Last updated: September 29, 2026 at 8:42 AM UTC
All 891 Vulnerability 357 Breach 144 Threat 383 Defense 7

Iran-linked MuddyWater (Seedworm) spent a week inside a major South Korean electronics maker - DLL sideloading off Fortemedia audio and SentinelOne binaries, ChromElevator credential theft

Symantec's Threat Hunter Team detailed a global cyber-espionage campaign by MuddyWater (a.k.a. Seedworm, Static Kitten, Temp Zagros), an APT linked to Iran's Ministry of Intelligence and Security. The group hit at least nine organizations on four continents in Q1 2026 - including a major unnamed South Korean electronics manufacturer where attackers maintained access from February 20 to 27. They abused signed legitimate binaries fmapp.exe (a Fortemedia audio utility) and sentinelmemoryscanner.exe (a SentinelOne component) to sideload malicious DLLs called fmapp.dll and sentinelagentcore.dll, both carrying the ChromElevator post-exploitation tool that lifts data from Chrome-based browsers. Stolen files were staged through public file-transfer service sendit[.]sh to blend in.

Check
Hunt endpoints for fmapp.exe or sentinelmemoryscanner.exe loading non-standard DLLs, search proxy and DNS logs for connections to sendit[.]sh from non-IT users, and review Chrome profile access patterns from sideloaded DLL contexts.
Affected
High-tech manufacturing, electronics, industrial firms, financial services, and government agencies with intellectual-property or downstream-customer value to Iran. Operations in Asia and the Middle East are most exposed, but victims span four continents.
Fix
Add detection rules for fmapp.dll and sentinelagentcore.dll in unexpected paths, block sendit[.]sh outbound where it has no business need, watch for unusual Node.js process trees spawning cmd.exe, and review LSASS access events around the 90-second beaconing window.

Initial access broker KongTuke pivots from web lures to Microsoft Teams - impersonates IT help desk, drops ModeloRAT in five minutes

ReliaQuest researchers say initial access broker KongTuke has shifted from web-based ClickFix and FileFix lures to Microsoft Teams social engineering, taking as little as five minutes to gain persistent access. The attacker reaches employees from one of five rotating Microsoft 365 tenants, uses Unicode whitespace tricks to make the display name look like internal IT help desk, then talks the victim through pasting a PowerShell command. That command downloads a ZIP from Dropbox containing a portable WinPython runtime and a Python-based RAT called ModeloRAT. The new ModeloRAT variant adds a five-server C2 pool with automatic failover, self-update, and randomized URL paths, and several major EDR products did not detect it.

Check
Search Microsoft 365 audit logs for inbound external Teams chats from new or low-trust tenants, hunt endpoint telemetry for pythonw.exe running from %APPDATA%\WPy64-31401 (or similar WinPython paths), and review PowerShell logs for clipboard-paste-driven commands.
Affected
Any enterprise that accepts inbound Microsoft Teams chats and calls from external tenants, especially help-desk-themed approaches. Initial access broker activity is typically resold to ransomware operators within days of compromise.
Fix
Restrict external Teams chat to allowlisted partners, enforce verified caller display in Teams admin, train staff that real IT never asks for a PowerShell paste, and add EDR rules for portable Python interpreters spawning from %APPDATA%.

China-linked FamousSparrow spent three months breaking back into an Azerbaijani oil and gas company through the same Microsoft Exchange flaw - first known China APT hit on South Caucasus energy

Bitdefender researchers documented a China-linked espionage group called FamousSparrow repeatedly compromising an Azerbaijani oil and gas company between late December 2025 and late February 2026. Each time the victim cleaned up, the attackers came back through the same unpatched Microsoft Exchange Server and dropped a new backdoor - first Deed RAT (a ShadowPad relative used by several Chinese groups), then TernDoor. The group overlaps with the Earth Estries cluster, which itself overlaps with Salt Typhoon. This is the first time FamousSparrow has been seen targeting South Caucasus energy infrastructure, a region whose role in supplying gas to Europe grew sharply after Russia's Ukraine transit deal expired.

Check
Audit Microsoft Exchange Server patch status across the estate, hunt for DLL sideloading patterns where signed executables load suspicious libraries, and search proxy and DNS logs for connections to sentinelonepro[.]com.
Affected
Internet-exposed Microsoft Exchange Server instances. Energy sector organizations operating in or partnering with Azerbaijan, Armenia, and Georgia, plus their European downstream gas customers.
Fix
Patch Exchange to the current security update and confirm ProxyNotShell-class fixes are applied. Rotate credentials exposed during prior intrusions, hunt for Deed RAT and TernDoor IoCs from Bitdefender's report, and block sentinelonepro[.]com.

GemStuffer campaign turned RubyGems into a clandestine data drop - 150+ malicious gems hid scraped UK council portal pages inside Ruby packages

Socket researchers found more than 150 RubyGems packages doing something the registry was never built to do: smuggling scraped data out of UK council websites. The malicious gems fetch pages from Lambeth, Wandsworth, and Southwark's public meeting portals, bundle the responses into a normal-looking .gem archive, and push it back to RubyGems using a hardcoded API key. The attacker then downloads the data as a public gem version. Whether GemStuffer is registry spam, a worm being tested, or a deliberate trial of package-registry abuse, the mechanics are intentional - and it landed the same week RubyGems froze new account signups over a separate flood of malicious packages.

Check
Search dependency manifests and gem caches for gems published from newly registered RubyGems accounts in May 2026 with junk names, and review outbound traffic from CI runners for connections to council .gov.uk subdomains.
Affected
Any developer workstation, CI agent, or container image that allows arbitrary outbound gem installs from rubygems.org. UK local government portals (Lambeth, Wandsworth, Southwark) had public pages scraped through this channel.
Fix
Restrict gem installs to internal mirrors with allowlists, block outbound HTTP to council .gov.uk domains from build agents, and use Socket's published GemStuffer indicators to block known malicious gems.

Backend of 'The Gentlemen' ransomware operation leaked - 9 named operators, ransom chat transcripts, and chain-victimization tactics now public

The Gentlemen, the second most prolific public ransomware operation of 2026 with over 320 listed victims, has had its own internal database leaked. Check Point Research and others obtained the data after a breach of the group's hosting provider 4VPS exposed their Rocket backend. The leak unmasks roughly 9 named operators centered on an administrator known as zeta88 (aka hastalamuerte), who built the RaaS panel in three days using DeepSeek and Qwen AI coding assistants, runs payouts, and joins encryption events personally. Internal chats also confirm chain-victimization: in April the group hit a UK software consultancy and then weaponized stolen client credentials to compromise one of the consultancy's customers in Turkey.

Check
Pull historical access logs for Fortinet and Cisco edge appliances and check for credentials matching infostealer log dumps, then hunt for NTLM relay activity consistent with CVE-2025-33073 in Windows event logs.
Affected
Organizations exposed to The Gentlemen include any running FortiGate or Cisco edge gear with CVE-2024-55591, CVE-2025-32433, or CVE-2025-33073 unpatched, and downstream clients of compromised IT service providers.
Fix
Patch CVE-2024-55591, CVE-2025-32433, and CVE-2025-33073. Enforce MFA on every edge-management interface, rotate credentials that appear in infostealer logs, and load Check Point's 'Thus Spoke The Gentlemen' IoCs into your EDR and firewall blocklists.

TeamPCP supply-chain worm 'Mini Shai-Hulud' hits TanStack, Mistral AI, UiPath, OpenSearch, and Guardrails AI - 170 packages, 401 malicious versions, 518 million weekly downloads (CVE-2026-45321)

TeamPCP launched its largest supply-chain attack to date on May 11, compromising 170+ npm and PyPI packages with 518 million combined weekly downloads. The attackers chained three GitHub Actions vulnerabilities to publish 401 malicious versions carrying valid SLSA Build Level 3 attestations - cryptographically indistinguishable from legitimate releases. Affected packages include TanStack, Mistral AI (npm and PyPI), UiPath, OpenSearch, and Guardrails AI. The worm installs a persistent gh-token-monitor daemon that triggers 'rm -rf ~/' if tokens get revoked, and includes a probabilistic full-disk-wipe routine for Israeli and Iranian locales.

Check
Audit lockfiles for @tanstack/* (84 affected versions), @uipath/* (66 versions), @mistralai/*, opensearch-project/opensearch 3.5.3-3.8.0, guardrails-ai 0.10.1, mistralai 2.4.6.
Affected
Any Node.js or Python environment that installed compromised packages between May 11 and registry takedown. CI/CD pipelines, developer workstations, AI/ML environments. Crypto wallets and password managers (1Password, Bitwarden) are primary exfil targets.
Fix
Remove gh-token-monitor daemon BEFORE revoking tokens (~/Library/LaunchAgents macOS, ~/.config/systemd/user/ Linux) - removal first prevents triggering the wipe. Pin lockfiles to clean versions. Rotate all npm tokens, GitHub PATs, cloud credentials, and crypto wallet seeds.

Checkmarx Jenkins AST plugin backdoored by TeamPCP - third Checkmarx supply chain hit since late March

TeamPCP, the group behind the March Trivy breach and Shai-Hulud npm worm, used credentials stolen in that March attack to publish a backdoored version of Checkmarx's Jenkins AST plugin to the Jenkins Marketplace. This is the third Checkmarx supply-chain hit since late March. The rogue version 2026.5.09 went up on May 9, outside Checkmarx's normal release process - no git tag, no GitHub release. Checkmarx says its GitHub repos are isolated from customer production and no customer data is stored there, but anyone who installed the bad plugin should assume their CI credentials are compromised, rotate them all, and hunt for lateral movement.

Check
Check whether your Jenkins instances have the Checkmarx AST plugin installed. If yes, verify the running version - anything dated 2026.5.09 in the version string is the malicious build.
Affected
Any Jenkins instance running the rogue Checkmarx Jenkins AST plugin version 2026.5.09, which was published to the Jenkins Marketplace on May 9, 2026, between then and Checkmarx's takedown. The plugin was outside Checkmarx's normal release pipeline and lacked both a git tag and a GitHub release.
Fix
Roll back to version 2.0.13-829.vc72453fa_1c16 published December 17, 2025, or any earlier officially-tagged build. Rotate every credential the Jenkins host had access to, including cloud API keys, source-repo tokens, deployment keys, and signing certificates. Hunt for lateral movement from the Jenkins host. Pull Checkmarx's published IoC list from their Support Portal and run it across your environment.

TrickMo Android banker hides command-and-control inside Telegram's TON blockchain network to dodge takedowns

The TrickMo Android banking malware now routes its command-and-control through The Open Network (TON), the decentralized peer-to-peer network originally built around Telegram, making the C2 infrastructure much harder to identify or take down. ThreatFabric (which tracks this variant as Trickmo.C) has been watching it since January in campaigns hitting users in France, Italy, and Austria. The malware disguises itself as TikTok or streaming apps and steals banking credentials and crypto wallet keys via phishing overlays, keylogging, SMS interception, OTP suppression, and live screen recording. The new variant also adds SSH tunneling, port forwarding, and SOCKS5 proxy commands, turning infected phones into a pivot point.

Check
Check MDM logs for users in France, Italy, or Austria who side-loaded apps masquerading as TikTok or streaming services since January 2026. Flag corporate phones showing outbound TON network traffic.
Affected
Android devices belonging to users in France, Italy, and Austria that side-loaded apps disguised as TikTok or streaming services. Banking and cryptocurrency-wallet credentials, SMS-delivered OTPs, screen contents, and keystrokes are all at risk. The TON-based C2 means traditional domain blocking and DNS-based filters will miss this malware family entirely.
Fix
Confirm Google Play Protect is active and side-loading is blocked on all managed Android devices. For potentially infected users, perform a full factory reset, reinstall apps only from Google Play, and reset banking and cryptocurrency credentials from a known-clean device. Add TON .adnl traffic to egress monitoring - while you cannot decrypt it, unusual volumes from corporate networks are a signal.

GhostLock proof-of-concept abuses Windows file-sharing API to disrupt file access without encryption

A researcher at Israel Aerospace Industries published a proof-of-concept tool called GhostLock that uses a legitimate Windows API call to make files unreadable without encrypting anything. The technique abuses the dwShareMode parameter of CreateFileW - setting it to 0 grants the calling process exclusive access, so every other user or app trying to open the file gets a sharing violation. GhostLock automates this recursively across SMB shares from a standard domain user account, no elevation required. Researcher Kim Dvash frames it as a disruption attack, not destructive - data is not lost, but operational downtime can mirror a ransomware incident.

Check
Review your EDR and SIEM detection rules for behavior-based ransomware indicators. Verify they cover sharing-violation spikes and ShareAccess=0 file-open counts, not just mass file write or encryption activity.
Affected
Windows file servers and SMB shares in environments where any standard domain user account can authenticate. No CVE has been assigned - GhostLock abuses intended Windows file-sharing behavior, not a flaw. Behavioral detection systems focused on mass writes or encryption operations will not flag this attack pattern; the attack also requires no elevation.
Fix
Implement detection at the file server layer: monitor per-session open-file counts with ShareAccess=0 - the reliable signal Dvash identifies, which lives in storage platform management interfaces, not Windows event logs or EDR telemetry. Pull the SIEM queries and NDR rule from the GhostLock whitepaper as a detection template. Limit which domain user accounts have read or write access to critical shares.

Mr_Rot13 actor exploits cPanel CVE-2026-41940 to deploy cross-platform 'Filemanager' backdoor

QiAnXin XLab has tied the ongoing exploitation of cPanel's CVE-2026-41940 to a previously-quiet threat actor it tracks as Mr_Rot13, who has been operating since at least 2020. The attack chain exploits the cPanel and WHM authentication bypass to drop a Go-based infector that adds an attacker SSH key, plants a PHP web shell, and serves a fake login page to steal cPanel credentials (ROT13-encoded, exfiltrated to wrned[.]com). The final payload is a cross-platform backdoor called Filemanager that runs on Windows, macOS, and Linux. XLab counts over 2,000 attacker source IPs currently scanning for this flaw.

Check
Search cPanel and WHM authentication logs for unusual successful logins since April 28. Check /root/.ssh/authorized_keys on every cPanel host for unknown public keys, and search web roots for unfamiliar PHP files.
Affected
Any cPanel or WHM installation that was not patched against CVE-2026-41940 between disclosure on April 28, 2026, and now. Indicators of Mr_Rot13 compromise include the SSH public key added under root, the wrned[.]com credential exfiltration domain, the cp.dene[.]de[.]com infector source, and the wpsock[.]com Filemanager delivery domain.
Fix
If still unpatched, install the cPanel fix for CVE-2026-41940 immediately. On any host that was internet-exposed and unpatched, assume compromise: remove unknown SSH keys from root, sweep for unfamiliar PHP web shells, block the indicator domains wrned[.]com, cp.dene[.]de[.]com, and wpsock[.]com at egress, rotate cPanel and WHM root credentials, and check bash_history for evidence of attacker reconnaissance.