Last updated: September 29, 2026 at 8:42 AM UTC
All 891 Vulnerability 357 Breach 144 Threat 383 Defense 7
Tag: leaked-credentials (2 articles)Clear

Truffle Security finds hundreds of leaked AWS keys still fully controlling accounts

Researchers at Truffle Security reported that after four years of collecting leaked Amazon Web Services keys, they found 768 that still grant full control over a company's cloud account, with a median age of about five years. The keys were exposed in places like public code and configuration and were never rotated, so they remain live long after the people who created them have likely forgotten them. A single valid key with broad permissions can let an attacker read data, spin up resources, and move through a cloud environment. The finding is a reminder that leaked long-lived credentials remain one of the most durable and overlooked paths into cloud accounts.

Check
Scan code, configuration, and logs for exposed AWS keys, revoke and rotate any long-lived keys you find, and move toward short-lived credentials and roles instead of static access keys.
Affected
Organizations with old, long-lived AWS access keys exposed in code or configuration and never rotated; an attacker who finds a still-valid key can gain full control of the account it belongs to.
Fix
Replace static keys with temporary credentials and roles, enforce rotation and least privilege, add automated secret scanning across repositories and history, and monitor for use of old or unexpected keys.

Attackers are using stolen Amazon keys to send convincing phishing emails directly from Amazon's email service - bypassing every spam filter

Kaspersky reported a sharp rise in phishing campaigns sent through Amazon's Simple Email Service (SES). Because the emails come from Amazon's own infrastructure, they pass SPF, DKIM, and DMARC checks that normally catch fake-brand emails - and reputation-based blocks don't trigger because Amazon's mail servers have legitimate reputation. The pattern starts with attackers harvesting AWS access keys leaked in public GitHub repos, .env files, Docker images, and S3 buckets, then using those keys to send phishing through SES from the victim's own AWS account. Wiz documented similar abuse in 2025 with attackers escalating from sandbox mode (200 emails/day) to production mode (50,000+/day) by issuing PutAccountDetails across all AWS regions in 10 seconds.

Check
Open the SES console in every AWS region (not just your home region) and check sending statistics for unexpected volume. Search CloudTrail for ses:PutAccountDetails calls from unfamiliar IPs.
Affected
Any AWS account where IAM access keys could be exposed - public GitHub repos, .env files committed by mistake, Docker images that bundled credentials, or developer workstations. AWS accounts where SES has never been used legitimately are at acute risk because there's no baseline. Verified domain owners face inbox-reputation damage even if no breach happened on their systems.
Fix
Apply Service Control Policies that block ses:* actions in regions and accounts where SES isn't legitimately used. Replace static AWS access keys with IAM roles using short-lived credentials. Run TruffleHog or git-secrets across your repos to find leaked keys. Rotate any IAM keys older than 90 days. Configure CloudTrail alerts on SES API calls from unfamiliar IPs.