Last updated: August 19, 2026 at 1:47 AM UTC
All 741 Vulnerability 286 Breach 129 Threat 319 Defense 7

codexui-android npm steals OpenAI Codex auth tokens for a month - non-expiring refresh_token exfiltrated to fake Sentry endpoint

Aikido Security has disclosed that codexui-android, an npm package advertised as a remote web UI for OpenAI Codex with over 29,000 weekly downloads, has been silently exfiltrating users' Codex authentication tokens for the past month. Unlike a typosquat, the malware was embedded into a functional, actively-developed package roughly a month after publication to build trust; the GitHub repo stayed clean. The code reads ~/.codex/auth.json and ships the access_token, refresh_token, id_token, and account ID to sentry.anyclaw[.]store, a server masquerading as Sentry. The non-expiring refresh_token lets an attacker silently impersonate the developer indefinitely with full Codex account access. The package remains available; the npm account is 'friuns.'

Check
Inventory developer machines for the codexui-android npm package. If present, treat ~/.codex/auth.json as compromised. Search egress for traffic to sentry.anyclaw[.]store.
Affected
Developers who installed codexui-android (29K weekly downloads, still live). Stolen non-expiring Codex refresh_tokens give attackers persistent, silent impersonation of the victim's OpenAI Codex account.
Fix
Remove codexui-android. Revoke and re-issue OpenAI Codex sessions; the refresh_token does not expire, so rotation is mandatory. Pin dependencies and audit AI-tooling packages before install.

DriveSurge initial-access broker hijacks thousands of sites for ClickFix and FakeUpdates, routes victims through zTDS pay-per-install network

SilentPush has detailed DriveSurge, a threat actor running large-scale malware-distribution campaigns by compromising thousands of websites and using ClickFix and FakeUpdates social engineering. ClickFix tricks visitors into copying and running malicious commands under the pretense of fixing a technical issue; FakeUpdates uses fraudulent browser-update prompts. DriveSurge operates primarily as an initial-access broker on a pay-per-install model, enabling follow-on attacks by other criminals. Compromised-site visitors are routed through a Traffic Distribution System called zTDS that profiles them before redirecting to malware-delivery infrastructure. The model lets DriveSurge monetize hijacked traffic at scale while downstream actors deploy infostealers, loaders, or ransomware. The campaign overlaps with the broader ClickFix surge across the ecosystem.

Check
Hunt web properties for unauthorized injected redirect scripts and zTDS-related indicators. Train staff that browser-update prompts and 'paste this command to fix' pages are ClickFix/FakeUpdates lures.
Affected
Visitors to thousands of compromised websites redirected through DriveSurge's zTDS. Any organization whose users browse compromised sites can receive infostealers, loaders, or ransomware via pay-per-install.
Fix
Apply SilentPush IoCs and block known zTDS infrastructure. Deploy script-integrity monitoring on your own sites. Disable clipboard-to-terminal workflows; train users never to run commands a webpage supplies.

WordPress malware hides C2 in Steam profile comments using invisible Unicode - ~1,980 sites infected since July 2025

GoDaddy has documented a WordPress malware campaign that hides command-and-control data inside Steam Community profile comments, abusing Valve's platform to avoid running separate C2 infrastructure and evade detection. Around 1,980 WordPress sites have been infected since July 2025. The first-stage malware loads a Steam profile on each page view and extracts text from benign-looking comments that conceal a payload encoded with six invisible Unicode characters such as zero-width joiners. The decoder maps the invisible characters to bytes, reconstructs a URL to hello-mywordl[.]info, and injects JavaScript disguised as a legitimate library into every frontend page. The final stage is a backdoor that responds to POST requests carrying a specific authentication cookie.

Check
Audit WordPress sites for injected first-stage loaders calling Steam Community profiles and frontend JavaScript from hello-mywordl[.]info. Check admin accounts, FTP/SFTP credentials, and theme/plugin integrity.
Affected
WordPress sites compromised via stolen admin logins, weak FTP/SFTP credentials, or vulnerable themes/plugins. ~1,980 sites infected since July 2025 using Steam profile comments as a covert C2 channel.
Fix
Remove injected scripts and the POST-triggered backdoor. Rotate all WordPress admin and FTP/SFTP credentials. Patch themes/plugins. Block hello-mywordl[.]info and monitor web-server requests to Steam profile pages.

Dashlane locks out users after external brute-force attack triggers automated account suspensions; no system compromise, accounts restored

Password manager Dashlane locked out multiple users after an external brute-force attack triggered its automated account-suspension defenses. Affected users received emails about suspicious access requests and device-registration codes from foreign locations they did not initiate, prompting confusion about whether the messages were themselves phishing. Dashlane confirmed the suspensions were a built-in security response to credential-stuffing-style login attempts and said there is no evidence its systems were compromised. The company opened an investigation on May 31 at 15:19 UTC and marked it resolved by 22:30 UTC, with all affected accounts unsuspended. The episode shows account-lockout defenses working as designed, though the user-experience and phishing-confusion fallout is real.

Check
If your team uses Dashlane and saw lockouts, confirm accounts are restored and that the device-registration emails were legitimate, not phishing. Verify no unauthorized devices were registered.
Affected
Dashlane users targeted by external credential-stuffing/brute-force. No Dashlane system compromise reported; risk is account-takeover attempts and phishing confusion from legitimate-but-unexpected security emails.
Fix
Enable the strongest available MFA on Dashlane. Use a unique high-entropy master password. Treat unexpected device-registration codes as suspicious and verify via Dashlane's status page, not email links.

Operation Dragon Weave: China-aligned spear-phishing hits Czech and Taiwan officials with Rust RUSTCLOAK loader and Azure-hosted AdaptixC2

Seqrite Labs has documented Operation Dragon Weave, a China-aligned cyber-espionage campaign targeting government, research, academic, technology, and financial-services organizations in the Czech Republic and Taiwan. Spear-phishing emails carry ZIP attachments that trigger one of two infection chains: a malicious LNK file masquerading as a PDF that runs PowerShell, or a self-contained Rust dropper launched directly. Both extract RuntimeBroker_update.exe, which DLL-sideloads a malicious UnityPlayer.dll to deploy a Rust loader called RUSTCLOAK. RUSTCLOAK decrypts and runs the final payload, an AdaptixC2 agent codenamed AZUREVEIL that uses Microsoft Azure Blob Storage for command-and-control. The use of legitimate cloud services for C2 and Rust tooling complicates detection.

Check
Hunt for LNK files masquerading as PDFs, RuntimeBroker_update.exe, and DLL side-loading of UnityPlayer.dll. Search egress for AdaptixC2 traffic to Azure Blob Storage endpoints. Apply Seqrite IoCs.
Affected
Government, research, academic, technology, and financial-services organizations in the Czech Republic and Taiwan - Dragon Weave's named targets. Spear-phishing with ZIP attachments is the delivery vector.
Fix
Block ZIP-with-LNK email attachments at the gateway. Restrict PowerShell for standard users. Hunt for RUSTCLOAK and AZUREVEIL indicators. Monitor anomalous outbound Azure Blob Storage connections.

Hackers social-engineer Meta's new AI account-recovery bot to hijack high-value Instagram handles; MFA-enabled accounts were unaffected

Krebs on Security reports that attackers social-engineered Meta's newly-deployed conversational AI account-recovery assistant to hijack high-value, short Instagram handles allegedly worth over half a million dollars. Meta had rolled out the AI layer to reduce friction in common recovery workflows - relinking emails, triggering password resets, verifying ownership - that previously required weeks of back-and-forth with automated ticketing. Just as human support staff can be tricked into granting unauthorized access, the AI assistant proved equally eager to help and vulnerable to manipulation. Meta pushed an emergency patch over the weekend and says no back-end database was breached. Critically, the exploit failed against any account with MFA enabled.

Check
For high-value social accounts, enable phishing-resistant MFA (passkey or security key) now. Review whether any platforms you depend on use AI bots for sensitive account-recovery workflows.
Affected
High-value Instagram accounts without MFA. More broadly, any platform deploying AI chatbots for account recovery creates a social-engineerable attack surface, just like human support staff.
Fix
Enable the strongest MFA available - even SMS codes blocked this exploit. Treat AI-driven account-recovery flows as a new attack surface and require step-up verification for high-value account changes.

Anthropic to give EU cybersecurity agency ENISA access to Mythos via Project Glasswing - first non-US/UK entity, terms still negotiating

Anthropic is set to give the EU's cybersecurity agency ENISA access to its restricted Mythos model through Project Glasswing - making ENISA the first EU institution and first entity outside the US and UK to join. The move, communicated to the European Commission over the weekend, ends a weeks-long standoff after euro-area finance ministers, the ECB, and member states demanded access on learning Mythos had found flaws in systems European banks, governments, and critical infrastructure rely on. Terms covering data sovereignty, sharing findings with member states, and the scope of systems ENISA may test are still being negotiated. BNP Paribas and Mistral continue building a European alternative.

Check
EU-based organizations: track ENISA's Mythos access as a future channel for coordinated vulnerability findings affecting European infrastructure. Factor frontier-AI vulnerability discovery into your patch-SLA planning.
Affected
European banks, governments, and critical-infrastructure operators whose systems Mythos has already flagged but whose findings were not previously visible to any EU institution until ENISA's access.
Fix
Compress patch cycles in anticipation of AI-surfaced vulnerability disclosures. Engage national CERTs and ENISA channels as they mature. Assume similarly capable models will broaden access over coming months.

Dutch police dismantle 17-million-device botnet linked to Asocks proxy service, seize 200+ servers at local hosting provider

Dutch authorities have taken offline a botnet of at least 17 million infected computers, tablets, and smartphones, seizing more than 200 servers at a Netherlands-based hosting provider. The action was led by the National Police with the National Cyber Security Centre (NCSC). Local media link the infrastructure to Asocks, a service that advertises itself as a universal residential-proxy provider - the kind of proxy network used to launder malicious traffic, run credential-stuffing and ad fraud, and anonymize attacks. The hosting provider took the botnet offline once it was confirmed to be supporting criminal activity. Authorities have not formally named the botnet or announced arrests.

Check
Check whether your network egress or fraud logs show traffic to or from Asocks residential-proxy exit nodes. Review IoT and endpoint fleets for proxyware infections feeding such services.
Affected
17 million compromised devices (computers, tablets, smartphones) conscripted into the proxy botnet. Organizations targeted via proxied credential-stuffing, ad fraud, and anonymized attacks routed through residential IPs.
Fix
Block known Asocks infrastructure once IoCs are published. Hunt for proxyware and residential-proxy SDKs on managed devices. Add residential-proxy ASNs to fraud-scoring and bot-detection rules.

WithSecure: Russia-linked GREYVIBE targets Ukraine with AI-assisted malware via PhantomMail, PhantomRelay RAT, and ClickFix fake-CAPTCHA chains

WithSecure has attributed persistent attacks against Ukraine and Ukraine-related entities since at least August 2025 to GREYVIBE, a previously undocumented Russian-speaking group operating in the Russian time zone and aligned with Kremlin intelligence interests. Victims span military, government, civilian, and business organizations. The group uses spear-phishing (PhantomMail, delivering JavaScript loaders from Google Drive and 4sync), a PowerShell RAT called PhantomRelay, and ClickFix-style fake-CAPTCHA pages (PhantomClick) impersonating Zoom and a fake adult-club site (PrincessClub). WithSecure describes GREYVIBE as low-to-moderately sophisticated, hampered by repeated OPSEC mistakes, but increasingly relying on generative AI and LLMs to accelerate malware development. Some members have ties to the broader Russian cybercrime ecosystem.

Check
Hunt for PhantomRelay PowerShell RAT activity and JavaScript loaders from Google Drive or 4sync links. Block known GREYVIBE ClickFix domains impersonating Zoom. Apply WithSecure IoCs.
Affected
Ukrainian military, government, civilian, and business organizations and Ukraine-related entities. Delivery via spear-phishing, fake CAPTCHA pages, and fraudulent adult-club websites since August 2025.
Fix
Block GREYVIBE C2 and loader-hosting domains per WithSecure. Restrict PowerShell for standard users. Train staff against ClickFix fake-CAPTCHA 'paste this command' prompts. Monitor Google Drive/4sync archive downloads.

Google Chrome rolls out Device Bound Session Credentials to all users, binding cookies to TPM/Secure Enclave against theft

Google has made Device Bound Session Credentials (DBSC) generally available in Chrome, rolling it out to all users to blunt session-cookie theft. First announced in 2024 and in beta since April, DBSC cryptographically binds session cookies to a specific device using the hardware security chip - the TPM on Windows or the Secure Enclave on macOS. Because the public/private keys are generated inside the security chip and never leave it, stolen cookies become useless on any other machine, defeating the infostealer-to-account-takeover pipeline that bypasses MFA. Google frames it as a shift from reactive detection to proactive prevention. The protection is most effective where sites adopt the DBSC server-side protocol.

Check
Confirm managed Chrome fleets are updated to the DBSC-capable release. For your own web properties, evaluate adopting the server-side DBSC protocol to bind user sessions to device hardware.
Affected
Organizations relying on session cookies without device binding remain exposed to infostealer-driven account takeover that bypasses MFA. DBSC only protects sessions where both browser and server support it.
Fix
Roll out DBSC-capable Chrome via policy. Implement the DBSC server-side protocol on high-value web apps. Pair with phishing-resistant MFA and short session lifetimes for defense in depth.