Last updated: September 29, 2026 at 8:42 AM UTC
All 891 Vulnerability 357 Breach 144 Threat 383 Defense 7

CrowdStrike, Google, Shadowserver disrupt GlassWorm botnet by cutting four resilient C2 channels - Solana memos, BitTorrent DHT, Google Calendar, direct VPS

CrowdStrike, Google, and The Shadowserver Foundation have disrupted the GlassWorm developer-supply-chain botnet by simultaneously cutting four resilient command-and-control channels. Active since October 2025, GlassWorm spread through malicious OpenVSX and VS Code extensions, GitHub repos, and npm packages (one March campaign hit 400+ artifacts), stealing crypto wallets and developer credentials. Its C2 was built to resist takedown: server addresses encoded in Solana transaction memo fields, configuration stored in the BitTorrent DHT, Base64 C2 paths hidden in Google Calendar event titles, and direct VPS connections for payload delivery. All four had to fall at once. Infected hosts now beacon to CrowdStrike's sinkhole at 164.92.88[.]210.

Check
Run CrowdStrike's published YARA rules across developer workstations and build servers. Search network logs for beacons to 164.92.88[.]210 (CrowdStrike sinkhole) indicating prior GlassWorm infection.
Affected
Developers who installed malicious OpenVSX or VS Code extensions, or pulled compromised GitHub repos and npm packages since October 2025. 400+ artifacts hit in the March campaign alone.
Fix
Remediate any host beaconing to the sinkhole. Audit installed OpenVSX/VS Code extensions against known-bad lists. Rotate crypto wallets and developer credentials exposed on infected machines.

FBI flash alert: Silent Ransom Group (Luna Moth/UNC3753) sends operatives in person to plug USB drives into US law firm computers

The FBI has issued a flash alert warning that the Silent Ransom Group (also tracked as Luna Moth, Chatty Spider, and UNC3753) is now sending operatives physically to US law firms to steal data. SRG actors first pose as internal IT over phone or phishing email and try to get an employee to grant a remote-desktop session; if that fails, they dispatch someone in person to plug a USB drive or external hard drive into the target's computer. The group, formed from Conti/BazarCall operators after the 2022 Conti shutdown, has targeted US legal and financial firms since 2023, extorting victims via its leak site.

Check
Brief reception and staff at law/finance firms: verify any in-person 'IT support' visit through a known internal channel before granting access. Alert SOC to unexpected USB-storage mounts.
Affected
US law firms and financial-services organizations. SRG poses as internal IT via phone/phishing, escalating to physical USB-drive theft if remote-access social engineering fails.
Fix
Enforce device-control policy blocking unauthorized USB mass storage. Require multi-channel verification for IT-support remote-access requests. Lock workstations and restrict physical access. Run callback-phishing awareness training.

Iranian intelligence (MOIS) behind LA Metro hack disguised as 'Ababil of Minab' hacktivists - hundreds of terabytes wiped

Israeli firm Gambit Security has forensically linked the late-March attack on the Los Angeles County Metropolitan Transportation Authority to Iran's Ministry of Intelligence and Security (MOIS), despite the attackers branding themselves as the pro-Iran hacktivist collective 'Ababil of Minab.' The group posted videos claiming it wiped hundreds of terabytes and stole over a terabyte of files. LA Metro confirmed the breach on April 2, 2026, and had to check hundreds of servers for compromise before bringing them back online. The case illustrates a recurring pattern of state operations wearing a hacktivist costume to provide deniability while targeting critical infrastructure.

Check
Critical-infrastructure and transit operators: treat 'hacktivist' claims of destructive attacks as possible state-operation cover. Hunt for wiper precursors and bulk-deletion activity. Validate offline backup integrity.
Affected
US critical infrastructure, especially transit authorities. Iran's MOIS uses fake-hacktivist fronts (here, Ababil of Minab) to claim destructive attacks while preserving deniability.
Fix
Maintain tested offline backups resilient to wipers. Segment OT/IT networks. Monitor for mass-deletion and destructive commands. Coordinate with CISA and ISACs on Iranian APT indicators.

Malicious npm package 'mouse5212-super-formatter' steals files from Claude AI /mnt/user-data directory, exfiltrates to attacker GitHub via postinstall

OX Security has flagged a malicious npm package, mouse5212-super-formatter (campaign codenamed Malware-Slop), designed to exfiltrate files from /mnt/user-data - the directory Anthropic's Claude uses to handle uploads and outputs. The package presents itself as an 'archive deployment sync' utility but, during the postinstall stage, authenticates to GitHub using a token found in the victim's environment (or a hard-coded fallback), creates an attacker-controlled repository, and recursively uploads every local file. It writes a fake 'network connections' log to disguise the theft. The package leaked its own GitHub token, suggesting AI-generated malware with poor OPSEC. It has ~676 downloads and remains live on npm.

Check
Search npm install logs and CI/CD for mouse5212-super-formatter. On any host that ran it, audit /mnt/user-data access and outbound GitHub API calls. Rotate exposed GitHub tokens.
Affected
Developers and AI-tooling users who installed mouse5212-super-formatter (676 downloads, still live). Systems with Claude's /mnt/user-data directory and a GitHub token in the environment are the target.
Fix
Remove the package and pin dependencies via lockfile. Rotate every GitHub token reachable from affected hosts. Treat uploaded/output files in /mnt/user-data as potentially exfiltrated.

Grandoreiro banking trojan and BTMOB Android RAT hit Iberia and Latin America - DLL side-loading, WebRTC P2P, targets Wise and Revolut

WatchGuard and ESET have documented two parallel banking-malware campaigns hitting Windows and Android users across Iberia and Latin America. The Windows campaign delivers Grandoreiro - an actively evolving banking trojan operating since 2016 that targets thousands of institutions across 45 countries - via DLL side-loading of four legitimate applications, using Delphi 11-built DLLs that abuse the sgcWebSockets library for WebRTC peer-to-peer C2 over STUN and ICE protocols to blend with web-conferencing traffic. Named targets include Abanca, Banco de Portugal, BBVA PT, Caixa Geral, Santander, plus Revolut and Wise. A companion campaign delivers the BTMOB RAT to Android users in Brazil.

Check
Hunt Windows endpoints for DLL side-loading of mingwm10.dll, libwebp.dll, libffi-6.dll, or libpng15.dll. Inspect outbound WebRTC/STUN/ICE traffic to unexpected peers. Check for Delphi-built DLLs.
Affected
Banking customers and finance staff in Spain, Portugal, Mexico (Windows/Grandoreiro) and Brazil (Android/BTMOB). Named targets include Abanca, Santander, Banco de Portugal, Revolut, and Wise.
Fix
Apply WatchGuard and ESET IoCs. Block known C2 peers. Train finance staff against phishing links delivering ZIP archives. Deploy mobile threat defense on Android devices accessing banking apps.

Microsoft: cryptojacking campaign uses AI chatbot recommendations and SEO poisoning to push fake GPU utilities, deploys ScreenConnect persistence

Microsoft has warned of an active cryptojacking campaign that surfaces malicious download sites through AI chatbot recommendations, extending SEO poisoning beyond conventional search. Attackers impersonate legitimate system utilities - CrystalDiskInfo, HWMonitor, Display Driver Uninstaller, FurMark, K-Lite Codec Pack, PDFgear - to target users with high-performance GPUs, prioritizing mining yield per host over mass infection. Beyond mining, the operators deploy ScreenConnect for persistent remote access enabling data theft, lateral movement, or ransomware. Victims who ask LLM-based tools for software-download recommendations are served links to attacker domains on subdomains of gleeze[.]com, hosted via Dynu dynamic DNS. Microsoft says it has detected and blocked the activity.

Check
Hunt for ScreenConnect installs you did not authorize and traffic to gleeze[.]com subdomains or Dynu dynamic-DNS hosts. Flag downloads of GPU/hardware utilities from non-official domains.
Affected
Users with high-performance GPUs who download system utilities (CrystalDiskInfo, HWMonitor, FurMark, etc.) via search results or AI chatbot recommendations. Gaming, engineering, and ML workstations at highest risk.
Fix
Block gleeze[.]com and known Dynu C2 at egress. Source utilities only from official vendor sites. Educate users that AI-chatbot download links can be SEO-poisoned. Monitor GPU-utilization anomalies.

Microsoft Defender for Endpoint adds automatic device isolation as part of automatic attack disruption (preview)

Microsoft has rolled out a preview of automatic device isolation in Microsoft Defender for Endpoint as part of its automatic attack disruption feature. When Defender detects a compromised endpoint, it now disconnects the device from the network without operator action, while preserving the Defender management channel so the host can still be monitored, investigated, and released. Security teams can release a device from containment after triage via 'Release from isolation' on the Device inventory or device page. The feature works only on onboarded end-user workstations. It joins earlier preview controls for blocking traffic to unmanaged endpoints and isolating compromised user accounts.

Check
Review Defender for Endpoint Action Center preview features in the Microsoft 365 Defender portal. Confirm automatic device isolation is enabled for high-risk endpoint groups.
Affected
Organizations relying on Defender for Endpoint where manual response to compromise alerts has historically been slow enough to allow lateral movement or data exfiltration.
Fix
Enable automatic device isolation in preview. Define release-from-isolation runbooks. Pair with automatic user-account isolation already available. Document operator override procedures for false positives.

MuddyWater (Seedworm) 'Operation Olalampo' espionage hits 9 countries with DLL sideloading via sentinelmemoryscanner.exe and ChromElevator browser theft

Symantec and Carbon Black, working with Huntress, have documented Operation Olalampo, a new MuddyWater (also tracked as Seedworm) espionage campaign that has hit at least nine countries. The Iran-linked actor uses DLL sideloading by abusing two trusted binaries - sentinelmemoryscanner.exe sideloads sentinelagentcore.dll - to deploy the open-source ChromElevator tool, which steals passwords, cookies, and payment-card data from Chromium browsers while bypassing App-Bound Encryption. The campaign also uses Node.js-based implants that drop PowerShell scripts for reconnaissance, SAM-hive theft, screenshot capture, and SOCKS5 reverse-proxy tunneling. Stolen data has been staged on the public file-transfer service sendit[.]sh.

Check
Hunt Windows endpoints for sentinelmemoryscanner.exe with a sideloaded sentinelagentcore.dll. Check outbound traffic to 157.20.182[.]49 and sendit[.]sh. Watch for Node.js execution on non-developer hosts.
Affected
Organizations in MuddyWater's typical target sectors (telecom, government, defense, energy) across nine countries. Symantec/Carbon Black/Huntress confirm at least one South Korean electronics manufacturer hit.
Fix
Block 157.20.182[.]49 and sendit[.]sh at egress. Apply Huntress and Symantec IoCs. Hunt for ChromElevator browser-credential theft. Restrict Node.js execution on non-developer endpoints.

CERT-In mandates 12-hour patching window for internet-facing KEV vulnerabilities to counter AI-assisted attacks; full risk-tiered SLA blueprint

India's national CERT has published a risk-tiered patch SLA blueprint in response to AI-assisted attack acceleration. Internet-facing systems with KEV-listed vulnerabilities must be remediated within 12 hours; critical externally exposed flaws within 1 day; internal-system KEV within 1 day unless documented compensating controls exist; critical internal flaws on high-value systems within 3 days; high-severity issues within 5 days. CERT-In urges defenders to assume breach, adopt Zero Trust and defense-in-depth, embed secure-by-design into AI workflows, validate via red teaming, and treat AI-system visibility as a first-class governance concern. Mitigations (isolation, WAF, monitoring) are expected when no patch is available.

Check
Inventory your current patch SLAs against CERT-In's tiers. Identify any internet-facing systems with KEV CVEs older than 12 hours. Map AI workflows and governance gaps.
Affected
Any organization with patch SLAs measured in weeks/months on internet-facing systems. AI-assisted attacks compress exploit-development to hours/days; old SLAs are now structurally inadequate.
Fix
Adopt CERT-In's tiered SLA: 12hr for internet-facing KEV, 1d for critical exposed or internal KEV, 3d for critical internal high-value, 5d high-severity. Pair with Zero Trust isolation and WAF controls.

Iran's Nimbus Manticore (UNC1549) accelerated wartime ops with AI-assisted MiniFast backdoor, trojanized Zoom installers, and SEO poisoning of SQL Developer

Check Point has documented Iranian APT Nimbus Manticore (also tracked as UNC1549) accelerating its operations during US Operation Epic Fury rather than going quiet. The campaign hits aviation, software, and defense organizations in the US, Europe, and the Middle East via three waves: career-themed phishing using AppDomain hijacking to deploy MiniJunk (February), a trojanized Zoom installer that hijacks legitimate scheduled tasks to deliver the new MiniFast backdoor (March), and the group's first SEO poisoning campaign distributing a weaponized Oracle SQL Developer installer via getsqldeveloper[.]com (April). MiniFast shows signs of AI-assisted development: defensive coding patterns, verbose error strings, and modular structure.

Check
Search EDR for AppDomain hijacking patterns spawning unsigned DLLs from Microsoft-signed executables. Hunt for trojanized Zoom installers and visits to getsqldeveloper[.]com via DNS logs.
Affected
Aviation, software, defense, and telecom organizations in the US, Europe, and Middle East. Nimbus Manticore targets employees via fake career offers, fake Zoom meetings, and SEO poisoning.
Fix
Apply Check Point IoCs. Block getsqldeveloper[.]com and known Nimbus Manticore C2 infrastructure. Train staff against unsolicited career or meeting-invitation downloads. Strengthen endpoint allowlisting against unsigned DLL sideloading.