Researchers at Reco detailed a long-running data-theft campaign they call City-Forum that has been quietly stealing records from Salesforce and ServiceNow customer portals since at least March 2025. Rather than exploiting a platform vulnerability, the attacker uses custom tooling to pull data that organizations mistakenly exposed to anonymous guest users through overly permissive sharing rules and portal settings. It targets Salesforce Experience Cloud sites and a poorly documented ServiceNow portal search endpoint, hitting telecoms, banks, software vendors, security firms, and public-sector portals worldwide. All activity traces to a single server, and one victim alone saw over half a million data enumeration requests.
Huntress detailed an Akira ransomware intrusion that reached in through an exposed SonicWall VPN and then forced Windows into Safe Mode to disable defenses. Because Safe Mode starts only a minimal set of services, the endpoint detection tools and Microsoft Defender did not load, leaving the attacker free to run their encryptor. The twist is that Safe Mode also starves the system of virtual memory, and thirteen seconds after the reboot the encryptor ran out of memory and crashed, so files were not encrypted, though the attacker still stole data. The technique remains a useful evasion play worth detecting even when the payload fails.
Researchers at Socket identified a campaign of 737 free virtual private network and proxy extensions published across browser marketplaces that route users' web traffic through outside proxy servers. Many impersonate well-known brands to appear trustworthy, so a user installing what looks like a legitimate free VPN can instead have their browsing redirected through infrastructure they do not control. Because a browser extension can see and alter the pages a user visits, routing traffic this way exposes browsing activity and can enable interception. Free VPN and proxy extensions are a recurring source of this problem, trading the promise of privacy for the opposite.
A joint advisory from the FBI, CISA, the NSA, the Secret Service, and South Korean police warns that the Gunra ransomware group is exploiting known Fortinet VPN vulnerabilities to bypass multi-factor authentication and break into networks, targeting government agencies and critical infrastructure. Gunra, believed to be built on leaked Conti source code, runs a double-extortion model: it steals data before encrypting, using a custom tool to pull files from Microsoft OneDrive and SharePoint and moving large archives to a file-sharing service with utilities like RClone and 7-Zip. The final payload appends a distinct extension and drops a ransom note. The group has grown into a ransomware-as-a-service operation recruiting access brokers.
Researchers at Wordfence found that attackers compromised the upstream infrastructure of BdThemes, a popular WordPress plugin vendor, and poisoned a remote JSON feed that its plugins fetch to show promotional banners in the admin dashboard. Because the malicious code lives in that feed rather than in the plugin source, no plugin update was needed and nothing changed on disk. The injected script runs in every logged-in administrator's browser, creates hidden rogue admin accounts through the site's own interface, and installs a fake plugin containing a web shell for persistence. Seven plugins including Element Pack and Prime Slider were affected, and the flaw sat unnoticed for about five months.
Researchers at Yeeth Security flagged malicious Visual Studio Code extensions named Solidity Pro that pose as tools for blockchain developers while stealing wallets and credentials. Early versions quietly fetched an encrypted payload from cloud infrastructure after a delay of up to three days and ran it outside the editor to evade quick checks. Later versions became full information stealers, collecting browser profiles, cryptocurrency wallets and seed phrases, source-control tokens, cloud credentials, API keys, and SSH private keys, then sending them out through a Telegram bot. The extensions were pulled from the Open VSX marketplace, but the project's code repository remained available.
Novee Security showed at Black Hat that a GitHub issue opened by an account with no repository access could reach the CI runners behind major AI coding agents in their default configurations, tested against Claude Code, Gemini CLI, and Codex. The strongest, a Gemini CLI container-launcher command injection scored 10.0, runs code on the CI host before the sandbox starts. In Claude Code, a validator that stripped quoted text let a payload in a Git flag reach the runner, and a separate flaw leaked an API key through a download counter. Untrusted issue content reaching an agent that holds secrets and tools in the same runtime is the shared weakness.
Two security firms showed that Atlassian's Rovo AI assistant can be steered by hidden instructions into collecting Jira and Confluence data a signed-in user can access and sending it to an outside server. PromptArmor concealed the instructions in a document Rovo reads, so asking it to organize tickets makes it gather internal data and leak it through a URL request, with no approval step and even with web search disabled. Varonis used a chat URL parameter to preload instructions, so one click ran them with the user's privileges. Atlassian fixed the link-based path server-side, but the content-based path was not confirmed fixed at disclosure.
Microsoft Threat Intelligence detailed a macOS ClickFix operation spanning more than 250 domains that now fingerprints visitors before deciding whether to show a malware lure. The server-side gate hides the malicious page from crawlers and sandboxes while presenting selected Mac users with a fake software download, an anti-analysis layer rather than a change to the attack itself. The lure still requires the victim to copy and run an obfuscated command in Terminal, which fetches scripts and installs an infostealer, in this case Atomic Stealer, that targets credentials, browser data, authentication stores, and cryptocurrency wallets. Many domains follow a dictionary-word naming pattern using the word file.
GitGuardian found 321 live n8n automation instances reachable using API tokens that developers had accidentally committed to public GitHub repositories, and showed four ways an attacker could abuse them. n8n workflows often hold credentials for the services they connect, so a valid API token can expose not just the automation platform but the downstream accounts it touches, from cloud services to messaging and databases. Because n8n is widely self-hosted and frequently wired into sensitive systems, an exposed token can become a path to broader compromise. The finding is a reminder that secrets committed to source control remain one of the most reliable ways in.
TrustStrike Labs