Ontinue tied the Psychedelic Stealer, spread through compromised Ukrainian websites using ClickFix-style fake Cloudflare verification pages, to a wider malware-as-a-service platform called Lunex. The chain starts with a bogus CAPTCHA that delivers a malicious MSI, which drops LunexLoader. The loader bypasses User Account Control through the CMSTPLUA COM object, then uses a bring-your-own-vulnerable-driver technique against the AMD Radeon Software driver PDFWKRNL.sys, affected by CVE-2023-20598, to escalate and evade defenses before fetching the stealer. Researchers note BYOVD is rarely used as a precursor to an infostealer. The final payload extracts credentials from seven Chromium-based browsers, exfiltrates cryptocurrency wallets, and installs a PowerShell-based browser Native Messaging Host for persistent remote filesystem access.
LastPass and Delphos Labs reported a fake LastPass Authenticator installer, hosted on a lookalike GitHub page, that installs a Windows kernel driver to shut off security software before a password stealer runs. The driver, named Alinubx.sys, was signed through Microsoft's hardware-compatibility program, scored zero detections on VirusTotal in August, and was not on Microsoft's blocklist. It carries 145 antivirus and security process names and terminates each from the kernel, below where endpoint tools can see or block it. The installer uses DLL side-loading through a renamed Microsoft debugger, escalates to SYSTEM, and ships in padded 128 to 148 MB archives to evade size-limited scanners.
Cisco Talos detailed a financially motivated, Chinese-speaking group it tracks as UAT-10147 that breaks into internet-facing Windows and Linux web servers at scale and installs malware for data theft and search-engine-optimization fraud. The group weaves AI tools through its operations, from exploiting known vulnerabilities to generating payloads, and Talos even found AI-generated code comments left in the source of its Linux kernel rootkit. Its cross-platform implant, SPECTRE, offers credential theft, process injection, encrypted command-and-control, and driver-based bypassing of endpoint detection. Investigators also recovered prompt logs from AI coding assistants on the attackers' own machines, a concrete look at adversaries using the same agent tools defenders do.
Researchers detailed Cruciferra, a crypter service that packages Windows malware to evade detection using two notable techniques. It brings a vulnerable signed driver to disable security tooling, an approach known as bring-your-own-vulnerable-driver, and it uses process ghosting, where a malicious file is deleted before its code is mapped into a running process, so the running program has no backing file for tools to inspect. Together these let common payloads run while sidestepping many endpoint defenses. Crypter services matter because they lower the skill needed to deploy malware stealthily, letting many separate actors wrap their payloads in the same evasion layer rather than building it themselves.
Symantec detailed GodDamn, a ransomware operation that disables endpoint defenses using PoisonX, a malicious kernel driver its developers managed to get signed by Microsoft, an unusual escalation over the more common tactic of abusing a legitimate vulnerable driver. In an early-June attack, the operators used AnyDesk for remote access and a credential-harvesting toolkit that pulls passwords from browsers, Windows Credential Manager, cached domain credentials, email clients, and network traffic, before deploying the ransomware. Alongside the signed driver, they ran a user-mode tool disguised as a Symantec product to blind security software. Symantec links GodDamn to a developer it tracks as Hyadina and says the group is actively improving its defense-evasion capabilities.
Symantec reports that DragonForce ransomware operators stayed hidden inside a major US services firm's network for up to two months by disguising their command-and-control traffic as ordinary Microsoft Teams activity. A new Go-based backdoor, Backdoor.Turn, grabs an anonymous Teams visitor token, routes through a legitimate Microsoft Teams relay server, and then tunnels to the attackers' real server, so defenders watching the network only see connections to genuine Microsoft infrastructure. It is the first known malware to abuse Teams relay servers this way. The attackers also used a custom malicious driver to disable defenses, and installed the backdoor after deploying ransomware, suggesting they kept access for a return visit or to resell.
TrustStrike Labs