQL injection, and privilege escalation, then modify network settings, product identifiers, tank volumes, and pump controls, and can disable alerts - raising the risk of leaks or equipment failure. The advisory does not formally attribute the activity, but it follows May CNN reporting linking Iranian hackers to similar ATG breaches. Agencies urge removing ATG systems from the internet.

Check
Inventory automatic tank gauge (ATG) systems and confirm none are internet-exposed. Replace default passwords, enable MFA, and review device logs for unauthorized changes to settings, volumes, or pump controls.
Affected
Internet-exposed ATG systems across Energy, Chemical, Food and Agriculture, and Transportation sectors. Access via auth-bypass, hardcoded credentials, command-execution, SQL injection, and privilege-escalation flaws. Prior activity linked to Iran.
Fix
Remove ATG systems from the internet; restrict remote access via firewalls, VPNs, or ACLs. Replace default credentials, enforce MFA, apply updates, and monitor for unauthorized configuration changes.

AI-built ransomware toolkit uses Cursor and Claude Opus agents to automate EDR evasion and Active Directory discovery, Sophos finds

Sophos has detailed a threat actor using an AI-assisted ransomware toolkit that automates Active Directory discovery and EDR evasion. Tool and payload development was aided by Cursor and Claude Opus agents across coding, analysis, and revision, with some agents tasked to scrape security-research posts for fresh bypass techniques; resulting malware was tested in VMs against Sophos, CrowdStrike, and Microsoft EDR. The framework includes Cobalt Strike profiles mimicking legitimate web traffic, a Telegram-bot C2, Python shellcode injectors preserving host-binary functionality, and a Cloudflare Worker front-end redirector. Despite the AI orchestration, the workflow is entirely human-driven. Operator logs and a ransomware-leak-site reference confirmed criminal, not red-team, use.

Check
Hunt endpoints for payloads under C:\Users\*\Documents\test, Telegram-bot C2 traffic, and Cobalt Strike beacons fronted by Cloudflare Workers. Apply Sophos IoCs across EDR-monitored hosts.
Affected
Organizations relying on EDR signatures alone. This toolkit was AI-tuned specifically to bypass Sophos, CrowdStrike, and Microsoft EDR, and routes C2 through Telegram and Cloudflare Workers to blend in.
Fix
Layer behavioral detection and AD-tiering on top of EDR. Block unauthorized Telegram API and anomalous Cloudflare Worker egress. Monitor for AD-discovery patterns and shellcode injection into signed binaries.

Gamaredon (FSB) exploits WinRAR to deliver GammaWorm and GammaSteel against Ukraine - resilient, highly obfuscated modular RAR chain

Sekoia has documented Gamaredon - a Russian state-sponsored intrusion set officially linked to the FSB - exploiting WinRAR via booby-trapped RAR archives to deliver the GammaWorm and GammaSteel malware against Ukrainian targets. The infection chain is described as resilient, massive, and highly obfuscated with a modular design whose configurations operators can update on the fly, making reuse likely. Gamaredon has a long history of targeting Ukrainian government, military, and critical-infrastructure entities through spear-phishing with malicious attachments. The disclosure coincides with related Ukraine-focused activity by UAC-0184 (PassMark BurnInTest LNK lures), UAC-0247 (HTA droppers against drone operators), and APT28's evolving PixyNetLoader delivering a COVENANT implant via CVE-2026-21509.

Check
Hunt for malicious RAR archives and WinRAR exploitation, GammaWorm and GammaSteel indicators, and spear-phishing with RAR attachments in Ukraine-facing operations. Apply Sekoia IoCs.
Affected
Ukrainian government, military, and critical-infrastructure entities - Gamaredon's persistent FSB-linked targets. Spear-phishing with booby-trapped RAR archives delivering modular, frequently-updated payloads is the vector.
Fix
Patch WinRAR to the latest version. Block RAR attachments at the email gateway where feasible. Restrict mshta and script execution. Hunt for GammaSteel exfiltration and GammaWorm persistence.

SideCopy (APT36) Operation XENOFISCAL hits Afghanistan Finance Ministry with Pashto-lure Xeno RAT via mshta.exe and Edge-mimicking persistence

Seqrite Labs has documented Operation XENOFISCAL, a campaign by the Pakistan-linked SideCopy group (under the Transparent Tribe / APT36 umbrella) targeting Afghanistan's Ministry of Finance, provincial revenue and finance directorates, and Pashto-speaking government officials. The attack opens with spear-phishing delivering a ZIP archive containing a malicious LNK file bearing a Pashto-language filename - a deliberate choice reflecting familiarity with Afghan government circles. The LNK uses mshta.exe to fetch a remote HTA from a compromised Afghan education domain, running obfuscated in-memory JavaScript. It establishes Registry persistence mimicking Microsoft Edge and drops Xeno RAT 1.8.7 plus a decoy document via a DLL loader. Xeno RAT supports keylogging, screenshots, and SOCKS5 tunneling.

Check
Hunt for LNK files with Pashto filenames, mshta.exe fetching remote HTA, Edge-mimicking Registry persistence, and Xeno RAT 1.8.7 TCP C2. Apply Seqrite IoCs in South Asia government environments.
Affected
Afghanistan's Ministry of Finance, provincial revenue/finance directorates, and Pashto-speaking government officials. SideCopy (APT36 umbrella) uses language-tailored spear-phishing reflecting deep target familiarity.
Fix
Block ZIP-with-LNK email attachments and restrict mshta.exe for standard users. Hunt for Xeno RAT scheduled-task persistence and SOCKS5 tunneling. Monitor compromised education-domain callbacks.

WeedHack malware-as-a-service infostealer infects 116,000+ Minecraft systems via YouTube and SEO-poisoned fake mods and cheat clients

McAfee has detailed WeedHack, a malware-as-a-service infostealer campaign that has infected more than 116,000 systems since January by targeting Minecraft players. The malware spreads through malicious Minecraft mods, clients, cheats, and utilities promoted via YouTube videos (some with voice-over narration and thousands of views) and SEO poisoning of keywords matching popular clients like Meteor, Wurst, LiquidBounce, and Impact. WeedHack averages 2,000-3,000 infections daily, mostly in the US, Germany, India, and the UK, across 240+ distribution URLs and 3,820 unique malicious JAR files. It offers customers a dashboard to view stolen credentials and victim data. Some fake sites even link to legitimate GitHub repos to fabricate credibility.

Check
Brief staff and family-device users that Minecraft mods, cheats, and clients from YouTube links or search results frequently carry infostealers. Hunt endpoints for the 3,820 known WeedHack JAR hashes.
Affected
Minecraft players (often younger users on shared/home devices) installing third-party mods, cheats, and clients. 116,000+ infected since January, mostly US, Germany, India, UK. MaaS dashboard tracks victims.
Fix
Source Minecraft tools only from official project pages. Apply McAfee WeedHack IoCs and block known distribution URLs. Rotate credentials on any system that ran an untrusted JAR.

FBI-flagged Kali365 phishing-as-a-service expands reach - Microsoft 365 OAuth device-code consent abuse grows beyond April campaigns

Dark Reading reports that Kali365 - the phishing-as-a-service platform the FBI flagged for fueling Microsoft 365 attacks in April - is expanding its reach. Rather than stealing passwords, Kali365 captures OAuth access and refresh tokens by tricking victims into completing attacker-initiated Microsoft device-login requests, granting immediate mailbox access. The service generates branded lures impersonating Adobe, DocuSign, and SharePoint in many languages and sells in tiers from $250 for 30 days to $2,000 annually. Its continued growth signals that OAuth device-code consent phishing remains a high-yield technique, and that defenders should prioritize blocking device-code flows for non-mobile platforms and enforcing phishing-resistant MFA across Microsoft 365 tenants.

Check
Search Microsoft 365 logs for unfamiliar device-login completions and OAuth consent grants. Hunt for inbox rules hiding security alerts. Block Adobe/DocuSign/SharePoint-themed device-code lures.
Affected
Microsoft 365 tenants where users can complete attacker-initiated device-login flows. Kali365's branded multi-language lures and tiered pricing keep OAuth device-code phishing scalable and growing.
Fix
Block device-code flow in Conditional Access for non-mobile platforms. Enforce phishing-resistant FIDO2 MFA. Train users to verify device-login codes. Audit OAuth-granted apps regularly.

Red Hat @redhat-cloud-services npm namespace compromised with 'Miasma' Shai-Hulud variant - 30+ packages, 117K weekly downloads, steals dev and cloud secrets

More than 30 npm packages under Red Hat's @redhat-cloud-services namespace were backdoored in a supply-chain attack distributing a new Shai-Hulud variant dubbed 'Miasma.' Aikido and OX Security found dozens of package versions laced with malware that steals developer credentials, cloud secrets, SSH keys, and CI/CD tokens. Aikido says the compromised packages pull roughly 117,000 weekly downloads. Red Hat told BleepingComputer it removed the affected packages after becoming aware of the incident and that the compromise was limited to internal development tooling, with no impact on production products or services. The Miasma variant continues the self-propagating worm behavior that made the original Shai-Hulud campaign so disruptive.

Check
Inventory projects pulling @redhat-cloud-services npm packages. Check package-lock.json for backdoored versions since the compromise. Rotate developer, cloud, SSH, and CI/CD credentials reachable from build hosts.
Affected
30+ @redhat-cloud-services npm packages (~117K weekly downloads) backdoored with the Miasma Shai-Hulud variant. Red Hat says impact is limited to internal development tooling, not production products.
Fix
Remove affected package versions and pin to known-clean releases via lockfile. Rotate all secrets reachable from affected developer and CI hosts. Apply Aikido and OX Security IoCs.

codexui-android npm steals OpenAI Codex auth tokens for a month - non-expiring refresh_token exfiltrated to fake Sentry endpoint

Aikido Security has disclosed that codexui-android, an npm package advertised as a remote web UI for OpenAI Codex with over 29,000 weekly downloads, has been silently exfiltrating users' Codex authentication tokens for the past month. Unlike a typosquat, the malware was embedded into a functional, actively-developed package roughly a month after publication to build trust; the GitHub repo stayed clean. The code reads ~/.codex/auth.json and ships the access_token, refresh_token, id_token, and account ID to sentry.anyclaw[.]store, a server masquerading as Sentry. The non-expiring refresh_token lets an attacker silently impersonate the developer indefinitely with full Codex account access. The package remains available; the npm account is 'friuns.'

Check
Inventory developer machines for the codexui-android npm package. If present, treat ~/.codex/auth.json as compromised. Search egress for traffic to sentry.anyclaw[.]store.
Affected
Developers who installed codexui-android (29K weekly downloads, still live). Stolen non-expiring Codex refresh_tokens give attackers persistent, silent impersonation of the victim's OpenAI Codex account.
Fix
Remove codexui-android. Revoke and re-issue OpenAI Codex sessions; the refresh_token does not expire, so rotation is mandatory. Pin dependencies and audit AI-tooling packages before install.

DriveSurge initial-access broker hijacks thousands of sites for ClickFix and FakeUpdates, routes victims through zTDS pay-per-install network

SilentPush has detailed DriveSurge, a threat actor running large-scale malware-distribution campaigns by compromising thousands of websites and using ClickFix and FakeUpdates social engineering. ClickFix tricks visitors into copying and running malicious commands under the pretense of fixing a technical issue; FakeUpdates uses fraudulent browser-update prompts. DriveSurge operates primarily as an initial-access broker on a pay-per-install model, enabling follow-on attacks by other criminals. Compromised-site visitors are routed through a Traffic Distribution System called zTDS that profiles them before redirecting to malware-delivery infrastructure. The model lets DriveSurge monetize hijacked traffic at scale while downstream actors deploy infostealers, loaders, or ransomware. The campaign overlaps with the broader ClickFix surge across the ecosystem.

Check
Hunt web properties for unauthorized injected redirect scripts and zTDS-related indicators. Train staff that browser-update prompts and 'paste this command to fix' pages are ClickFix/FakeUpdates lures.
Affected
Visitors to thousands of compromised websites redirected through DriveSurge's zTDS. Any organization whose users browse compromised sites can receive infostealers, loaders, or ransomware via pay-per-install.
Fix
Apply SilentPush IoCs and block known zTDS infrastructure. Deploy script-integrity monitoring on your own sites. Disable clipboard-to-terminal workflows; train users never to run commands a webpage supplies.

WordPress malware hides C2 in Steam profile comments using invisible Unicode - ~1,980 sites infected since July 2025

GoDaddy has documented a WordPress malware campaign that hides command-and-control data inside Steam Community profile comments, abusing Valve's platform to avoid running separate C2 infrastructure and evade detection. Around 1,980 WordPress sites have been infected since July 2025. The first-stage malware loads a Steam profile on each page view and extracts text from benign-looking comments that conceal a payload encoded with six invisible Unicode characters such as zero-width joiners. The decoder maps the invisible characters to bytes, reconstructs a URL to hello-mywordl[.]info, and injects JavaScript disguised as a legitimate library into every frontend page. The final stage is a backdoor that responds to POST requests carrying a specific authentication cookie.

Check
Audit WordPress sites for injected first-stage loaders calling Steam Community profiles and frontend JavaScript from hello-mywordl[.]info. Check admin accounts, FTP/SFTP credentials, and theme/plugin integrity.
Affected
WordPress sites compromised via stolen admin logins, weak FTP/SFTP credentials, or vulnerable themes/plugins. ~1,980 sites infected since July 2025 using Steam profile comments as a covert C2 channel.
Fix
Remove injected scripts and the POST-triggered backdoor. Rotate all WordPress admin and FTP/SFTP credentials. Patch themes/plugins. Block hello-mywordl[.]info and monitor web-server requests to Steam profile pages.