Group-IB detailed a new version of the RedHook Android banking trojan that gains shell-level control of a phone by abusing the operating system's own wireless debugging feature, with no computer or root needed. Once a user is tricked into granting Accessibility permissions, the malware silently taps through Settings to enable Developer Options and Wireless Debugging, then pairs over the loopback interface to run privileged commands. From there it can silently install or remove apps, change secure settings, log keystrokes, stream the screen, and steal credentials, while an aggressive persistence stack keeps it running through reboots. It spreads through social engineering, with attackers impersonating government or bank staff.
Sysdig detailed a financially motivated operator who chained two Langflow vulnerabilities to raid the AI orchestration platform for credentials, part of why CISA just added one of them to its exploited-vulnerabilities catalog. Using a cross-tenant access flaw (CVE-2026-55255), the attacker ran flows belonging to other tenants to steal their large language model provider keys and AWS keys, while a separate unauthenticated code-execution flaw (CVE-2026-33017) took over the host itself. The activity, observed in late June against an internet-exposed Langflow instance, followed a methodical pattern of reconnaissance, flow enumeration, and credential theft. It underscores that AI orchestration platforms concentrate valuable secrets and are increasingly a direct target once left exposed online.
Researchers at Socket uncovered a network of 222 GitHub repositories, tracked as Operation Muck and Load, built to spread Windows malware through a fake Go module posing as a DNS and subdomain scanner. Running the module quietly launches PowerShell that pulls an encrypted payload from attacker infrastructure and deploys infostealers, remote access trojans, and cryptominers. To look trustworthy, the operators used an automated workflow that force-pushes fake commits every minute, making repositories appear actively maintained and generating hundreds of package versions. More than 700 of the module's 1,200-plus versions were malicious. The lures cluster around crypto wallets, Telegram bots, and game cheats, aimed at people likely to run untrusted code.
A cybercrime group left its own server exposed on the internet for weeks, revealing a mass website-hacking operation that researchers at SOCRadar now track as WP-SHELLSTORM. The crew breaks into sites at scale, plants hidden backdoors, and resells the access to other criminals. Rather than using zero-days, it automated attacks against 27 known vulnerabilities in outdated WordPress and Joomla plugins; a single flaw in the Breeze caching plugin accounted for over 17,000 backdoored sites. Target lists named more than 1.4 million domains, with roughly 25,000 confirmed compromised. The same server also revealed an earlier campaign that stole cloud credentials and database passwords from exposed configuration servers.
Attackers compromised a legitimate maintainer's GitHub account for the Injective blockchain SDK and used it to push a malicious version of the widely used @injectivelabs/sdk-ts npm package, which has around 50,000 weekly downloads. The tainted code, disguised as usage telemetry, hooked the SDK's wallet key-generation functions to capture private keys and seed phrases, then sent them to a server made to look like legitimate Injective infrastructure. Trusted-publishing automation spread the malicious release across 18 packages within minutes, though it was live under an hour before being pulled. Because the theft can reach apps that used the SDK only indirectly, any wallet keys handled by affected versions should be treated as compromised.
A new phishing-as-a-service platform called Forg365 is built to steal Microsoft 365 accounts, combining adversary-in-the-middle and device-code phishing with AI-generated lures created directly in its control panel. Researchers at ZeroBEC found the panel lets operators build campaigns, configure malicious OAuth apps, generate and refine phishing emails with AI, and monitor compromised mailboxes for keywords, all in one place. It also ships a browser extension that silently refreshes session cookies through an OAuth flow, giving attackers ongoing access without re-authenticating. The operators deliver lures posing as business documents, using legitimate email-sending infrastructure to slip past filters. The researchers note AI is lowering the cost of both writing phishing content and building phishing platforms.
Symantec detailed GodDamn, a ransomware operation that disables endpoint defenses using PoisonX, a malicious kernel driver its developers managed to get signed by Microsoft, an unusual escalation over the more common tactic of abusing a legitimate vulnerable driver. In an early-June attack, the operators used AnyDesk for remote access and a credential-harvesting toolkit that pulls passwords from browsers, Windows Credential Manager, cached domain credentials, email clients, and network traffic, before deploying the ransomware. Alongside the signed driver, they ran a user-mode tool disguised as a Symantec product to blind security software. Symantec links GodDamn to a developer it tracks as Hyadina and says the group is actively improving its defense-evasion capabilities.
Microsoft detailed GigaWiper, a destructive Windows backdoor that stitches several older malware families into one implant, letting operators choose how to destroy a machine. Its commands include a raw disk wiper that overwrites the drive and partition table, a multi-pass wiper for the Windows drive, and a fake-ransomware module that encrypts files with keys it never saves, so there is no recovery and no ransom note, only destruction disguised as extortion. It also offers remote access and log clearing. To hide, it poses as OneDrive through a scheduled task and routes command traffic over legitimate services like RabbitMQ and Redis. Because it runs after intrusion, offline backups are the real defense.
Researchers have shown an attack, called HalluSquatting, that weaponizes the tendency of AI coding assistants to invent plausible-sounding names for software packages that do not exist. The attackers work out which fake names an AI reliably hallucinates, register those names first on a package registry or GitHub, and upload a trap that instructs the coding agent to install a reverse shell or runs code directly. When the assistant fetches the made-up dependency on a developer's machine, it runs the attacker's payload. Tested against nine AI coding assistants, the technique could let attackers pool compromised developer machines into a botnet for crypto mining, denial-of-service attacks, or ransomware.
Okta warns of a campaign that phones Microsoft 365 users and talks them through what looks like setting up a passkey, but is actually a phishing kit that hands their account to the attacker. Active since April, the operators register passkey-themed domains and call targets, exploiting unfamiliarity with how passkeys really work. The kit mimics Microsoft's passkey enrollment without registering a real passkey, and pushes the victim to "save a recovery key" that the attacker controls, capturing the access needed to take over the account. The campaign, aimed at extortion, notably targets the passkey adoption process itself, turning a security upgrade into a social-engineering opening.