Last updated: August 19, 2026 at 1:47 AM UTC
All 741 Vulnerability 286 Breach 129 Threat 319 Defense 7
Tag: open-vsx (2 articles)Clear

77 malicious Open VSX extensions posed as dev tools to harvest developer data

Manifold Security found 77 malicious extensions on Open VSX, the open marketplace that editors like VSCodium, Cursor, and Windsurf pull extensions from, impersonating legitimate developer tools. Detected between July 26 and August 1, all 77 were linked through a shared exfiltration domain and common code. Fifty-eight sent only basic system information, while the other 19 performed deeper reconnaissance, exfiltrating developer, Git repository, and continuous integration metadata. Manifold found no access to source code, credentials, tokens, or SSH material and did not determine the campaign's goal. The extensions were pulled from Open VSX by August 3, but must still be removed manually from affected machines.

Check
Check developer machines and workspace configuration files for the extension identifiers in Manifold's report, remove any that appear, and block the campaign's exfiltration domain, mangorbit dot com.
Affected
Developers who installed the evil-twin extensions from Open VSX through editors like VSCodium, Cursor, or Windsurf; the extensions leaked system, Git repository, and continuous integration metadata about their environments.
Fix
Vet extensions and publishers before installing, prefer verified sources, inventory installed extensions across developer machines, block the known exfiltration domain, and monitor for extensions contacting unexpected external hosts.

Attackers planted 73 fake VS Code extensions on Open VSX as 'sleepers' that pretended to be popular tools, then quietly turned malicious

Socket reported 73 newly identified malicious extensions on Open VSX, the marketplace used by VS Code, Cursor, and Windsurf editors. The extensions impersonate popular developer tools - same name, same icon, but published by newly-created GitHub accounts with empty repositories. Instead of being malicious from day one, they sit harmlessly for weeks gathering downloads and trust, then push a 'normal' update that silently installs malware. Six of the 73 extensions have already activated; the rest are still in the sleeper phase. The campaign is part of GlassWorm, an ongoing supply-chain attack family that has been working its way through npm, GitHub, and editor extension marketplaces since 2025.

Check
Check every developer machine and CI runner for editor extensions, verify each publisher matches the official one, and remove anything you can't account for.
Affected
Developers using VS Code, Cursor, Windsurf, or other Open VSX-compatible editors who installed extensions in the past two months. Particularly risky if your team installs popular extensions by name without checking publisher namespace, or auto-updates extensions without review. Sleeper extensions look identical to legitimate ones, so visual checks alone are insufficient.
Fix
List installed extensions in each editor and cross-check the publisher against the legitimate one (microsoft.* for Microsoft tools, the original project's GitHub for others). Remove any with newly-created publishers or mismatched namespaces. Disable auto-update on extensions in higher-risk environments. Allowlist approved extensions in managed dev environments. Socket's GlassWorm v2 page tracks the 73 by name.