Huntress detailed a Microsoft 365 adversary-in-the-middle campaign that ran from July to September, capturing sign-in sessions behind fake login pages and replaying the stolen tokens from attacker devices within minutes, a technique it calls token spraying. From over 200,000 login attempts the attackers achieved 497 successful sign-ins, compromised 97 accounts across 79 organizations, and registered 48 rogue Entra devices. In at least 19 organizations they removed existing MFA methods and registered their own within three hours, and planted hidden inbox rules hiding payroll and deposit emails. Defenders should revoke sessions, audit Entra devices and MFA methods, and restrict the device-code workflow with Conditional Access.
Varonis Threat Labs detailed a post-compromise technique it calls TrustSink, in which an attacker holding a highly privileged Microsoft Entra account registers a rogue External Authentication Method as an external MFA provider. During normal sign-ins, Entra redirects users to the rogue provider to complete the second factor, and the attacker inserts a convincing Microsoft password prompt that captures the password in plaintext before returning a valid signed token, so the login completes with no error. In testing, every sign-in succeeded while the attacker server logged passwords with source IPs. Resetting a captured password does not remove the rogue provider, which persists in the configuration and works against any external provider model.
Okta warns of a campaign that phones Microsoft 365 users and talks them through what looks like setting up a passkey, but is actually a phishing kit that hands their account to the attacker. Active since April, the operators register passkey-themed domains and call targets, exploiting unfamiliarity with how passkeys really work. The kit mimics Microsoft's passkey enrollment without registering a real passkey, and pushes the victim to "save a recovery key" that the attacker controls, capturing the access needed to take over the account. The campaign, aimed at extortion, notably targets the passkey adoption process itself, turning a security upgrade into a social-engineering opening.