Last updated: November 2, 2026 at 1:20 PM UTC
All 957 Vulnerability 399 Breach 144 Threat 407 Defense 7
Tag: ci-cd (19 articles)Clear

Gheist campaign uses stolen GitHub tokens to leak private repository secrets through Actions logs

Wiz detailed Gheist, an automated campaign that uses stolen GitHub tokens to push a sync-check.yml workflow to a short-lived ci-sync branch, then reads the job's secrets from the run log. The workflow base32-encodes every secret the job can access, defeating GitHub's log masking, downloads the log through the API, and deletes the run seconds later, so nothing leaves through an attacker server. Since September 15, Wiz recovered more than 13,500 planted branches across more than 850 compromised accounts, succeeding in private repositories and GitHub Enterprise, where GitHub's hold on suspicious runs does not apply. Rotate every reachable secret, since deleting branches does not undo exposure.

Check
Hunt for ci-sync branches containing only a sync-check.yml workflow and runs deleted shortly after finishing, and rotate every secret those repositories could access.
Affected
Private GitHub repositories and Enterprise servers reachable with a stolen token can have all their accessible secrets leaked through a planted workflow's run logs.
Fix
Rotate repository, organization, and environment secrets, revoke the tokens that pushed commits, prefer short-lived fine-grained tokens, and require reviewers on environments holding production secrets.

GitLab patches critical integer overflow in CI/CD regex compiler enabling unauthenticated remote code execution

GitLab disclosed CVE-2026-97229, a critical integer overflow in the CI/CD regular expression compiler that parses and evaluates regular expressions in pipeline configuration files. Under certain conditions, an unauthenticated user can execute arbitrary code on the GitLab server through a specially crafted regular expression. It affects versions from 19.2 before 19.2.8, 19.3 before 19.3.4, and 19.4 before 19.4.2, with fixes in 19.2.8, 19.3.4, and 19.4.2. Self-managed installations must upgrade immediately, while GitLab.com already runs the patched version and Dedicated customers need no action. A researcher reported it through GitLab's HackerOne program, and no exploitation is reported.

Check
Upgrade self-managed GitLab to 19.2.8, 19.3.4, or 19.4.2 immediately, since GitLab.com and Dedicated are already covered and no action is needed there.
Affected
Self-managed GitLab versions before the fixed releases let an unauthenticated user run arbitrary code on the server through a crafted regular expression in pipeline configuration.
Fix
Apply the fixed GitLab releases to self-managed installations, restrict who can submit pipeline configurations, and review the server for unexpected code execution.

Credential-stealing GitHub Actions workflows planted across tens of thousands of repositories via compromised maintainer accounts

Socket, StepSecurity, and GitGuardian reported a resurgence of the GhostAction supply chain campaign, in which more than 500 GitHub accounts committed a credential-stealing workflow to tens of thousands of repositories since October 7. The attacker likely used maintainer personal access tokens leaked in infostealer logs, starting with the author of the pyxel game engine and spreading to other accounts. The injected workflow, disguised as a security audit, scans the working tree and full git history against 13 secret patterns, including AWS, Anthropic, OpenAI, and GitLab keys, and exfiltrates them over plain HTTP to a hardcoded address. Earlier GhostAction activity hit 772 repositories and thousands of secrets.

Check
Search repositories and forks for security-audit.yml or github_actions_security.yml workflows added since August 31, and if present assume compromise and rotate every exposed secret.
Affected
Repositories whose maintainer tokens were leaked had a rogue workflow injected that steals GitHub Actions secrets and any credentials in the working tree and git history.
Fix
Revoke compromised GitHub credentials, delete the malicious workflow from all branches and forks, rotate all exposed secrets, and store tokens outside infostealer-reachable locations.

Compromised GitHub Actions came back online still executing Mini Shai-Hulud credential malware

Socket reported that two GitHub Actions, actions-cool/issues-helper and actions-cool/maintain-one-comment, were disabled a second time after their repositories became accessible again on September 16, months after being compromised in the May Mini Shai-Hulud campaign. When the repositories returned, their release tags were not cleaned up and still pointed to the malicious content introduced on May 18, so any workflow referencing either action by a version tag resumed downloading and executing the payload on its next run. The original May 18 compromise ran code that harvested credentials from CI/CD pipelines and exfiltrated them, activity linked to the Mini Shai-Hulud cluster through a shared exfiltration domain. GitHub has again disabled both repositories.

Check
Audit workflows for references to the two actions-cool actions, pin actions to trusted commit hashes, and rotate any CI/CD secrets exposed since September 16.
Affected
Pipelines referencing the affected actions-cool actions by version tag re-ran the May 18 payload after September 16, harvesting and exfiltrating CI/CD credentials.
Fix
Remove or repin the actions to vetted commits, rotate pipeline secrets, and prefer commit-hash pinning over mutable version tags for third-party actions.

Shai-Hulud npm worm now hunts credentials across 469 different locations

Researchers at GitGuardian found that a recent variant of the self-spreading Shai-Hulud npm worm has expanded its credential theft to scan 469 distinct locations on infected developer machines. The targets now span developer environments, continuous integration and deployment tooling, cloud configuration files, and even the configuration of AI tools. That breadth turns a single compromised package into a wide net for secrets, from cloud and registry credentials to keys held by developer and AI tooling. It reflects how supply-chain worms are industrializing secret collection, treating any credential a developer's machine can reach as fair game once malicious code runs during installation or use.

Check
Scan your dependencies and lockfiles for known-compromised packages, rotate any credentials that a developer machine or pipeline can reach, and reduce the number of long-lived secrets stored in reachable configuration files.
Affected
Developers and CI/CD systems that install compromised npm packages; the worm harvests credentials from 469 locations across developer, pipeline, cloud, and AI-tool configurations, then uses them to spread and steal further secrets.
Fix
Pin and vet dependencies, use scoped short-lived tokens instead of long-lived secrets, isolate build environments, monitor for credential access during installs, and keep secrets out of files developer and AI tools read.

Attackers exploit a critical JFrog Artifactory flaw to mint admin tokens

Days after disclosure, attackers are exploiting a critical authentication-bypass flaw in JFrog Artifactory, the widely used repository manager for binaries, packages, containers, and build artifacts. Tracked as CVE-2026-82329 and scored 9.8, the flaw lets an unauthenticated attacker with network access gain administrative privileges under Artifactory's default configuration. Researchers at watchTowr observed exploitation beginning September 1, with attackers minting admin tokens for themselves and enumerating users, groups, and credentials. Because Artifactory sits at the center of software supply chains and CI/CD pipelines, admin access lets attackers tamper with build pipelines, poison trusted dependencies, and push malicious code downstream to customers. JFrog patched it in version 7.161.20 on August 28.

Check
Patch self-managed JFrog Artifactory to 7.161.20 or later immediately, prioritizing internet-exposed instances, then inspect audit logs for unexpected admin tokens, user enumeration, and any changes to hosted artifacts.
Affected
Organizations running self-managed JFrog Artifactory in default configuration (CVE-2026-82329); an unauthenticated attacker with network access can gain admin, mint tokens, harvest credentials, and tamper with the supply chain, and exploitation is active.
Fix
Patch now, rotate Artifactory credentials and tokens, review hosted packages and build pipelines for tampering, restrict network exposure of the service, and treat any exposed unpatched instance as a supply-chain compromise.

GitHub issue title let an AI agent hijack Snowflake CI and steal a token

Researchers at Wiz found that a public Snowflake code repository could be hijacked through nothing more than a crafted GitHub issue title. A workflow that ran when issues were opened dropped the attacker-controlled title straight into a command, so an unauthenticated user could run code on the GitHub Actions runner and steal a Jira API token used by the automation. The notable twist is how the bug arrived: it was introduced days earlier by an AI tool meant to fix security issues, and an AI code reviewer approved the change. Snowflake fixed it by passing the title safely as an argument rather than expanding it into a command.

Check
Audit GitHub Actions workflows that run on untrusted input like issue titles or pull requests, and never interpolate that input directly into shell commands; pass it as environment variables or arguments.
Affected
Repositories whose workflows trigger on issues or pull requests and interpolate attacker-controlled text into commands; an unauthenticated user can run code on the runner and steal the secrets the workflow holds.
Fix
Sanitize untrusted workflow input, minimize the secrets and permissions each workflow can access, and do not assume AI-generated or AI-reviewed code is safe, since automated fixes and reviews miss injection flaws.

A single GitHub issue could reach CI secrets across major AI coding agents

Novee Security showed at Black Hat that a GitHub issue opened by an account with no repository access could reach the CI runners behind major AI coding agents in their default configurations, tested against Claude Code, Gemini CLI, and Codex. The strongest, a Gemini CLI container-launcher command injection scored 10.0, runs code on the CI host before the sandbox starts. In Claude Code, a validator that stripped quoted text let a payload in a Git flag reach the runner, and a separate flaw leaked an API key through a download counter. Untrusted issue content reaching an agent that holds secrets and tools in the same runtime is the shared weakness.

Check
Update Gemini CLI to 0.39.1 and Claude Code to 2.1.163, and review any workflow where an AI agent runs automatically on issues or pull requests from untrusted users.
Affected
Teams running AI coding agents on public repositories in default configurations (CVE-2026-12537, CVE-2026-54316); an unprivileged GitHub issue or pull request can reach CI runners and expose workflow secrets and tokens.
Fix
Patch the agents, restrict their tools with allowlists rather than blocklists, give triage and review agents read-only tokens, and keep separate agent runs from sharing writable directories.

Google removes AI agent workflows after a GitHub issue could hijack a privileged agent

Pillar Security showed that Google's Agent Development Kit repository could be turned against itself through a poisoned pull request or issue. The public repository ran a low-privileged triage agent that responded to outside contributions, and a higher-privileged agent reserved for maintainers. Because the triage agent posted through a bot account that counted as a repository collaborator, a prompt injection could make it post a command that satisfied the privileged workflow's trust check, invoking the maintainer-level agent. That crossed into a job holding a long-lived access token, a Google API key, and a cloud service-account credential, enabling code execution on the runner and secret theft. Google deleted the affected workflows.

Check
Review any AI agent workflows that act on untrusted pull requests or issues, and check whether a low-privileged agent can trigger a higher-privileged one through a shared bot identity.
Affected
Teams running tiered AI agent workflows in code repositories; untrusted issue or pull-request content can prompt-inject a public agent into invoking a privileged one, exposing continuous integration secrets and code execution.
Fix
Give agents scoped, non-collaborator identities, keep untrusted content from reaching privileged workflows, require human approval for sensitive agent actions, and minimize the tokens and credentials an agent job can access.

Critical TeamCity flaw lets unauthenticated attackers run commands on the CI server

JetBrains patched a critical flaw in TeamCity, its continuous integration and delivery server, that lets an unauthenticated attacker run operating-system commands. Tracked as CVE-2026-63077 and scored 9.8, the deserialization bug affects all on-premises versions and is reached through the agent polling protocol, letting an attacker with HTTP access bypass authentication and execute commands with the privileges of the server process. JetBrains warns that exploitation exposes stored credentials and can compromise the integrity of the build pipeline. It is fixed in versions 2025.11.7 and 2026.1.3, with a patch plugin for older releases, and TeamCity Cloud is already updated. No exploitation has been reported.

Check
Upgrade on-premises TeamCity to 2025.11.7 or 2026.1.3, or apply the security patch plugin if you cannot upgrade, and restrict network access to the server.
Affected
Organizations running any on-premises TeamCity version (CVE-2026-63077); an unauthenticated attacker with HTTP access can execute commands as the server process, steal stored credentials, and tamper with build pipelines.
Fix
Patch or apply the plugin, keep TeamCity off the public internet or behind a VPN, rotate credentials the server held, and review build configurations and logs for unauthorized changes.