Last updated: November 2, 2026 at 1:20 PM UTC
All 957 Vulnerability 399 Breach 144 Threat 407 Defense 7
Tag: dns (2 articles)Clear

Attackers hijack .gh, .sl, and .as registries to obtain fraudulent TLS certificates for Google domains

Google disclosed that attackers hijacked the .gh, .sl, and .as country-code registries and changed authoritative DNS records to pass domain-validation checks, obtaining at least twelve TLS certificates for seven Google-owned names including google.com.gh, google.sl, and google.as. Let's Encrypt issued eleven and ZeroSSL one, all logged between September 22 and 27 and since revoked, and Chrome also blocked them through CRLSets. Such certificates let an attacker impersonate the real sites, though Google has not confirmed any misuse and says its own systems were not breached. Google advises domain owners to monitor certificate transparency logs and publish strict CAA records tied to their certificate authority.

Check
Monitor certificate transparency logs for all owned domains, including parked and country-code names, and publish strict CAA records that name only your certificate authority.
Affected
Organizations with domains under the hijacked .gh, .sl, and .as registries could have had domain-validated certificates issued to attackers able to impersonate their sites.
Fix
Watch certificate transparency logs, publish strict CAA records tied to your certificate authority account, and report any unrequested certificates to the issuing authority through a certificate problem report.

Underminr domain-fronting attack hijacks brand reputations via CDN trust - 42% of websites globally, 51% in US, vulnerable

ADAMnetworks researchers have disclosed Underminr, a domain-fronting attack that abuses how major content delivery networks resolve HTTP requests, letting an attacker route malicious traffic so it appears to come from trusted brand domains. Protective DNS filters see the DNS lookup for the legitimate site and wave it through. ADAMnetworks estimates 42% of websites globally are vulnerable, 51% in the US, around one-third in Eastern Europe, and under 9% in China's heavily-regulated internet. The researchers say attackers are already using the technique. Boutique security-focused CDNs that perform domain verification are not vulnerable; the larger general-purpose providers carry most of the exposure.

Check
Inventory CDN providers and check whether each performs domain verification (validates Host header at edge). Search egress logs for traffic resolving a trusted domain but landing on attacker infrastructure.
Affected
Roughly 42% of websites worldwide, 51% in the US, hosted on CDNs that do not perform strict Host-header verification. Boutique CDNs that verify ownership are not vulnerable.
Fix
Move sensitive properties to CDNs that perform strict domain verification. Audit Protective DNS allowlists and pair them with TLS SNI or HTTP-Host inspection downstream. Treat domain-only allowlists as weak.