Krebs on Security reports that Jacob Butler, the 18-year-old Ottawa resident allegedly known online as 'Dort,' has been arrested and charged in both the US and Canada with running the Kimwolf IoT botnet. KrebsOnSecurity unmasked Butler as the operator on February 28 by tying together his email addresses, forum registrations, and public Telegram and Discord posts. Dort later threatened and swatted researchers including Synthient's Ben Brundage. Ontario Provincial Police executed a search warrant in Ottawa on March 19 and seized devices. Kimwolf competed with Aisuru, JackSkid, and Mossad for the same vulnerable-IoT population. Butler faces up to 10 years if extradited and convicted in the US.
ADAMnetworks researchers have disclosed Underminr, a domain-fronting attack that abuses how major content delivery networks resolve HTTP requests, letting an attacker route malicious traffic so it appears to come from trusted brand domains. Protective DNS filters see the DNS lookup for the legitimate site and wave it through. ADAMnetworks estimates 42% of websites globally are vulnerable, 51% in the US, around one-third in Eastern Europe, and under 9% in China's heavily-regulated internet. The researchers say attackers are already using the technique. Boutique security-focused CDNs that perform domain verification are not vulnerable; the larger general-purpose providers carry most of the exposure.
Hunt.io has mapped 1,350+ command-and-control servers spread across 98 providers in 14 Middle Eastern countries over three months. Saudi Telecom Company (STC) hosts 981 of them - 72.4% of all observed regional C2 - the largest single-provider concentration the researchers have seen globally. Most of STC's hosting appears to be compromised customer systems rather than deliberate bulletproof hosting, but the effect is the same. Other heavy hosts include SERVERS TECH FZCO (UAE), OMC (Israel), Türk Telekom, and Iraqi provider Regxa, which Hunt.io flags as the highest bulletproof-hosting profile observed. Named campaigns hosted on this infrastructure include Eagle Werewolf espionage, DYNOWIPER attacks on Poland's energy sector, and RondoDox.
ESET has documented Chinese-aligned threat actor Webworm adding two new custom backdoors to its toolset: EchoCreep, which uses a Discord channel for command-and-control, and GraphWorm, which routes C2 through the Microsoft Graph API and uploads exfiltrated files to OneDrive. Webworm is staging tools out of a GitHub repository disguised as a WordPress fork and has been observed targeting government organizations in Belgium, Italy, Serbia, Poland, Spain, and a university in South Africa. The earliest EchoCreep Discord commands date to March 21, 2024; about 433 messages have been sent through the channel. Initial access is still unclear, but dirsearch and nuclei are involved.
Ukrainian cyberpolice working with US law enforcement have identified an 18-year-old man from Odesa as the suspected operator of an infostealer operation that ran from 2024 through 2025 against customers of a California online retailer. The malware harvested 28,000 customer accounts; the operators used about 5,800 of them to make $721,000 in unauthorized purchases, leaving the retailer with around $250,000 in direct losses including chargebacks. The suspect ran the back-end infrastructure for processing and selling stolen session tokens. Police searched two residences and seized computers, phones, and bank cards. No arrest has been announced yet.
B1ack's Stash, a dark-web carding marketplace operating since at least 2023, has released roughly 4.6 million stolen credit-card records as a free download. The market frames the dump as punishment for sellers caught reselling its data on rival platforms; SOCRadar says the marketplace also suspended about 8 million additional CVV2 records. The records include full PAN, CVV2, expiration date, billing address, full name, email, phone number, and IP address, which makes them directly usable for card-not-present fraud and account-opening fraud. This is the third free dump B1ack's Stash has used as a customer-acquisition tactic since its 2024 emergence.
Between 01:56 and 02:56 UTC on May 19, a Shai-Hulud-flavored attack published 639 malicious versions across 323 npm packages, mostly in the @antv chart and graph namespace, after compromising the maintainer account 'atool.' Affected libraries include @antv/g2, @antv/g6, echarts-for-react, timeago.js, and jest-canvas-mock (still 10M monthly downloads despite three years dormant). A linked attack hijacked 15 tags of the 'actions-cool' GitHub Action and replaced them with a credential stealer that reads runner memory and exfils to t.m-kosche[.]com - the same domain as the @antv campaign. Socket and Aikido say there are now 2,900+ GitHub repos generated by this wave.
The Nx team has confirmed that version 18.95.0 of its VS Code extension was malicious and that a few users were compromised. The bad version was available on the marketplace for only 11 minutes on May 18 (12:36 to 12:47 UTC), but that was enough to plant Python-based persistence under ~/.local/share/kitty/cat.py and a macOS LaunchAgent at com.user.kitty-monitor.plist, then steal tokens, secrets, and SSH keys reachable from the machine. The Nx team has shipped a clean 18.100.0 release and published indicators of compromise. This is the second time Nx has been targeted within a year, after the August 2025 s1ngularity supply-chain attack on its npm packages.
Microsoft is tracking a financially motivated actor it calls Storm-2949 that abuses the Microsoft 365 Self-Service Password Reset flow to hijack high-value identities and then exfiltrate as much data as possible. The actor socially engineers IT staff and senior leaders, kicks off an SSPR reset, then poses as IT support and convinces the victim to approve the resulting MFA prompt. Once in, Storm-2949 uses Graph API and custom Python to enumerate the tenant, downloads thousands of OneDrive and SharePoint files in single actions, and pivots into Azure - VMs, Key Vaults, SQL, storage - via privileged custom RBAC roles.
Microsoft's Digital Crimes Unit, supported by law enforcement, has disrupted Fox Tempest, a 'malware-signing-as-a-service' offering that abused Azure Artifact Signing (formerly Trusted Signing) to issue legitimate Microsoft-signed certificates for malware. Operators created more than 1,000 certificates and hundreds of Azure tenants using stolen US and Canadian identities, all valid for 72 hours to reduce takedown risk. Microsoft has revoked the certificates, seized the signspace[.]cloud domain, and taken hundreds of supporting VMs offline. The service signed Oyster, Lumma Stealer, Vidar, and ransomware payloads for Rhysida, Akira, INC, Qilin, and BlackByte, used by groups including Vanilla Tempest and Storm-0501.
TrustStrike Labs