Last updated: November 2, 2026 at 1:20 PM UTC
All 957 Vulnerability 399 Breach 144 Threat 407 Defense 7
Tag: backdoor (14 articles)Clear

LiteLLM 1.107.0 compromised in supply chain attack delivering credential stealer and GitHub-controlled backdoor

Researchers at SafeDep, Socket, StepSecurity, and Upwind reported that LiteLLM version 1.107.0, a popular Python AI gateway, was published with malware through compromised GitHub CLI OAuth tokens belonging to three engineers. A cook.pth file runs a payload whenever the Python interpreter starts, even before LiteLLM is imported. The first stage, calling itself privcollect, harvests cloud tokens, developer credentials, private keys, AI tooling credential files, browser data, environment variables, and the proxy's saved keys and model config, exfiltrating over HTTP to litellm[.]dev/healthcheck. A second payload is a backdoor that fetches and runs further commands. The PyPI package and Docker images were pulled, and users should pin to 1.106.2.

Check
Check whether LiteLLM 1.107.0 was installed from PyPI or Docker, and if so revoke and replace all reachable credentials from a clean machine, then pin to 1.106.2.
Affected
Systems that installed LiteLLM 1.107.0 ran a credential stealer and backdoor on Python startup, exposing cloud tokens, keys, browser data, and the LiteLLM proxy's saved secrets.
Fix
Pin LiteLLM to 1.106.2 by digest, rotate every exposed credential, remove the cook.pth persistence, and block outbound traffic to the litellm.dev healthcheck exfiltration endpoint.

Attackers abuse stolen UpdraftCentral keys to install backdoor plugins on connected WordPress sites

TeamUpdraft disclosed that attackers breached its website over the October 17 weekend and reached its customer database, obtaining names, emails, hashed passwords, 2FA settings, and the UpdraftCentral connection keys that let them push backdoor plugins to connected WordPress sites. UpdraftPlus, a backup plugin with over four million installs, ships an UpdraftCentral client in every copy. Patchstack saw signed plugin.upload_plugin commands over an 18-hour window and 99 backdoor plugin names, and one backdoor creates a persistent data-ops43 editor account that survives plugin removal. Fixes are in UpdraftPlus 1.26.13 and 2.26.13, which disconnect pre-incident UpdraftCentral connections. Site owners should rotate keys and hunt for rogue accounts.

Check
Update UpdraftPlus to 1.26.13 or 2.26.13, delete the UpdraftCentral connection key, and check WordPress sites for unknown admin or editor accounts and plugins.
Affected
WordPress sites connected to cloud UpdraftCentral could receive attacker-pushed backdoor plugins and a persistent data-ops43 account that survives plugin removal and normal login unless 2FA blocks it.
Fix
Apply the fixed UpdraftPlus release, rotate UpdraftCentral and storage keys, remove rogue accounts and plugins including must-use plugins, and restore from a pre-October-17 backup if needed.

Attackers exploit Ninja Forms WordPress plugin stored cross-site scripting flaw to plant site backdoors

Patchstack identified a campaign on October 4 exploiting CVE-2026-94504, a high-severity stored cross-site scripting flaw in the Ninja Forms WordPress plugin, which is installed on more than 500,000 sites. Attackers plant malicious JavaScript in form submissions, and when a logged-in administrator loads the content, the script runs under the authenticated WordPress session. The payload installs a backdoor plugin and creates several hidden access paths: a visible administrator account, a concealed account kept out of the user list, a secret login URL, and unauthenticated file manager access. Versions 3.15.3 and older are affected, with a fix in 3.15.4.

Check
Update the Ninja Forms plugin to 3.15.4 or later on all WordPress sites, then check for unknown administrator accounts, rogue plugins, and hidden login paths.
Affected
WordPress sites running Ninja Forms 3.15.3 or older let attackers store malicious JavaScript that runs in an administrator's session to install backdoors and hidden admin accounts.
Fix
Upgrade Ninja Forms, remove unauthorized admin accounts and backdoor plugins, rotate credentials and keys, and audit for secret login URLs and file manager access.

WordPress SC backdoor rebuilds itself from files database and shared memory after cleanup

Sucuri detailed a WordPress compromise using a backdoor it codenamed SC, after SC_ markers in the injected content, which it describes as a self-healing mesh. The payload lives in at least eight places at once, spread across files, the database, and a shared-memory segment, and every location can rebuild all the others. Cleaning every file on disk lets the next page load restore the whole set from the database or shared memory, so there is no single point to remove. The malware carries no readable function names, using a substitution cipher to unscramble its code, and a .user.ini auto_prepend_file runs a loader before every PHP request.

Check
Treat infected WordPress sites as needing coordinated full cleanup across files, database, and runtime, and rebuild from a known-good backup where feasible.
Affected
WordPress sites hit by the SC backdoor cannot be cleaned piecemeal, since files, database entries, and shared memory each regenerate the removed components.
Fix
Take the site offline during cleanup, purge all eight component types together, rotate credentials and keys, restore from clean backups, and harden PHP auto_prepend_file.

GigaWiper bundles disk wiping and fake ransomware into one Windows backdoor

Microsoft detailed GigaWiper, a destructive Windows backdoor that stitches several older malware families into one implant, letting operators choose how to destroy a machine. Its commands include a raw disk wiper that overwrites the drive and partition table, a multi-pass wiper for the Windows drive, and a fake-ransomware module that encrypts files with keys it never saves, so there is no recovery and no ransom note, only destruction disguised as extortion. It also offers remote access and log clearing. To hide, it poses as OneDrive through a scheduled task and routes command traffic over legitimate services like RabbitMQ and Redis. Because it runs after intrusion, offline backups are the real defense.

Check
Hunt for GigaWiper's signs, including a scheduled task posing as OneDrive Update, command traffic to RabbitMQ or Redis services you do not use, and unexpected changes to disk partitions or recovery settings.
Affected
Windows organizations an attacker has already breached; GigaWiper can destroy disks and files irreversibly while disguising the destruction as ransomware, and can also spy and maintain remote access before it strikes.
Fix
Keep tested, offline backups since wiped data cannot be decrypted, enable tamper protection and endpoint detection in block mode, monitor for suspicious scheduled tasks and disk operations, and restrict outbound traffic.

Tenda routers ship a hidden backdoor password with no patch available

CERT/CC has warned that several Tenda router firmware versions contain an undocumented authentication backdoor that grants full administrative access to the web management interface. Tracked as CVE-2026-11405, the flaw lives in the login function of the router's web server: if normal password checking fails, the firmware compares the supplied password against a hidden value stored in the device configuration and, on a match, grants admin access regardless of the username. It affects models including the FH1201, W15E, AC10, AC5, and AC6, is baked into the firmware, and cannot be disabled from the interface. Tenda has not responded, so there is no fix, and public exploit tooling is already scanning for vulnerable devices.

Check
Identify any Tenda routers in use, especially the affected FH1201, W15E, AC10, AC5, and AC6 models, and check whether the web management interface is reachable remotely or from untrusted networks.
Affected
Users of affected Tenda router models (CVE-2026-11405); anyone who can reach the web management interface can log in as administrator using a hidden backdoor password, with no valid credentials needed.
Fix
With no patch available, disable remote management, change the default LAN IP, restrict management access to trusted hosts, monitor for scanning on UDP port 7329, and plan to replace unsupported devices.

Stealthy Mistic backdoor gives ransomware access broker KongTuke lasting footholds

Symantec and Zscaler detailed Mistic, a stealthy new Windows backdoor used in intrusions since April and tied to KongTuke, an initial access broker that sells footholds to ransomware crews including Qilin, Akira, and Rhysida. Mistic is side-loaded through a legitimate Microsoft executable and a malicious DLL named to mimic endpoint-security software, runs payloads only in memory with nothing written to disk, and includes a self-delete kill switch, all aimed at long-term, low-visibility access. It is delivered through social-engineering lures such as fake CAPTCHAs and Microsoft Teams help-desk pretexts that trick users into running PowerShell commands. Defenders should watch for the unusual DLL side-loading pattern.

Check
Hunt for the legitimate MpExtMs.exe process side-loading unexpected DLLs, in-memory-only payloads, and signs of paste-and-run PowerShell delivered through fake CAPTCHAs or Microsoft Teams help-desk messages.
Affected
Enterprises across insurance, education, IT, and professional services targeted by KongTuke; a quiet, in-memory backdoor establishes durable access that is later sold to ransomware affiliates for deployment.
Fix
Train users against paste-and-run and fake IT-support lures, restrict PowerShell and script execution, deploy behavioral detection for DLL side-loading and in-memory backdoors, and apply the published indicators of compromise.

Hacked WordPress plugin updates push credential-stealing backdoor to paying sites

Attackers compromised the build pipeline of ShapedPlugin, a WordPress plugin maker, and slipped malware into legitimate updates delivered to paying customers through the vendor's own update system. The tainted releases install a fake plugin that impersonates WooCommerce components, steals site credentials, and gives attackers the ability to write files remotely. Three paid plugins are affected: Product Slider Pro for WooCommerce, Real Testimonials Pro, and Smart Post Show Pro. The backdoor was injected into Pro builds on May 21, with the first customer reports on June 10. Versions on WordPress.org stayed clean, pointing to a compromise of the vendor's release infrastructure rather than the plugins themselves.

Check
Check whether your WordPress sites run ShapedPlugin's Product Slider Pro, Real Testimonials Pro, or Smart Post Show Pro, and look for unfamiliar plugins impersonating WooCommerce components and new admin or file-write activity.
Affected
WordPress sites that updated the paid plugins Product Slider Pro (before 3.5.4), Real Testimonials Pro 3.2.5, or Smart Post Show Pro (before 4.0.2) between May 21 and the fix (tracked as CVE-2026-10735).
Fix
Update the affected ShapedPlugin products to fixed versions, remove any rogue WooCommerce-impersonating plugin, rotate all site and admin credentials, and scan the site for web shells and unauthorized file changes.

WordPress plugin supply-chain attack backdoors sites via Awesome Motive CDN

Attackers compromised the content-delivery network of Awesome Motive, one of the biggest WordPress plugin makers, and injected malicious JavaScript into files served for OptinMonster, TrustPulse, and PushEngage, plugins running on more than 1.2 million sites. Discovered by Sansec, the code only triggered when a logged-in WordPress administrator viewed an affected site, at which point it stole authentication tokens, created a hidden rogue admin account, and installed a self-concealing backdoor plugin that exposed a web shell. The bad files were served on June 12 to 14. Awesome Motive says attackers stole a CDN API key after breaching its marketing site, and has since rotated credentials.

Check
If your site runs OptinMonster, TrustPulse, or PushEngage, check for rogue admin accounts like developer_api1 or dev_xxxxxx and inspect wp-content/plugins for hidden backdoor plugins.
Affected
WordPress sites running OptinMonster, TrustPulse, or PushEngage where an administrator was logged in during the June 12 to 14 injection window; other Awesome Motive plugins should be treated cautiously.
Fix
Remove rogue admin accounts and backdoor plugins, then rotate administrator passwords, API keys, database credentials, and WordPress security salts. Update affected plugins and scan the site for further tampering.

Mr_Rot13 actor exploits cPanel CVE-2026-41940 to deploy cross-platform 'Filemanager' backdoor

QiAnXin XLab has tied the ongoing exploitation of cPanel's CVE-2026-41940 to a previously-quiet threat actor it tracks as Mr_Rot13, who has been operating since at least 2020. The attack chain exploits the cPanel and WHM authentication bypass to drop a Go-based infector that adds an attacker SSH key, plants a PHP web shell, and serves a fake login page to steal cPanel credentials (ROT13-encoded, exfiltrated to wrned[.]com). The final payload is a cross-platform backdoor called Filemanager that runs on Windows, macOS, and Linux. XLab counts over 2,000 attacker source IPs currently scanning for this flaw.

Check
Search cPanel and WHM authentication logs for unusual successful logins since April 28. Check /root/.ssh/authorized_keys on every cPanel host for unknown public keys, and search web roots for unfamiliar PHP files.
Affected
Any cPanel or WHM installation that was not patched against CVE-2026-41940 between disclosure on April 28, 2026, and now. Indicators of Mr_Rot13 compromise include the SSH public key added under root, the wrned[.]com credential exfiltration domain, the cp.dene[.]de[.]com infector source, and the wpsock[.]com Filemanager delivery domain.
Fix
If still unpatched, install the cPanel fix for CVE-2026-41940 immediately. On any host that was internet-exposed and unpatched, assume compromise: remove unknown SSH keys from root, sweep for unfamiliar PHP web shells, block the indicator domains wrned[.]com, cp.dene[.]de[.]com, and wpsock[.]com at egress, rotate cPanel and WHM root credentials, and check bash_history for evidence of attacker reconnaissance.