Last updated: August 19, 2026 at 1:47 AM UTC
All 741 Vulnerability 286 Breach 129 Threat 319 Defense 7

Signal phishing campaign impersonates Support to steal backup recovery keys from journalists and activists, enabling full message decryption

Security researchers are warning of a phishing campaign that impersonates Signal Support over text message to steal users' backup recovery keys, specifically targeting journalists and activists. Once an attacker obtains the recovery key, they can decrypt the victim's entire message-history backup. The campaign relies purely on social engineering - there is no flaw in Signal's cryptography - tricking targets into handing over the secret that protects their encrypted backups. The targeting of journalists and activists points to surveillance-motivated actors rather than financially-driven crime. Signal users should treat any unsolicited 'Support' contact requesting recovery keys or codes as hostile, since Signal never asks for them.

Check
Brief journalists, activists, and high-risk staff that Signal never requests backup recovery keys. Treat any 'Signal Support' text asking for keys or codes as a phishing attempt and report it.
Affected
Signal users - particularly journalists and activists targeted by surveillance-motivated actors. The attack is pure social engineering; Signal's encryption is not broken, but a handed-over recovery key decrypts all backups.
Fix
Never share Signal recovery keys or codes with anyone. Enable registration lock. For high-risk users, store recovery keys offline and verify any support contact through official Signal channels only.

Anthropic confirms public Mythos rollout in 'coming weeks' - claimed more powerful than Opus 4.8, guardrails developed during preview

Anthropic has confirmed it will roll out Claude Mythos-class models to the general public in the coming weeks. Mythos was originally announced in April as a restricted preview available only to select security researchers and partners; Anthropic cited significant security risks if released too broadly. The company now says it has developed sufficient guardrails. Anthropic frames the trade-off as compressing the attacker advantage: 'in the short term, this could be attackers, if frontier labs aren't careful... in the long term, defenders will more efficiently direct resources and use these models to fix bugs.' Pricing and tier availability are not yet disclosed.

Check
Update internal AI-tool governance policies to cover Mythos-class capability tier. Identify which teams (security research, code audit, IR) would benefit from access once it ships.
Affected
Organizations with patch SLAs measured in weeks. Mythos-class models may surface unpatched flaws at attacker-tool speed; defenders need to compress SLAs to keep pace.
Fix
Tighten patch cycles on internet-facing services. Enroll qualifying security researchers in Anthropic's Cyber Verification Program. Draft internal disclosure policy before broad enablement.

JINX-0164 targets crypto firms with LinkedIn recruiter lures and macOS AUDIOFIX malware - lateral move into CI/CD code distribution

Wiz has documented JINX-0164, a previously undocumented financially-motivated threat actor targeting cryptocurrency firms via recruitment-themed social engineering and bespoke macOS malware since at least mid-2025. The chain starts with credible LinkedIn profiles offering virtual meetings; victims are steered to a rogue teleconference page that delivers a malicious 'meeting client.' A bash script then pulls AUDIOFIX, a Python-based macOS infostealer and RAT, from apple.driver-store[.]com. The payload is architecture-aware (Intel and Apple Silicon), saved as ChromeUpdater, masquerades as the system audio daemon coreaudiod, and persists via launchctl. AUDIOFIX moves laterally from developer laptops into code-distribution and CI/CD infrastructure, modifying source code to steal wallets at scale.

Check
Train developer and finance teams against LinkedIn recruiter approaches followed by 'meeting client' downloads. Hunt macOS endpoints for ChromeUpdater, coreaudiod imposters, and launchctl-loaded LaunchDaemons.
Affected
Cryptocurrency firms and crypto-adjacent developers using macOS, especially with access to CI/CD or code-distribution infrastructure. LinkedIn recruitment lures are the dominant initial vector.
Fix
Apply Wiz IoCs including apple.driver-store[.]com. Restrict launchctl persistence to known LaunchDaemons. Require strong identity attestation before any new meeting-client install. Audit CI/CD signing keys.

Malicious 'Sicoob.Sdk' NuGet steals Brazilian banking PFX certificates via hardcoded Sentry endpoint - amplified by Google Search AI Mode

Socket has flagged a malicious NuGet package, Sicoob.Sdk (versions 2.0.0-2.0.4), that masquerades as a C# SDK for Sicoob, one of Brazil's largest cooperative financial systems, and steals PFX certificates used to authenticate businesses with Sicoob's banking APIs. When a developer instantiates SicoobClient, the package reads the PFX file from disk, Base64-encodes it, and exfiltrates the client ID, PFX password, and encoded certificate to a hardcoded third-party Sentry endpoint. It also captures raw Boleto API responses. The package was downloaded ~500 times and the publisher has 11 other NuGet packages with ~6,000 combined downloads. Google Search AI Mode reportedly amplified the package as legitimate.

Check
Inventory C# projects for Sicoob.Sdk versions 2.0.0-2.0.4 and the publisher's 11 other packages. Search outbound traffic to the attacker Sentry endpoint identified in Socket's IoCs.
Affected
C# developers integrating with Sicoob banking APIs in Brazil. Any project that pulled Sicoob.Sdk via NuGet had PFX certificates, client IDs, and Boleto data harvested.
Fix
Remove all 12 affected NuGet packages and rotate every Sicoob PFX certificate and client credential reachable from affected hosts. Verify NuGet package signatures match expected GitHub source going forward.

Kimsuky (Velvet Chollima) targets South Korean military and corporate orgs with HTTPSpy, HelloDoor, and VS Code Tunnels backdoor

ENKI has attributed fresh attacks on South Korean military and corporate entities through March-April 2026 to the North Korean state-sponsored Kimsuky group (also Velvet Chollima). The actor spoofs security-software installation pages (nProtect Online Security and AhnLab Safe Transaction) to deliver nos-setup.exe and astx-setup.exe, which launch a MemLoader.dll payload via regsvr32.exe and establish persistence through scheduled tasks. A separate April campaign used a fake Cisco Webex page that prompted victims to run a script 'to fix camera access,' delivering an encrypted ZIP archive. Kimsuky's expanded toolset now includes the HTTPSpy variant, HelloDoor backdoor, and abuse of VS Code remote tunnels for C2.

Check
Hunt Windows endpoints for nos-setup.exe, astx-setup.exe, and MemLoader.dll loaded via regsvr32.exe. Audit scheduled tasks for unfamiliar persistence. Block VS Code Tunnels at egress where not needed.
Affected
South Korean military and corporate organizations - Kimsuky's primary targets. Messaging administrators were specifically singled out via spoofed B2B messaging-service installation pages.
Fix
Block known Kimsuky C2 and HTTPSpy IoCs published by ENKI. Restrict VS Code remote tunnels to allowlisted developer accounts. Train staff against fake security-software install prompts.

FBI warns of fake FIFA World Cup 2026 sites (fiffa.com, alt-TLDs) collecting payment data ahead of June 11 kickoff

The FBI has issued a public service announcement warning of hundreds of fake FIFA-themed phishing and fraud sites ahead of the 2026 World Cup running June 11 to July 19 in the US, Canada, and Mexico. Domains include fiffa[.]com and alternative TLDs (.org, .xyz, .live, .sale) plus fake employment portals like jobs-fifa[.]com and fifa-hiring[.]com. The fraudulent sites collect names, addresses, phone numbers, and banking/payment details; the data is used for fake-ticket sales, hospitality-package scams, identity theft, and fraudulent account creation. Group-IB and Bitdefender confirmed parallel malvertising via Google Search, Facebook, Telegram, and WhatsApp, with one major operation attributed to a Chinese-speaking gang.

Check
Add FIFA-themed lookalike domains (fiffa.com, fifa-*[.]com, fifa with alt-TLDs) to email and web filters. Brief staff that the only official site is fifa.com - any other is suspicious.
Affected
Anyone considering buying World Cup tickets, hospitality packages, or FIFA-related employment ahead of June 11. Chinese-speaking gangs and Russian-speaking operations target English, Spanish, and Portuguese speakers.
Fix
Source tickets only via fifa.com or authorized partner sites. Pay via credit card or escrow for chargeback protection. Report fake FIFA sites to FBI IC3. Apply Group-IB and Bitdefender IoCs.

CrowdStrike, Google, Shadowserver disrupt GlassWorm botnet by cutting four resilient C2 channels - Solana memos, BitTorrent DHT, Google Calendar, direct VPS

CrowdStrike, Google, and The Shadowserver Foundation have disrupted the GlassWorm developer-supply-chain botnet by simultaneously cutting four resilient command-and-control channels. Active since October 2025, GlassWorm spread through malicious OpenVSX and VS Code extensions, GitHub repos, and npm packages (one March campaign hit 400+ artifacts), stealing crypto wallets and developer credentials. Its C2 was built to resist takedown: server addresses encoded in Solana transaction memo fields, configuration stored in the BitTorrent DHT, Base64 C2 paths hidden in Google Calendar event titles, and direct VPS connections for payload delivery. All four had to fall at once. Infected hosts now beacon to CrowdStrike's sinkhole at 164.92.88[.]210.

Check
Run CrowdStrike's published YARA rules across developer workstations and build servers. Search network logs for beacons to 164.92.88[.]210 (CrowdStrike sinkhole) indicating prior GlassWorm infection.
Affected
Developers who installed malicious OpenVSX or VS Code extensions, or pulled compromised GitHub repos and npm packages since October 2025. 400+ artifacts hit in the March campaign alone.
Fix
Remediate any host beaconing to the sinkhole. Audit installed OpenVSX/VS Code extensions against known-bad lists. Rotate crypto wallets and developer credentials exposed on infected machines.

FBI flash alert: Silent Ransom Group (Luna Moth/UNC3753) sends operatives in person to plug USB drives into US law firm computers

The FBI has issued a flash alert warning that the Silent Ransom Group (also tracked as Luna Moth, Chatty Spider, and UNC3753) is now sending operatives physically to US law firms to steal data. SRG actors first pose as internal IT over phone or phishing email and try to get an employee to grant a remote-desktop session; if that fails, they dispatch someone in person to plug a USB drive or external hard drive into the target's computer. The group, formed from Conti/BazarCall operators after the 2022 Conti shutdown, has targeted US legal and financial firms since 2023, extorting victims via its leak site.

Check
Brief reception and staff at law/finance firms: verify any in-person 'IT support' visit through a known internal channel before granting access. Alert SOC to unexpected USB-storage mounts.
Affected
US law firms and financial-services organizations. SRG poses as internal IT via phone/phishing, escalating to physical USB-drive theft if remote-access social engineering fails.
Fix
Enforce device-control policy blocking unauthorized USB mass storage. Require multi-channel verification for IT-support remote-access requests. Lock workstations and restrict physical access. Run callback-phishing awareness training.

Iranian intelligence (MOIS) behind LA Metro hack disguised as 'Ababil of Minab' hacktivists - hundreds of terabytes wiped

Israeli firm Gambit Security has forensically linked the late-March attack on the Los Angeles County Metropolitan Transportation Authority to Iran's Ministry of Intelligence and Security (MOIS), despite the attackers branding themselves as the pro-Iran hacktivist collective 'Ababil of Minab.' The group posted videos claiming it wiped hundreds of terabytes and stole over a terabyte of files. LA Metro confirmed the breach on April 2, 2026, and had to check hundreds of servers for compromise before bringing them back online. The case illustrates a recurring pattern of state operations wearing a hacktivist costume to provide deniability while targeting critical infrastructure.

Check
Critical-infrastructure and transit operators: treat 'hacktivist' claims of destructive attacks as possible state-operation cover. Hunt for wiper precursors and bulk-deletion activity. Validate offline backup integrity.
Affected
US critical infrastructure, especially transit authorities. Iran's MOIS uses fake-hacktivist fronts (here, Ababil of Minab) to claim destructive attacks while preserving deniability.
Fix
Maintain tested offline backups resilient to wipers. Segment OT/IT networks. Monitor for mass-deletion and destructive commands. Coordinate with CISA and ISACs on Iranian APT indicators.

Malicious npm package 'mouse5212-super-formatter' steals files from Claude AI /mnt/user-data directory, exfiltrates to attacker GitHub via postinstall

OX Security has flagged a malicious npm package, mouse5212-super-formatter (campaign codenamed Malware-Slop), designed to exfiltrate files from /mnt/user-data - the directory Anthropic's Claude uses to handle uploads and outputs. The package presents itself as an 'archive deployment sync' utility but, during the postinstall stage, authenticates to GitHub using a token found in the victim's environment (or a hard-coded fallback), creates an attacker-controlled repository, and recursively uploads every local file. It writes a fake 'network connections' log to disguise the theft. The package leaked its own GitHub token, suggesting AI-generated malware with poor OPSEC. It has ~676 downloads and remains live on npm.

Check
Search npm install logs and CI/CD for mouse5212-super-formatter. On any host that ran it, audit /mnt/user-data access and outbound GitHub API calls. Rotate exposed GitHub tokens.
Affected
Developers and AI-tooling users who installed mouse5212-super-formatter (676 downloads, still live). Systems with Claude's /mnt/user-data directory and a GitHub token in the environment are the target.
Fix
Remove the package and pin dependencies via lockfile. Rotate every GitHub token reachable from affected hosts. Treat uploaded/output files in /mnt/user-data as potentially exfiltrated.