Last updated: November 2, 2026 at 1:20 PM UTC
All 957 Vulnerability 399 Breach 144 Threat 407 Defense 7
Tag: entra (3 articles)Clear

Microsoft 365 token-replay campaign compromises 97 accounts across 79 organizations despite MFA

Huntress detailed a Microsoft 365 adversary-in-the-middle campaign that ran from July to September, capturing sign-in sessions behind fake login pages and replaying the stolen tokens from attacker devices within minutes, a technique it calls token spraying. From over 200,000 login attempts the attackers achieved 497 successful sign-ins, compromised 97 accounts across 79 organizations, and registered 48 rogue Entra devices. In at least 19 organizations they removed existing MFA methods and registered their own within three hours, and planted hidden inbox rules hiding payroll and deposit emails. Defenders should revoke sessions, audit Entra devices and MFA methods, and restrict the device-code workflow with Conditional Access.

Check
Hunt Microsoft 365 for rogue Entra device registrations, unexpected MFA-method changes, and hidden inbox rules, and revoke sessions for any suspected compromise.
Affected
Microsoft 365 users phished through an adversary-in-the-middle page have their post-login tokens replayed from attacker devices, bypassing MFA without reusing the password.
Fix
Reset credentials and revoke sessions, audit Entra devices and MFA methods, block legacy device-code flows with Conditional Access, and require MFA for all users and apps.

Rogue external MFA provider in Entra captures user passwords during legitimate logins

Varonis Threat Labs detailed a post-compromise technique it calls TrustSink, in which an attacker holding a highly privileged Microsoft Entra account registers a rogue External Authentication Method as an external MFA provider. During normal sign-ins, Entra redirects users to the rogue provider to complete the second factor, and the attacker inserts a convincing Microsoft password prompt that captures the password in plaintext before returning a valid signed token, so the login completes with no error. In testing, every sign-in succeeded while the attacker server logged passwords with source IPs. Resetting a captured password does not remove the rogue provider, which persists in the configuration and works against any external provider model.

Check
Audit Entra External Authentication Methods for unrecognized providers, remove rogue entries, and tighten which roles can register or modify external MFA providers.
Affected
Tenants where an attacker already holds a highly privileged Entra role can have a rogue external MFA provider silently harvest every user's password during normal logins.
Fix
Restrict and monitor privileged Entra roles, alert on External Authentication Method changes, and review provider configuration after any privileged-account compromise.

Attackers phone Microsoft 365 users to walk them through fake passkey setup

Okta warns of a campaign that phones Microsoft 365 users and talks them through what looks like setting up a passkey, but is actually a phishing kit that hands their account to the attacker. Active since April, the operators register passkey-themed domains and call targets, exploiting unfamiliarity with how passkeys really work. The kit mimics Microsoft's passkey enrollment without registering a real passkey, and pushes the victim to "save a recovery key" that the attacker controls, capturing the access needed to take over the account. The campaign, aimed at extortion, notably targets the passkey adoption process itself, turning a security upgrade into a social-engineering opening.

Check
Tell staff that Microsoft passkey setup happens through a device system prompt, not a phone call or web form, and that anyone calling to walk them through passkey registration is suspicious.
Affected
Microsoft 365 users unfamiliar with passkey enrollment; a convincing phone call plus a look-alike registration page can trick them into handing over the access an attacker needs to take over the account.
Fix
Train users on the genuine passkey enrollment flow, restrict who can register new authentication methods and recovery keys, monitor Entra for unexpected authentication-method changes, and verify unsolicited passkey calls internally.