Hunt.io has mapped 1,350+ command-and-control servers spread across 98 providers in 14 Middle Eastern countries over three months. Saudi Telecom Company (STC) hosts 981 of them - 72.4% of all observed regional C2 - the largest single-provider concentration the researchers have seen globally. Most of STC's hosting appears to be compromised customer systems rather than deliberate bulletproof hosting, but the effect is the same. Other heavy hosts include SERVERS TECH FZCO (UAE), OMC (Israel), Türk Telekom, and Iraqi provider Regxa, which Hunt.io flags as the highest bulletproof-hosting profile observed. Named campaigns hosted on this infrastructure include Eagle Werewolf espionage, DYNOWIPER attacks on Poland's energy sector, and RondoDox.
Quest KACE has a year-old maximum-severity authentication bypass (CVE-2025-32975, CVSS 10.0). Hunt.io researchers now report that an attacker exploited an unpatched KACE appliance at a Boston-area managed services provider called HIQ - then left their entire toolkit on a publicly accessible server with directory listing turned on. The exfiltrated 512 MB MariaDB dump turned out to contain the full appliance-managed endpoint list for over 60 named client organizations spanning law enforcement, government, healthcare, education, and private companies. None of those 60-plus organizations had any KACE relationship of their own - they were just customers of the MSP that ran it unpatched.
TrustStrike Labs