A researcher found more than 300 malicious Tor exit relays, at their October 4 peak about 7.46 percent of exit capacity, rerouting SSH connections to twelve interception servers. The attackers edited relay torrc files to allow port 22, and each hijacked exit presented its own host key before connecting onward to the real server, so sessions worked while passwords typed by users who accepted the key were captured. Key-based logins could not be relayed. The operator of the largest affected relay family traced the root cause to the Ebury backdoor and a reused plaintext password with SSH password authentication left enabled. Tor flagged the relays by October 5.
Microsoft has detailed a cryptocurrency-stealing campaign, active since February, that spreads through USB drives and hides its command channel inside the Tor network. Infection starts when someone opens a malicious Windows shortcut on a USB stick; the malware then hides real documents and replaces them with lookalike shortcuts, copies itself to other drives, and sets scheduled tasks for persistence. Its clipper component watches the clipboard about twice a second, swapping copied wallet addresses for the attacker's and grabbing seed phrases and private keys, which it sends out over a bundled Tor client. It can also run attacker-supplied code, doubling as a lightweight backdoor.