Last updated: November 2, 2026 at 1:20 PM UTC
All 957 Vulnerability 399 Breach 144 Threat 407 Defense 7
Tag: glassworm (3 articles)Clear

Attackers backdoor five OVHcloud CLI releases on GitHub to steal developer secrets from disk

OVHcloud disclosed that five releases of its open-source command-line tool, versions 0.11.0 through 0.15.0, were backdoored on GitHub to steal secrets from disk. An attacker who had controlled a developer's GitHub account for more than half a year modified the existing releases because GitHub release immutability was disabled, uploading locally built malware without touching the CI/CD pipeline, and planted a hidden preinstall.js loader. OpenSourceMalware linked it to the GlassWorm campaign. The malicious builds covered macOS, Linux, and Windows and were live from 14:47 to 16:21 UTC on October 19. Source builds and Docker images were unaffected, and users should revoke secrets.

Check
Identify machines that ran OVHcloud CLI versions 0.11.0 through 0.15.0, remove or update the binary, clean the systems, and revoke all secrets they could reach.
Affected
Developers who installed the backdoored OVHcloud CLI releases on macOS, Linux, or Windows had secrets stolen from disk by locally built malware uploaded to GitHub.
Fix
Update to a clean OVHcloud CLI release, rotate all exposed secrets, enable GitHub release immutability on your own repositories, and inspect hosts for the preinstall.js loader.

CrowdStrike, Google, Shadowserver disrupt GlassWorm botnet by cutting four resilient C2 channels - Solana memos, BitTorrent DHT, Google Calendar, direct VPS

CrowdStrike, Google, and The Shadowserver Foundation have disrupted the GlassWorm developer-supply-chain botnet by simultaneously cutting four resilient command-and-control channels. Active since October 2025, GlassWorm spread through malicious OpenVSX and VS Code extensions, GitHub repos, and npm packages (one March campaign hit 400+ artifacts), stealing crypto wallets and developer credentials. Its C2 was built to resist takedown: server addresses encoded in Solana transaction memo fields, configuration stored in the BitTorrent DHT, Base64 C2 paths hidden in Google Calendar event titles, and direct VPS connections for payload delivery. All four had to fall at once. Infected hosts now beacon to CrowdStrike's sinkhole at 164.92.88[.]210.

Check
Run CrowdStrike's published YARA rules across developer workstations and build servers. Search network logs for beacons to 164.92.88[.]210 (CrowdStrike sinkhole) indicating prior GlassWorm infection.
Affected
Developers who installed malicious OpenVSX or VS Code extensions, or pulled compromised GitHub repos and npm packages since October 2025. 400+ artifacts hit in the March campaign alone.
Fix
Remediate any host beaconing to the sinkhole. Audit installed OpenVSX/VS Code extensions against known-bad lists. Rotate crypto wallets and developer credentials exposed on infected machines.

Attackers planted 73 fake VS Code extensions on Open VSX as 'sleepers' that pretended to be popular tools, then quietly turned malicious

Socket reported 73 newly identified malicious extensions on Open VSX, the marketplace used by VS Code, Cursor, and Windsurf editors. The extensions impersonate popular developer tools - same name, same icon, but published by newly-created GitHub accounts with empty repositories. Instead of being malicious from day one, they sit harmlessly for weeks gathering downloads and trust, then push a 'normal' update that silently installs malware. Six of the 73 extensions have already activated; the rest are still in the sleeper phase. The campaign is part of GlassWorm, an ongoing supply-chain attack family that has been working its way through npm, GitHub, and editor extension marketplaces since 2025.

Check
Check every developer machine and CI runner for editor extensions, verify each publisher matches the official one, and remove anything you can't account for.
Affected
Developers using VS Code, Cursor, Windsurf, or other Open VSX-compatible editors who installed extensions in the past two months. Particularly risky if your team installs popular extensions by name without checking publisher namespace, or auto-updates extensions without review. Sleeper extensions look identical to legitimate ones, so visual checks alone are insufficient.
Fix
List installed extensions in each editor and cross-check the publisher against the legitimate one (microsoft.* for Microsoft tools, the original project's GitHub for others). Remove any with newly-created publishers or mismatched namespaces. Disable auto-update on extensions in higher-risk environments. Allowlist approved extensions in managed dev environments. Socket's GlassWorm v2 page tracks the 73 by name.