Microsoft disclosed Monday that a phishing campaign between April 14 and 16 hit 35,000+ users across 13,000+ organizations in 26 countries (92% in the US). Lures impersonated internal HR with subjects like 'Internal case log issued under conduct policy.' Each email had a PDF attachment with a 'Review Case Materials' link that walked victims through Cloudflare CAPTCHAs and a final adversary-in-the-middle (AiTM) Microsoft sign-in page. AiTM proxies the real Microsoft login and captures session tokens after MFA - so traditional MFA is bypassed. Healthcare (19%), financial services (18%), and professional services (11%) were the most-targeted sectors.
Push Security disclosed ConsentFix v3, a new attack that lets criminals take over Microsoft 365 accounts even if the victim has MFA and phishing-resistant passkeys turned on. The trick: instead of stealing a password, the attacker tricks the user into pasting a Microsoft authorization URL into a phishing page during what looks like a routine login. That URL contains a one-time code that the attacker exchanges for permanent access tokens. v3 automates the whole attack with Cloudflare Pages phishing sites, Pipedream webhook automation, and tenant fingerprinting that customizes the lure to each target organization's branding.
Microsoft quietly patched a privilege escalation flaw in Entra ID (formerly Azure AD) that let an attacker with a low-privileged service account take over any service principal in the same tenant - including high-value ones with admin consent grants. The bug was in how Entra ID validated role assignments during certain API calls: the validator checked whether the caller had any role on a service principal but didn't check whether that role authorized the specific action. Microsoft fixed the flaw on the back end, so customers don't need a patch - but the takeover scenario means anyone who exploited it before the fix could have created persistent backdoors via OAuth grants.
TrustStrike Labs