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Last updated: May 14, 2026 at 10:49 AM UTC
All 219 Vulnerability 76 Breach 45 Threat 91 Defense 7
Tag: windsurf (2 articles)Clear

Attackers planted 73 fake VS Code extensions on Open VSX as 'sleepers' that pretended to be popular tools, then quietly turned malicious

Socket reported 73 newly identified malicious extensions on Open VSX, the marketplace used by VS Code, Cursor, and Windsurf editors. The extensions impersonate popular developer tools - same name, same icon, but published by newly-created GitHub accounts with empty repositories. Instead of being malicious from day one, they sit harmlessly for weeks gathering downloads and trust, then push a 'normal' update that silently installs malware. Six of the 73 extensions have already activated; the rest are still in the sleeper phase. The campaign is part of GlassWorm, an ongoing supply-chain attack family that has been working its way through npm, GitHub, and editor extension marketplaces since 2025.

Check
Check every developer machine and CI runner for editor extensions, verify each publisher matches the official one, and remove anything you can't account for.
Affected
Developers using VS Code, Cursor, Windsurf, or other Open VSX-compatible editors who installed extensions in the past two months. Particularly risky if your team installs popular extensions by name without checking publisher namespace, or auto-updates extensions without review. Sleeper extensions look identical to legitimate ones, so visual checks alone are insufficient.
Fix
List installed extensions in each editor and cross-check the publisher against the legitimate one (microsoft.* for Microsoft tools, the original project's GitHub for others). Remove any with newly-created publishers or mismatched namespaces. Disable auto-update on extensions in higher-risk environments. Allowlist approved extensions in managed dev environments. Socket's GlassWorm v2 page tracks the 73 by name.

Anthropic MCP STDIO design flaw exposes 200,000+ AI servers to RCE - 14 CVEs assigned, Anthropic calls it 'expected behavior' (backfill from April 15)

Backfill from April 15: OX Security disclosed an architectural flaw in the official Model Context Protocol SDKs (Python, TypeScript, Java, Rust) that lets attacker-controlled JSON config trigger arbitrary OS commands via the STDIO transport. Roughly 200,000 publicly reachable MCP servers and 150 million SDK downloads inherit the issue. OX has tied 14 CVEs to the same root cause across LiteLLM (patched), Bisheng (patched), Windsurf (zero-click RCE in Cursor-style IDEs, still reported), Flowise, LangFlow, GPT Researcher, Agent Zero, and DocsGPT. Anthropic declined to patch the protocol, calling the behavior 'expected.'

Check
Audit every MCP server installed in Claude Code, Cursor, and other AI dev tools, remove any whose origin you don't recognize, and treat MCP configs as executable code.
Affected
Any tool or service running an Anthropic-SDK MCP server with STDIO transport, especially when add/configure flow is exposed to user input or marketplaces. Confirmed-affected: LiteLLM, LangChain, LangFlow, Flowise, LettaAI, LangBot, DocsGPT, Bisheng, Windsurf, Cursor IDE workflows, GPT Researcher, plus any private MCP server built on the official SDK without input sanitization.
Fix
Patch downstream tools to fixed versions (LiteLLM, Bisheng, Cursor). Block public internet access to services that host MCP add/configure UIs. Treat all external MCP configuration input as untrusted; never let raw user input reach StdioServerParameters. Run MCP services in sandboxes with no production-secret access. Install MCP servers only from verified sources and pin to specific commits.