CERT/CC disclosed two unpatched flaws in Kaltura's HTML5 video player library that let a remote, unauthenticated attacker read files from a server and run code, with only network access to the endpoint required. Both stem from the same unsafe deserialization in the mwEmbedLoader.php endpoint, which takes a user-controlled ServiceUrl parameter and passes fetched data to PHP's unserialize without validating it. Supplying a file path lets an attacker read any file the web server can access, including credentials and API keys, while the deserialization also enables code execution. CERT/CC could not reach the vendor, and because the endpoint is exposed on Kaltura's shared multi-tenant infrastructure, the flaws can affect many tenants at once.
One of the most methodical WordPress supply chain attacks ever: a buyer known only as 'Kris' purchased the entire Essential Plugin portfolio (30+ free WordPress plugins) on the Flippa marketplace for six figures. In August 2025, they injected a PHP deserialization backdoor in version 2.6.7, disguised as a compatibility check for WordPress 6.8.2. The malicious code sat dormant for eight months, building trust. On April 5-6, 2026, the attacker activated it - the C2 domain analytics.essentialplugin[.]com began distributing payloads to every site running the compromised plugins. The backdoor injected cloaked SEO spam into wp-config.php, visible only to Googlebot. WordPress.org permanently closed all 31 plugins on April 7 and pushed a forced auto-update - but the cleanup only removed the phone-home code, not the wp-config.php modifications, meaning compromised sites still served spam after the 'fix'. This happened the same week as the Smart Slider 3 supply chain attack we reported April 11 - two different supply chain attacks via the WordPress trusted update channel in one week.
TrustStrike Labs