Last updated: August 19, 2026 at 1:47 AM UTC
All 741 Vulnerability 286 Breach 129 Threat 319 Defense 7
Tag: developer-tools (4 articles)Clear

77 malicious Open VSX extensions posed as dev tools to harvest developer data

Manifold Security found 77 malicious extensions on Open VSX, the open marketplace that editors like VSCodium, Cursor, and Windsurf pull extensions from, impersonating legitimate developer tools. Detected between July 26 and August 1, all 77 were linked through a shared exfiltration domain and common code. Fifty-eight sent only basic system information, while the other 19 performed deeper reconnaissance, exfiltrating developer, Git repository, and continuous integration metadata. Manifold found no access to source code, credentials, tokens, or SSH material and did not determine the campaign's goal. The extensions were pulled from Open VSX by August 3, but must still be removed manually from affected machines.

Check
Check developer machines and workspace configuration files for the extension identifiers in Manifold's report, remove any that appear, and block the campaign's exfiltration domain, mangorbit dot com.
Affected
Developers who installed the evil-twin extensions from Open VSX through editors like VSCodium, Cursor, or Windsurf; the extensions leaked system, Git repository, and continuous integration metadata about their environments.
Fix
Vet extensions and publishers before installing, prefer verified sources, inventory installed extensions across developer machines, block the known exfiltration domain, and monitor for extensions contacting unexpected external hosts.

Popular ModHeader dev extension pulled after hidden history collector found

Google and Microsoft removed ModHeader, a header-editing browser extension popular with developers, with about 1.6 million installs, after researchers at Stripe OLT found a hidden browsing-history collector inside the official, signed store version. The collector was dormant, gated off by an empty allow-list, and no evidence has emerged that it ever sent data, but its presence in a trusted, signed extension is the concern. Its design frustrated automated review: the data was encrypted, the upload was switched off so sandboxes saw nothing leave, and malicious code was blended into a legitimate codebase, so scanners rated it low risk. It is a reminder that a store signature proves origin, not safe behavior.

Check
Check whether ModHeader is installed on developer or tester machines, remove or update it per the vendors' guidance, and review which browser extensions have broad permissions across your organization.
Affected
Developers and testers who installed ModHeader, and their organizations; a trusted, signed extension shipped a dormant collector capable of recording visited domains, showing signed extensions can still hide unwanted behavior.
Fix
Govern browser extensions with allow-lists and permission reviews, do not treat a store signature as proof of safe behavior, prefer minimal necessary extensions, and monitor for extensions contacting unfamiliar external endpoints.

Hackers bought Google ads pointing to a fake GoDaddy WordPress login page - any site manager who clicked saw their credentials stolen

BleepingComputer reports a phishing campaign that bought Google Ads to push a fake GoDaddy ManageWP login page to the top of search results. ManageWP is GoDaddy's centralized dashboard for managing multiple WordPress sites - so a successful phish gives the attacker simultaneous access to dozens or hundreds of sites under one account. The fake page is a near-perfect clone of managewp.com hosted on a typosquat domain; victims who enter credentials are redirected to the real site to mask the theft. Same Google Ads abuse template used recently against AWS, Notion, and other developer-tool brands.

Check
Brief staff who manage WordPress sites that they should never click Google Ads for login pages. Search proxy logs for visits to ManageWP-themed domains other than managewp.com over the past 30 days.
Affected
GoDaddy ManageWP customers, particularly agencies and freelancers managing multiple client WordPress sites under one account. Acute risk: small WordPress agencies whose ManageWP credentials enable simultaneous access to 50-500+ client sites. Anyone using GoDaddy hosting for WordPress.
Fix
Enable two-factor authentication on ManageWP accounts immediately. Reset ManageWP passwords for any user who recently clicked a Google Ads result for the brand. Add a corporate browser policy to suppress Google Ads on developer-tool searches. For agencies: rotate WordPress site credentials linked through ManageWP. Watch for unfamiliar admin user creation across managed sites.

Attackers planted 73 fake VS Code extensions on Open VSX as 'sleepers' that pretended to be popular tools, then quietly turned malicious

Socket reported 73 newly identified malicious extensions on Open VSX, the marketplace used by VS Code, Cursor, and Windsurf editors. The extensions impersonate popular developer tools - same name, same icon, but published by newly-created GitHub accounts with empty repositories. Instead of being malicious from day one, they sit harmlessly for weeks gathering downloads and trust, then push a 'normal' update that silently installs malware. Six of the 73 extensions have already activated; the rest are still in the sleeper phase. The campaign is part of GlassWorm, an ongoing supply-chain attack family that has been working its way through npm, GitHub, and editor extension marketplaces since 2025.

Check
Check every developer machine and CI runner for editor extensions, verify each publisher matches the official one, and remove anything you can't account for.
Affected
Developers using VS Code, Cursor, Windsurf, or other Open VSX-compatible editors who installed extensions in the past two months. Particularly risky if your team installs popular extensions by name without checking publisher namespace, or auto-updates extensions without review. Sleeper extensions look identical to legitimate ones, so visual checks alone are insufficient.
Fix
List installed extensions in each editor and cross-check the publisher against the legitimate one (microsoft.* for Microsoft tools, the original project's GitHub for others). Remove any with newly-created publishers or mismatched namespaces. Disable auto-update on extensions in higher-risk environments. Allowlist approved extensions in managed dev environments. Socket's GlassWorm v2 page tracks the 73 by name.