Wiz detailed Gheist, an automated campaign that uses stolen GitHub tokens to push a sync-check.yml workflow to a short-lived ci-sync branch, then reads the job's secrets from the run log. The workflow base32-encodes every secret the job can access, defeating GitHub's log masking, downloads the log through the API, and deletes the run seconds later, so nothing leaves through an attacker server. Since September 15, Wiz recovered more than 13,500 planted branches across more than 850 compromised accounts, succeeding in private repositories and GitHub Enterprise, where GitHub's hold on suspicious runs does not apply. Rotate every reachable secret, since deleting branches does not undo exposure.
OVHcloud disclosed that five releases of its open-source command-line tool, versions 0.11.0 through 0.15.0, were backdoored on GitHub to steal secrets from disk. An attacker who had controlled a developer's GitHub account for more than half a year modified the existing releases because GitHub release immutability was disabled, uploading locally built malware without touching the CI/CD pipeline, and planted a hidden preinstall.js loader. OpenSourceMalware linked it to the GlassWorm campaign. The malicious builds covered macOS, Linux, and Windows and were live from 14:47 to 16:21 UTC on October 19. Source builds and Docker images were unaffected, and users should revoke secrets.
Bloom Security disclosed a flaw in npm's Trusted Publishing, which binds a package to a GitHub repository and workflow. npm recorded the binding by repository slug rather than GitHub's permanent numeric IDs, so once a bound repository or owner was renamed, transferred, or deleted, an attacker could claim the freed slug, add a matching workflow, and receive a publish credential, even forging a valid provenance attestation. Bloom counted more than 1,500 exposed packages with over 10 million total downloads. GitHub, notified in June through HackerOne, shipped a fix in October so unvalidated configurations expire after 48 hours. It is unknown whether anyone exploited the weakness in the wild.
Novee Security showed at Black Hat that a GitHub issue opened by an account with no repository access could reach the CI runners behind major AI coding agents in their default configurations, tested against Claude Code, Gemini CLI, and Codex. The strongest, a Gemini CLI container-launcher command injection scored 10.0, runs code on the CI host before the sandbox starts. In Claude Code, a validator that stripped quoted text let a payload in a Git flag reach the runner, and a separate flaw leaked an API key through a download counter. Untrusted issue content reaching an agent that holds secrets and tools in the same runtime is the shared weakness.
GitHub is adding a default three-day cooldown before Dependabot opens pull requests for new package versions, aimed at supply chain attacks where a poisoned release spreads through automated updates before anyone catches it. Security updates that answer a known advisory still ship immediately; only routine version updates wait. GitHub points to the September 2025 compromise of chalk, debug, and other packages, whose crypto-stealing versions were live for roughly two hours, and notes its advisory database logged more than 6,500 npm malware advisories in the year to May 2026, around eighteen a day. Most malicious releases are caught within hours, so a short delay filters out the majority.
Researchers at Island uncovered FakeGit, a campaign running roughly 7,600 malicious GitHub repositories from about 6,600 lookalike developer profiles, of which more than 800 pose as AI skills or Model Context Protocol servers. The fake projects borrow the names and workflows of familiar tools, covering Gmail and WhatsApp integrations through to Databricks, Jenkins, and Docker tooling, and their convincing README files walk a user or an agent from routine setup into downloading a malicious ZIP. That triggers a loader chain ending in SmartLoader, which establishes persistence and pulls further payloads such as the StealC infostealer.
Researchers at Socket uncovered a network of 222 GitHub repositories, tracked as Operation Muck and Load, built to spread Windows malware through a fake Go module posing as a DNS and subdomain scanner. Running the module quietly launches PowerShell that pulls an encrypted payload from attacker infrastructure and deploys infostealers, remote access trojans, and cryptominers. To look trustworthy, the operators used an automated workflow that force-pushes fake commits every minute, making repositories appear actively maintained and generating hundreds of package versions. More than 700 of the module's 1,200-plus versions were malicious. The lures cluster around crypto wallets, Telegram bots, and game cheats, aimed at people likely to run untrusted code.
Researchers at Noma Labs showed that GitHub's new Agentic Workflows, which let an AI agent read issues and act on repositories automatically, can be tricked into leaking private code through nothing more than a public issue. The technique, GitLost, is indirect prompt injection: an attacker opens an ordinary-looking issue in an organization's public repository, buries plain-English instructions in it, and the agent, which often holds a token with read access across the org's repositories, follows them, fetches files from a private repo, and posts the contents in a public comment. No credentials, coding, or write access are needed. GitHub was notified, but researchers frame it as an architectural weakness.
Researchers at Mozilla's 0DIN found that an AI coding agent told to clone and set up a seemingly harmless GitHub repository can be tricked into running malware that stays invisible to security scanners, the agent itself, and human reviewers. The trick is that nothing malicious sits in the repository's files. Instead, a routine-looking setup command runs a script that fetches a value hidden in a DNS TXT record and executes it as a shell command, pulling down and running an attacker's payload like a reverse shell. Because the payload lives outside the repo and arrives over DNS at setup time, code review and static scanning see nothing wrong.
The self-spreading Miasma worm, a variant of the Shai-Hulud malware linked to the group TeamPCP, has reached Microsoft's own code. Using a stolen access token, attackers pushed a malicious commit into the Azure durabletask repository, and GitHub disabled 73 repositories across four Microsoft organizations including Azure and MicrosoftDocs. The twist: the planted code runs automatically when a developer opens the project in an AI coding assistant like Claude Code, Cursor, Gemini CLI, or VS Code, then harvests cloud and developer credentials and uses them to infect more projects. It hides the trigger inside a build file (binding.gyp) that most security tools ignore.