Data from a November 2025 breach at AI music platform Suno surfaced publicly in July, with Have I Been Pwned indexing 55,282,226 unique email addresses. Alongside the addresses, the corpus held names, phone numbers, physical addresses, and purchase records, plus tens of thousands of Stripe entries containing partial card data: card type, expiry date, and the last four digits. Reporting indicates the intrusion started with malware delivered through third-party code on a developer's machine, which yielded credentials for private repositories and internal databases. Suno has said no sensitive personal information was compromised and has not notified affected users.
Hugging Face, the largest public repository of AI models and datasets, disclosed an intrusion into its production infrastructure that it says was driven end to end by an autonomous AI agent system. The attacker used code execution paths in the dataset processing pipeline for initial access, then harvested credentials and reached internal clusters, though the company found no evidence that public models or datasets were tampered with. The campaign ran thousands of actions across short lived sandboxes, with self migrating command and control staged on public services. Hugging Face's own AI assisted anomaly detection flagged it, and it has rotated affected credentials and rebuilt compromised nodes.
Ernst & Young is notifying clients of a breach at a third-party IT service management platform used by staff supporting its tax practice. Support tickets submitted through the platform could include attached documents containing client tax information, and the firm says an unauthorized third party accessed the platform between March 28 and April 12 and downloaded documents belonging to a number of clients. EY detected the activity on April 23, roughly two weeks after it stopped, and filed breach notifications with the California Attorney General in July. The exposed data includes personal and financial information used to prepare tax filings.
Researchers at StepSecurity documented SleeperGem, a supply chain attack in which malicious versions of three RubyGems packages were published over two days, including one impersonating Microsoft's Git Credential Manager. Each release is a loader that fetches a second stage from an attacker controlled server, then checks around thirty environment variables that continuous integration platforms set. If it finds any, it exits and does nothing; on a developer machine it drops a native daemon and installs persistence. The accounts behind the packages were ordinary ones that had gone dormant for years, which is what made them attractive to hijack, and the releases had no matching source repository tags.
Attackers backdoored several widely used @asyncapi npm packages, together drawing around three million weekly downloads, by hijacking the project's GitHub Actions build pipeline rather than stealing a maintainer's npm token. Because the project's own release workflow published the malicious versions, they carried valid provenance signatures, which prove where a package came from but not that the code was trustworthy. The payload was hidden in normal runtime files behind trailing whitespace and ran when the module was imported, not on install, so defenses aimed at install scripts missed it. Once loaded, it fetched an encrypted second stage, stole credentials and cloud and registry tokens, and planted persistence, even in developer tool configuration files.
Researchers at JFrog found 148 npm packages that abused the registry not to attack developers but as free hosting for a booby-trapped web proxy aimed at students trying to bypass school filters. Anyone who opened one of the proxy sites had their browser quietly conscripted into a distributed denial-of-service botnet, flooding target servers with HTTP and WebSocket traffic, alongside injected ads and tracking. Crucially, the packages contained no install-time scripts and were never meant to be added to a project, so dependency scanners and install sandboxes, which watch what runs on install, would not catch them. The operators can re-arm the dormant attack code with a single commit.
Discount supermarket chain Lidl has notified online shop customers in Germany, Belgium, and the Netherlands of a data breach that stemmed from a hack at one of its service providers rather than Lidl's own systems. According to the company, the exposed information involves customer contact and order-related details, while payment card data was not affected. The incident is another example of third-party or supply-chain risk, where attackers compromise a vendor to reach a larger brand's customer data. Even without financial data, the exposed details can fuel convincing phishing and scams that impersonate Lidl, especially messages referencing real orders to make fraudulent requests look legitimate to shoppers who recently used the online shop.
Google and Microsoft removed ModHeader, a header-editing browser extension popular with developers, with about 1.6 million installs, after researchers at Stripe OLT found a hidden browsing-history collector inside the official, signed store version. The collector was dormant, gated off by an empty allow-list, and no evidence has emerged that it ever sent data, but its presence in a trusted, signed extension is the concern. Its design frustrated automated review: the data was encrypted, the upload was switched off so sandboxes saw nothing leave, and malicious code was blended into a legitimate codebase, so scanners rated it low risk. It is a reminder that a store signature proves origin, not safe behavior.
Attackers used a stolen publishing credential to push malicious versions of the jscrambler npm package that install a Rust infostealer as soon as the package is added to a project. Socket ties five bad versions to the same actor, published over about three hours; the malware ships as native binaries for Windows, macOS, and Linux and sweeps developer machines for cloud credentials, crypto wallets, and password-manager vaults. Because jscrambler is a build-time tool used in development and CI, the stealer runs where deploy tokens, cloud keys, and source code live. Partway through, the dropper moved into the package's main code, so installing with scripts disabled does not stop it.
Researchers at Socket uncovered a network of 222 GitHub repositories, tracked as Operation Muck and Load, built to spread Windows malware through a fake Go module posing as a DNS and subdomain scanner. Running the module quietly launches PowerShell that pulls an encrypted payload from attacker infrastructure and deploys infostealers, remote access trojans, and cryptominers. To look trustworthy, the operators used an automated workflow that force-pushes fake commits every minute, making repositories appear actively maintained and generating hundreds of package versions. More than 700 of the module's 1,200-plus versions were malicious. The lures cluster around crypto wallets, Telegram bots, and game cheats, aimed at people likely to run untrusted code.
TrustStrike Labs