Google disclosed that attackers hijacked the .gh, .sl, and .as country-code registries and changed authoritative DNS records to pass domain-validation checks, obtaining at least twelve TLS certificates for seven Google-owned names including google.com.gh, google.sl, and google.as. Let's Encrypt issued eleven and ZeroSSL one, all logged between September 22 and 27 and since revoked, and Chrome also blocked them through CRLSets. Such certificates let an attacker impersonate the real sites, though Google has not confirmed any misuse and says its own systems were not breached. Google advises domain owners to monitor certificate transparency logs and publish strict CAA records tied to their certificate authority.
ADAMnetworks researchers have disclosed Underminr, a domain-fronting attack that abuses how major content delivery networks resolve HTTP requests, letting an attacker route malicious traffic so it appears to come from trusted brand domains. Protective DNS filters see the DNS lookup for the legitimate site and wave it through. ADAMnetworks estimates 42% of websites globally are vulnerable, 51% in the US, around one-third in Eastern Europe, and under 9% in China's heavily-regulated internet. The researchers say attackers are already using the technique. Boutique security-focused CDNs that perform domain verification are not vulnerable; the larger general-purpose providers carry most of the exposure.