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Last updated: May 13, 2026 at 5:42 AM UTC
All 208 Vulnerability 72 Breach 41 Threat 88 Defense 7

28 fake apps on Google Play tricked 7.3 million Indian users into paying for fake call logs - charging up to $80 a year for fabricated data

ESET disclosed CallPhantom, a campaign of 28 fraudulent Android apps on Google Play that promised to reveal call histories, SMS records, and WhatsApp call logs for any phone number. Combined downloads: 7.3 million. After payment (weekly, monthly, or annual subscriptions up to $80), users receive fabricated phone numbers and names hardcoded into the apps. Targeting was India-focused (apps came pre-set with +91 country code and UPI integration via Google Pay, PhonePe, and Paytm) plus broader Asia-Pacific. Some apps embedded direct credit card forms, violating Play policy and making refunds harder. Google removed the 28 apps after ESET's report.

Check
If your organization issues Android devices to staff in India or APAC, check Google Play purchase histories for active subscriptions to call-history apps. Review corporate phone bills for unexpected UPI charges since November 2025.
Affected
Android users in India and broader Asia-Pacific, particularly those who searched Play Store for tools to retrieve call logs, SMS records, or WhatsApp histories. Indian users are the primary target due to UPI integration - 7.3M+ confirmed downloads. Corporate-issued Android devices used for personal app downloads face the same risk.
Fix
Cancel any active CallPhantom subscriptions through Play Store - Google has removed the apps. Request refunds via Play Store (subject to Google's time windows). For UPI-paid subscriptions, contact your UPI provider directly. Brief staff that no legitimate consumer app can reveal call logs of arbitrary phone numbers. For corporate fleets: apply MDM policies that block sideloading.

Two pro-Ukraine hacker groups appear to be teaming up to attack Russian companies - sharing servers and tools across phishing and espionage operations

Update on the Head Mare campaign we covered April 28: Kaspersky now reports that BO Team (also known as Black Owl) and Head Mare appear to be coordinating cyber operations against Russian organizations, sharing command-and-control infrastructure on the same compromised hosts. The likely division of labor: Head Mare phishes for initial access, then BO Team takes over for malware deployment. BO Team has shifted from destructive attacks to covert espionage, and in Q1 2026 hit 20 Russian organizations across manufacturing, telecoms, and oil and gas. The group uses BrockenDoor and Remcos backdoors. Earlier BO Team campaigns hit a Russian drone supplier and the federal digital signature authority.

Check
If your organization operates in Russia or has Russian subsidiaries, search proxy logs for BrockenDoor or Remcos C2 infrastructure since January. Hunt phishing emails referencing manufacturing, telecom, or oil and gas subjects with malicious documents.
Affected
Russian organizations across manufacturing, telecoms, and oil and gas - BO Team's Q1 2026 target list. By extension, Russian subsidiaries of Western multinationals operating in these sectors. The pattern of pro-Ukraine hacktivists coordinating with state-aligned operations means defenders cannot treat hacktivist incidents as opportunistic - they may be one stage of a longer espionage operation.
Fix
Block known BrockenDoor and Remcos C2 indicators per Kaspersky's published IoCs. Monitor for the phishing→malware deployment handoff pattern: phishing email landing followed within days by C2 traffic from a different actor. For organizations not in Russia: this is a template for how hacktivist groups in other regional conflicts may coordinate; expect the same pattern in Middle East and APAC tensions.

New 'TCLBanker' Android malware spreads itself by hijacking WhatsApp and Outlook to message every contact in the victim's address book

Researchers disclosed TCLBANKER, an Android banking trojan that adds worm-style self-propagation: once installed, it abuses Accessibility Services to read the victim's WhatsApp and Outlook contact lists and then send malicious download links to every contact as if from the victim. The malware targets banking and crypto-wallet apps with overlay screens that capture credentials, plus SMS-interception modules that grab one-time passcodes. Self-spreading via the victim's own messaging history defeats traditional URL-reputation controls. The campaign concentrates in Brazil, Spain, and Italy banking apps initially. Operators are renting access on Telegram for $1,500-3,000/month.

Check
Brief staff who manage Android devices that any 'app download' link sent through WhatsApp or Outlook from a known contact during business hours should be verified out-of-band before clicking. Review unfamiliar Android apps requesting Accessibility Services.
Affected
Android users in Brazil, Spain, and Italy initially - but worm-style spread will broaden the geography rapidly. Acute risk: anyone whose phone has Accessibility Services enabled for any third-party app. Banking and cryptocurrency app users face credential theft via overlay attacks. Contact networks of infected users get the lures next.
Fix
On managed Android devices: enforce MDM policies that block sideloading and require approval for any app requesting Accessibility Services. Disable Accessibility Services for apps that don't genuinely need it. Brief staff on the worm-spread pattern: contacts sending links to download apps is a hostile signal regardless of who the sender is.

New 'PCPJack' worm hunts down and removes competing malware before stealing cloud credentials - exploits five different vulnerabilities to spread

BleepingComputer and The Hacker News disclosed a new credential-stealing worm called PCPJack that hunts and removes the well-established TeamPCP malware family before installing itself - the first observed case of one cybercrime operation systematically displacing another at scale. PCPJack exploits five separate vulnerabilities to spread worm-like across cloud and Linux environments, then steals SSH keys, AWS credentials, GitHub tokens, and other secrets. Operators replace TeamPCP files in place rather than just disabling them, suggesting an attempt to inherit TeamPCP's existing victim base. The pattern signals a maturing cybercrime market.

Check
Search EDR and cloud logs for sudden disappearance of TeamPCP indicators on hosts that previously had them - that is the likely PCPJack handover signature. Hunt for outbound credential-theft traffic patterns matching the five CVEs PCPJack exploits.
Affected
Linux servers, cloud workloads (AWS, GCP, Azure), and CI/CD runners that previously had TeamPCP cryptominer infections. Any host running unpatched versions of the five CVEs PCPJack exploits is in scope. Cloud accounts where SSH keys, IAM access keys, or GitHub tokens are stored on compromised workloads face credential-theft escalation.
Fix
Patch all five CVEs PCPJack exploits per the Wiz and Datadog IoC publications. Rotate cloud credentials, SSH keys, and GitHub tokens on any host that may have had TeamPCP - do not assume TeamPCP cleanup means safety. Block PCPJack C2 domains at egress. Shift to short-lived IAM credentials via OIDC and remove static keys from VMs entirely.

Fake Claude AI website is delivering a brand-new Windows malware called 'Beagle' to people searching for the chatbot

BleepingComputer reports a fake Claude AI website is delivering a previously undocumented Windows malware called Beagle. The site impersonates Anthropic's Claude with a near-perfect clone of the official UI; visitors who click 'Download for Windows' get a Beagle installer rather than the legitimate Claude desktop app (Anthropic distributes Claude through claude.ai and the Mac App Store, not standalone Windows installers). Beagle harvests credentials from browsers, cryptocurrency wallets, Discord tokens, and SSH keys. Distribution is via Google Ads on Claude-related search terms - the same paid-placement abuse pattern hitting GoDaddy ManageWP, AWS, and Notion.

Check
Search proxy logs for visits to Claude-themed domains other than claude.ai or anthropic.com over the past 30 days. Hunt Windows endpoints for processes with Anthropic-branded names not signed by Anthropic.
Affected
Windows users searching for Claude or Anthropic products via Google search, particularly developers and AI-curious users. Acute risk: organizations whose staff use Claude through individual rather than enterprise accounts (no centralized management), and developers who pull AI tooling installers from search results. Cryptocurrency holders are at the highest risk.
Fix
Block Google Ads on AI-product searches via corporate browser policy or uBlock Origin. Brief staff that Anthropic distributes Claude through claude.ai and the Mac App Store - there is no standalone Windows installer. Treat any endpoint that downloaded a 'Claude installer' since April as compromised: rotate browser-stored credentials, crypto wallet keys, Discord tokens, and SSH keys.

Polish intelligence says hackers attacked control systems at Polish water treatment plants

Polish intelligence service ABW announced Wednesday that hackers attacked the industrial control systems at multiple Polish water treatment plants. The Record reports the targeting profile is consistent with state-aligned activity - patient reconnaissance, careful access, no data destruction. Polish authorities have not formally attributed the attack but the timing (alongside Russia-Ukraine conflict and Russia's interest in Polish infrastructure as a NATO frontline state) is unmistakable. Similar incidents have been reported in Germany, Austria, and the Netherlands over the past 12 months. No service disruption was reported, but the access establishes pre-positioning.

Check
If you run water, electric, gas, or transport infrastructure, audit your industrial control system (ICS) and SCADA networks for unfamiliar VPN connections, new remote access tool installations, or anomalous outbound traffic since January.
Affected
Water utilities, power grid operators, and other critical infrastructure operators in NATO frontline states (Poland, Baltic states, Romania, Finland) and adjacent countries. Acute risk for utilities running internet-reachable HMI or engineering workstations. Smaller municipal water utilities without dedicated OT security staff are most exposed because they cannot detect patient state-actor reconnaissance.
Fix
Air-gap or one-way-data-diode-isolate ICS networks from corporate IT where possible. Inventory and remove any unauthorized remote-access tools (TeamViewer, AnyDesk, ScreenConnect) on engineering workstations. Apply CISA's water utility cyber guidance and Poland's CERT.PL recommendations. Conduct a tabletop exercise focused on prolonged ICS reconnaissance scenarios.

North Korean hackers built a fake Korean game platform to spread Android spyware targeting ethnic Koreans living in China

ScarCruft (also called APT37 or Reaper) built a fake online gaming platform in Korean to spread BirdCall, a previously undocumented Android malware aimed at ethnic Koreans living in China. The Record reports the platform impersonated legitimate Korean-language game communities. BirdCall harvests device information, contacts, SMS, call logs, photos, and microphone audio - capabilities consistent with surveillance of diaspora communities rather than financial gain. ScarCruft has historically targeted North Korean defectors and journalists with similar Android malware lures.

Check
If your organization works with Korean-language communities or journalists covering North Korea, check Android devices for unfamiliar Korean game apps installed since early 2026. Review app permissions for SMS, contacts, and microphone access.
Affected
Android users in ethnic Korean communities in China, North Korean defectors, journalists covering North Korea, human-rights organizations, and South Korean policy researchers. Diaspora communities are the primary target. Organizations supporting diaspora communities or refugee networks face downstream risk through their constituents.
Fix
On managed Android devices: enforce Google Play Protect, block sideloading of APKs from unknown sources, and require MDM approval for any Korean-language gaming app. For at-risk individuals: reset Android devices that may have installed the fake platform, and use only verified Google Play apps. Follow Citizen Lab guidance for journalists working on North Korea topics.

Iranian hackers used Microsoft Teams chat to social-engineer victims, then dressed up their espionage as a Chaos ransomware attack to throw off blame

Rapid7 disclosed an Iranian state-sponsored intrusion that disguised itself as a Chaos ransomware attack to mask the real goal: cyber-espionage. The threat actor (assessed with moderate confidence as MuddyWater, linked to Iran's Ministry of Intelligence and Security) initiated chat requests through Microsoft Teams, walked employees into screen-sharing sessions, then captured credentials and manipulated MFA prompts. Some victims were asked to type their passwords into local text files during the call. Persistence came from a custom backdoor (Game.exe) deployed alongside DWAgent, AnyDesk, and RDP. The fake ransomware note and Chaos leak-portal entry concealed the espionage.

Check
Search Microsoft Teams logs for external chat invitations from unknown Entra tenants since January. Hunt endpoints for DWAgent, AnyDesk, ms_upd.exe, or Game.exe processes installed without IT approval.
Affected
Organizations allowing external Microsoft Teams chats by default - the campaign starts with chat invitations from attacker-controlled tenants. Acute risk for sectors MuddyWater historically targets: government, defense, telecoms, energy, and Israeli organizations. The 'IT Support' impersonation pattern works against any helpdesk-heavy enterprise. Iranian APT activity has been increasing through early 2026.
Fix
Restrict external Microsoft Teams chat to allowlisted partner tenants only. Block external screen-sharing requests by default. Brief staff that real IT support never asks them to type passwords into local files or read out MFA codes during a Teams call. Block Rapid7's published Stagecomp/Darkcomp code-signing certificate at the EDR layer.

Hackers bought Google ads pointing to a fake GoDaddy WordPress login page - any site manager who clicked saw their credentials stolen

BleepingComputer reports a phishing campaign that bought Google Ads to push a fake GoDaddy ManageWP login page to the top of search results. ManageWP is GoDaddy's centralized dashboard for managing multiple WordPress sites - so a successful phish gives the attacker simultaneous access to dozens or hundreds of sites under one account. The fake page is a near-perfect clone of managewp.com hosted on a typosquat domain; victims who enter credentials are redirected to the real site to mask the theft. Same Google Ads abuse template used recently against AWS, Notion, and other developer-tool brands.

Check
Brief staff who manage WordPress sites that they should never click Google Ads for login pages. Search proxy logs for visits to ManageWP-themed domains other than managewp.com over the past 30 days.
Affected
GoDaddy ManageWP customers, particularly agencies and freelancers managing multiple client WordPress sites under one account. Acute risk: small WordPress agencies whose ManageWP credentials enable simultaneous access to 50-500+ client sites. Anyone using GoDaddy hosting for WordPress.
Fix
Enable two-factor authentication on ManageWP accounts immediately. Reset ManageWP passwords for any user who recently clicked a Google Ads result for the brand. Add a corporate browser policy to suppress Google Ads on developer-tool searches. For agencies: rotate WordPress site credentials linked through ManageWP. Watch for unfamiliar admin user creation across managed sites.

Chinese hackers slipped a backdoor into the official DAEMON Tools installer for a month - thousands of computers in 100+ countries running tainted software signed with the real developer certificate

Kaspersky disclosed yesterday that the official DAEMON Tools installer - a popular Windows disk-image utility - has been distributing a backdoor since April 8. The trojanized versions (12.5.0.2421 through 12.5.0.2434) are downloaded from the legitimate vendor website and signed with valid AVB Disc Soft certificates. Thousands of infections recorded across 100+ countries, but follow-on payloads went to about a dozen targets in retail, scientific, government, and manufacturing sectors in Russia, Belarus, and Thailand. Kaspersky attributes the attack to Chinese-speaking actors and says it remains active. Detection took roughly a month - similar timeline to the 2023 3CX supply-chain attack.

Check
Search Windows endpoints for DAEMON Tools versions 12.5.0.2421-12.5.0.2434, and verify file hashes of DTHelper.exe, DiscSoftBusServiceLite.exe, and DTShellHlp.exe. Search proxy logs for env-check.daemontools.cc since April 8.
Affected
Windows endpoints with DAEMON Tools versions 12.5.0.2421 through 12.5.0.2434 installed since April 8, 2026. Compromised binaries are DTHelper.exe, DiscSoftBusServiceLite.exe, and DTShellHlp.exe in the DAEMON Tools install directory. Acute risk for organizations in Russia, Belarus, and Thailand and in retail, scientific, government, or manufacturing sectors - Kaspersky observed targeted second-stage payloads only on these.
Fix
Uninstall trojanized DAEMON Tools versions and reinstall from a verified clean release. Block env-check.daemontools.cc at the DNS resolver. Treat machines that ran trojanized versions as compromised: rotate credentials, hunt for QUIC RAT, and reimage if any second-stage payload is found. Apply application allowlisting to prevent vendor-signed but compromised binaries from running.