TeamPCP, the group behind the March Trivy breach and Shai-Hulud npm worm, used credentials stolen in that March attack to publish a backdoored version of Checkmarx's Jenkins AST plugin to the Jenkins Marketplace. This is the third Checkmarx supply-chain hit since late March. The rogue version 2026.5.09 went up on May 9, outside Checkmarx's normal release process - no git tag, no GitHub release. Checkmarx says its GitHub repos are isolated from customer production and no customer data is stored there, but anyone who installed the bad plugin should assume their CI credentials are compromised, rotate them all, and hunt for lateral movement.
Checkmarx confirmed Friday that data from its private GitHub repository was posted on the dark web following the March 23 TeamPCP supply-chain attack. The LAPSUS$ group published the dump, which includes Checkmarx source code, an employee database, API keys, and MongoDB and MySQL credentials. Checkmarx says the affected GitHub repository was separate from the customer Checkmarx One SaaS production environment, with no customer data stored in it. The bigger picture: an attack that started by poisoning a single GitHub Action 35 days ago has now produced a full source code, credentials, and employee data leak - under five weeks end to end.
TeamPCP's self-propagating supply-chain worm is back in its third iteration, branded 'Shai-Hulud: The Third Coming' in hard-coded strings across the malware. On April 22, Socket reported Checkmarx's official KICS Docker images and a KICS VS Code / Open VSX extension had been trojanized. Bitwarden's own clients repo runs a Checkmarx scan on every pull request via a pull_request_target workflow that holds id-token: write and fetches credentials from Azure Key Vault, so when the poisoned scanner executed it harvested GitHub OIDC and Azure tokens. At 17:57 ET the same day, attackers used those tokens to push a modified publish-cli.yml to the Bitwarden repo and publish a malicious @bitwarden/cli version 2026.4.0 to npm. The package remained live for 93 minutes until Bitwarden pulled it at 19:30 ET. The payload: a 10MB obfuscated credential harvester that grabs SSH keys, cloud provider credentials, npm publish tokens, GitHub tokens, and - new in this variant - MCP (Model Context Protocol) configuration files used by Claude Code, Cursor, and similar AI coding tools. It then self-propagates by republishing into every npm package the victim can modify and uploads encrypted stolen secrets to public GitHub repositories under Dune-themed names. The worm has a Russian-locale kill switch (exits if LC_ALL/LANG starts with 'ru').
One group, four major compromises, nine days. TeamPCP started by backdooring Aqua Security's Trivy vulnerability scanner on March 19 - then used the stolen CI/CD credentials to poison LiteLLM, Checkmarx tools, and Telnyx one after another. Each compromised tool handed them the keys to the next target. They've now partnered with the Vect ransomware gang to turn stolen access into extortion.
TrustStrike Labs