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Last updated: May 14, 2026 at 10:49 AM UTC
All 219 Vulnerability 76 Breach 45 Threat 91 Defense 7

Cisco network management products have a flaw that lets attackers crash them remotely - victims need to manually reboot the device to recover (CVE-2026-20188)

Cisco patched a high-severity denial-of-service flaw in Cisco Crosswork Network Controller (CNC) and Cisco Network Services Orchestrator (NSO) that lets unauthenticated remote attackers exhaust connection resources and force the system into an unresponsive state. CVE-2026-20188. Recovery requires manual reboot. Cisco's PSIRT has not seen exploitation in the wild yet, but Cisco previously patched similar DoS bugs (CVE-2025-20362, CVE-2025-20333) that ended up being weaponized to force ASA and FTD firewalls into reboot loops, which CISA addressed with an emergency directive in November 2025.

Check
Inventory Cisco CNC and Cisco NSO instances. Check whether their management interfaces are reachable from untrusted networks. Set up monitoring alerts for connection-resource exhaustion on these systems.
Affected
Cisco Crosswork Network Controller (CNC) and Cisco Network Services Orchestrator (NSO) running unpatched versions. CVE-2026-20188, high severity. The DoS condition requires manual reboot to recover, meaning a successful attack creates extended outages. Service-provider and enterprise customers using Cisco network orchestration are in scope.
Fix
Upgrade Cisco CNC and NSO to fixed versions per Cisco's advisory. Restrict management interfaces to trusted internal networks. Implement rate limiting at the network edge to throttle connection attempts to CNC/NSO ports. Document recovery procedures including console access for manual reboot - a remote-only management plan fails if the box itself becomes unreachable.

Chinese hackers slipped a backdoor into the official DAEMON Tools installer for a month - thousands of computers in 100+ countries running tainted software signed with the real developer certificate

Kaspersky disclosed yesterday that the official DAEMON Tools installer - a popular Windows disk-image utility - has been distributing a backdoor since April 8. The trojanized versions (12.5.0.2421 through 12.5.0.2434) are downloaded from the legitimate vendor website and signed with valid AVB Disc Soft certificates. Thousands of infections recorded across 100+ countries, but follow-on payloads went to about a dozen targets in retail, scientific, government, and manufacturing sectors in Russia, Belarus, and Thailand. Kaspersky attributes the attack to Chinese-speaking actors and says it remains active. Detection took roughly a month - similar timeline to the 2023 3CX supply-chain attack.

Check
Search Windows endpoints for DAEMON Tools versions 12.5.0.2421-12.5.0.2434, and verify file hashes of DTHelper.exe, DiscSoftBusServiceLite.exe, and DTShellHlp.exe. Search proxy logs for env-check.daemontools.cc since April 8.
Affected
Windows endpoints with DAEMON Tools versions 12.5.0.2421 through 12.5.0.2434 installed since April 8, 2026. Compromised binaries are DTHelper.exe, DiscSoftBusServiceLite.exe, and DTShellHlp.exe in the DAEMON Tools install directory. Acute risk for organizations in Russia, Belarus, and Thailand and in retail, scientific, government, or manufacturing sectors - Kaspersky observed targeted second-stage payloads only on these.
Fix
Uninstall trojanized DAEMON Tools versions and reinstall from a verified clean release. Block env-check.daemontools.cc at the DNS resolver. Treat machines that ran trojanized versions as compromised: rotate credentials, hunt for QUIC RAT, and reimage if any second-stage payload is found. Apply application allowlisting to prevent vendor-signed but compromised binaries from running.

Apache web server has a critical flaw in HTTP/2 that crashes servers and could let attackers run code (CVE-2026-23918)

Apache patched a double-free vulnerability in mod_http2 yesterday. CVE-2026-23918 (CVSS 8.8) lets a remote attacker crash the server immediately, with a path to remote code execution under specific memory-layout conditions. The bug is in the stream cleanup code in h2_mplx.c and is triggered by a crafted sequence of HTTP/2 frames including an early stream reset. mod_http2 ships in default Apache builds and HTTP/2 is widely enabled in production. The MPM prefork worker is not affected. Researchers warn practical RCE requires an info leak and probabilistic heap spray, but in lab conditions execution lands in minutes.

Check
Identify Apache HTTP Server 2.4.66 installations. Run 'httpd -v' or 'apache2 -v' on each server, and check whether mod_http2 is enabled with 'apache2ctl -M | grep http2'.
Affected
Apache HTTP Server 2.4.66 with mod_http2 enabled (default in most builds). CVE-2026-23918, CVSS 8.8. The MPM prefork worker is not affected; MPM event and worker (default in modern installs) are vulnerable. No public proof-of-concept yet but exploitation is straightforward for DoS. Internet-facing Apache servers running HTTP/2 are at acute risk.
Fix
Upgrade to Apache HTTP Server 2.4.67. If immediate upgrade isn't possible, disable mod_http2 with 'a2dismod http2' - but this drops HTTP/2 support entirely. The 2.4.67 release also patches mod_rewrite (CVE-2026-24072), mod_proxy_ajp (CVE-2026-28780), mod_md, and mod_dav_lock - apply all fixes together.

New Linux malware called 'Quasar Linux' targets developer laptops to steal credentials for npm, GitHub, AWS, and Docker - barely detected by antivirus

Trend Micro disclosed Quasar Linux (QLNX), a previously undocumented Linux remote access trojan designed for developer workstations and DevOps environments. The malware harvests credentials for npm, PyPI, GitHub, AWS, Docker, and Kubernetes - then uses them to publish trojanized packages to public registries. QLNX runs entirely fileless and in-memory, dynamically compiling its rootkit and PAM backdoor on the target host using gcc, then loading them via /etc/ld.so.preload for system-wide interception. Capabilities include a 58-command RAT, dual-layer rootkit, keylogging, SSH lateral movement, and peer-to-peer mesh networking. Only four security tools detect the binary as malicious.

Check
Hunt Linux developer machines and CI runners for /etc/ld.so.preload entries you didn't put there, /tmp/.X*-lock files outside legitimate X server use, and gcc invocations on hosts that don't normally compile code.
Affected
Linux developer workstations and DevOps environments with credential access to npm, PyPI, GitHub, AWS, Docker, or Kubernetes. Acute risk for organizations with developers running root-capable Linux desktops, particularly those whose CI/CD pipelines pull dependencies from public registries. Compromised credentials enable supply-chain attacks against the organization's own published packages.
Fix
Deploy Linux EDR with eBPF visibility on every developer machine and CI runner - QLNX hides from userland tools but eBPF-aware sensors detect the kernel-level rootkit. Restrict /etc/ld.so.preload modifications via auditd alerts. For high-risk developers: use ephemeral build environments (containers, VMs) that don't carry persistent credentials. Trend Micro published IoCs.

Critical MOVEit Automation flaw lets attackers take over file-transfer servers without logging in - Cl0p hit MOVEit's sister product in 2023 and stole data from 62 million people (CVE-2026-4670)

Progress Software released emergency patches Sunday for two MOVEit Automation flaws. The worst, CVE-2026-4670 (CVSS 9.8), lets remote attackers reach the management interface without logging in - and from there take administrative control. Airbus researchers disclosed both flaws privately and Progress hasn't seen exploitation in the wild, but the comparison with MOVEit's history is uncomfortable: the Cl0p ransomware gang exploited MOVEit Transfer in 2023 to steal data from 2,100 organizations and 62 million individuals. Shodan shows 1,400+ MOVEit Automation instances exposed online, including a dozen linked to US local and state government agencies.

Check
Inventory MOVEit Automation instances and check the version under Web Admin > Help > About. Search firewall logs for inbound traffic to the service backend command port.
Affected
MOVEit Automation versions before 2025.1.5, 2025.0.9, and 2024.1.8. CVE-2026-4670 (CVSS 9.8, auth bypass) and CVE-2026-5174 (CVSS 7.7, privilege escalation). 1,400+ internet-exposed instances per Shodan, including state and local government agencies. Internet-reachable management interfaces face acute risk.
Fix
Upgrade to MOVEit Automation 2025.1.5, 2025.0.9, or 2024.1.8 using the full installer (the standard service installer does not patch the flaw). Restrict the management interface to internal networks only. Rotate every credential MOVEit holds for downstream destinations - cloud storage, SFTP servers, partner systems. Block external traffic to the service backend command port at the firewall.

Phishing campaign hit 80+ companies by getting employees to install legitimate remote-access software disguised as a Social Security letter

Securonix tracked a phishing campaign called VENOMOUS#HELPER that has hit 80+ organizations (mostly in the US) since April 2025 by getting employees to install legitimate remote-monitoring software they think is a Social Security Administration document. The lure is a fake SSA email asking the recipient to download their statement; the link points to a compromised Mexican business website hosting a SimpleHelp installer. Once installed, the attackers gain SYSTEM-level access, then quietly install ConnectWise ScreenConnect as a backup channel. The pattern aligns with initial-access broker activity: quiet persistence, then sale or hand-off to ransomware operators.

Check
Hunt every Windows endpoint for SimpleHelp and ConnectWise ScreenConnect installs not authorized by IT. Search proxy logs for connections to gruta.com.mx since April 2025.
Affected
Windows endpoints in organizations without strict application allowlisting. 80+ confirmed victims, mostly US, across multiple sectors. Acute risk: companies whose staff regularly receive government correspondence (SSA, IRS, state tax) where 'verify and download' lures feel routine. Initial access brokers run these campaigns to sell footholds, so any compromised host becomes a potential ransomware launchpad weeks later.
Fix
Enforce application allowlisting on Windows endpoints to block unapproved RMM software. Remove unauthorized SimpleHelp, ScreenConnect, PDQ Connect, LogMeIn Resolve, N-able, or Fleetdeck installs and treat the host as compromised. Block Securonix's published indicators (gruta.com.mx, server.cubatiendaalimentos.com.mx) at the network egress layer. Rotate credentials on affected hosts.

China-linked group is sending 1,600 fake tax-audit emails to Indian and Russian companies, then dropping a brand-new backdoor called ABCDoor

Kaspersky tracked a China-based group called Silver Fox running a tax-themed phishing campaign against organizations in India, Russia, Indonesia, Japan, and South Africa. Phishing emails impersonate the Indian Income Tax Department or Russian tax service with subjects about audits or 'lists of tax violations.' Inside the attached archive sits a modified Rust loader that pulls down a known backdoor called ValleyRAT, plus a brand-new Python-based backdoor called ABCDoor. ABCDoor handles screen recording, keystroke control, clipboard theft, and file operations. Kaspersky logged 1,600+ phishing emails between January and February 2026 across industrial, consulting, retail, and transportation sectors.

Check
Search proxy and DNS logs for connections to abc.haijing88.com since December 2025. Hunt endpoints for pythonw.exe processes initiating outbound HTTPS to unfamiliar destinations.
Affected
Organizations in India, Russia, Indonesia, Japan, and South Africa, particularly in industrial, consulting, retail, and transportation sectors. Finance and accounting staff who routinely receive tax correspondence are the highest-risk role. Multinationals with operations in any of these regions face the same risk through local subsidiaries.
Fix
Block abc.haijing88.com and related Silver Fox infrastructure at the DNS resolver. Train finance staff that real tax correspondence never arrives as a ZIP or RAR archive of 'violations' to download. Quarantine any host running pythonw.exe with unexpected outbound HTTPS, and remove FFmpeg installations not authorized by IT. Rotate credentials on suspected compromised hosts and reimage.

Attackers are using stolen Amazon keys to send convincing phishing emails directly from Amazon's email service - bypassing every spam filter

Kaspersky reported a sharp rise in phishing campaigns sent through Amazon's Simple Email Service (SES). Because the emails come from Amazon's own infrastructure, they pass SPF, DKIM, and DMARC checks that normally catch fake-brand emails - and reputation-based blocks don't trigger because Amazon's mail servers have legitimate reputation. The pattern starts with attackers harvesting AWS access keys leaked in public GitHub repos, .env files, Docker images, and S3 buckets, then using those keys to send phishing through SES from the victim's own AWS account. Wiz documented similar abuse in 2025 with attackers escalating from sandbox mode (200 emails/day) to production mode (50,000+/day) by issuing PutAccountDetails across all AWS regions in 10 seconds.

Check
Open the SES console in every AWS region (not just your home region) and check sending statistics for unexpected volume. Search CloudTrail for ses:PutAccountDetails calls from unfamiliar IPs.
Affected
Any AWS account where IAM access keys could be exposed - public GitHub repos, .env files committed by mistake, Docker images that bundled credentials, or developer workstations. AWS accounts where SES has never been used legitimately are at acute risk because there's no baseline. Verified domain owners face inbox-reputation damage even if no breach happened on their systems.
Fix
Apply Service Control Policies that block ses:* actions in regions and accounts where SES isn't legitimately used. Replace static AWS access keys with IAM roles using short-lived credentials. Run TruffleHog or git-secrets across your repos to find leaked keys. Rotate any IAM keys older than 90 days. Configure CloudTrail alerts on SES API calls from unfamiliar IPs.

cPanel ransomware attackers are now hunting government agencies and the IT companies that manage them

Update on the cPanel ransomware wave covered May 3: attackers have shifted focus and are now targeting governments and managed service providers exploiting CVE-2026-41940. Security Affairs reports the operation is no longer just opportunistic mass-encryption of small business websites - the actors are deliberately looking for hosting accounts owned by government agencies and IT firms that manage downstream customers. CISA added the cPanel flaw to its KEV catalog Friday with a federal patch deadline of May 21. With 44,000 cPanel hosts already compromised in the initial wave, the secondary phase targeting MSPs has the potential to multiply impact through customer-tenant relationships - much like the 2023 Kaseya VSA campaign.

Check
Audit /var/cpanel/sessions/raw/ for entries created since February 23, 2026. Search for files with the .sorry extension across hosted sites. Check authentication logs for unusual successful logins between February 23 and April 28.
Affected
Government agencies, MSPs, and hosting companies running unpatched cPanel infrastructure. Particularly acute: MSPs whose cPanel instances host downstream customer accounts - a single compromise spreads to many tenants. Federal agencies under BOD 22-01 must patch by May 21. State and local governments without that mandate face the same active threat without the same enforcement.
Fix
Patch cPanel to 11.110.0.97, 11.118.0.63, 11.126.0.54, 11.132.0.29, 11.134.0.20, or 11.136.0.5. Restore from backups predating February 23 rather than just resuming operations. Rotate root, admin, and customer credentials. For MSPs: notify customers proactively before they discover compromise from a ransom note.

Microsoft says fake HR compliance emails fooled 35,000 people across 26 countries - phishing kit captured login tokens even with MFA enabled

Microsoft disclosed Monday that a phishing campaign between April 14 and 16 hit 35,000+ users across 13,000+ organizations in 26 countries (92% in the US). Lures impersonated internal HR with subjects like 'Internal case log issued under conduct policy.' Each email had a PDF attachment with a 'Review Case Materials' link that walked victims through Cloudflare CAPTCHAs and a final adversary-in-the-middle (AiTM) Microsoft sign-in page. AiTM proxies the real Microsoft login and captures session tokens after MFA - so traditional MFA is bypassed. Healthcare (19%), financial services (18%), and professional services (11%) were the most-targeted sectors.

Check
Search Exchange Online logs for emails between April 14-16 with subjects containing 'conduct policy' or 'awareness case log.' Hunt sign-in logs for OAuth grants from acceptable-use-policy-calendly.de or compliance-protectionoutlook.de.
Affected
Microsoft 365 / Entra ID tenants with users on traditional MFA (push, SMS, TOTP). AiTM bypasses any non-phishing-resistant MFA factor - only FIDO2 hardware keys and Windows Hello are immune. US users in healthcare, life sciences, financial services, and professional services are at acute risk based on Microsoft's targeting data.
Fix
Migrate users to phishing-resistant MFA (FIDO2 hardware keys, Windows Hello, passkeys) for all accounts. Enable Conditional Access policies that require token binding for high-privilege accounts. Turn on Zero-hour auto purge in Defender for Office 365 to retroactively quarantine campaign emails. Revoke session tokens for any user who visited a fake sign-in page.