Last updated: August 19, 2026 at 1:47 AM UTC
All 741 Vulnerability 286 Breach 129 Threat 319 Defense 7

Skoda Auto's German online shop breached via e-commerce software flaw - customer names, addresses, phones, and password hashes exposed; server logs cannot confirm full exfiltration

Skoda Auto, the Volkswagen Group's Czech-built carmaker with 34,000 employees and 27 billion euros in annual sales, disclosed that attackers exploited a flaw in its German online shop software to access customer data. The breach hit shop.skoda-auto.de, not Skoda's global systems or the Skoda Connect portal. Exposed information includes names, addresses, email addresses, phone numbers, order history, account data, and password hashes. Payment card details were not stored on the affected system. Skoda took the shop offline, patched the flaw, and engaged external forensics, but admitted its server logs cannot retrospectively confirm exactly what data was copied out during the intrusion window.

Check
Check the email account used for any past Skoda online shop orders, search your password manager for credentials reused across Skoda and other services, and watch for German-language phishing referencing real order numbers.
Affected
Customers who created an account or placed an order on shop.skoda-auto.de (Skoda Auto Germany's online store). The Skoda Connect Portal and Skoda's global systems are not affected per the company.
Fix
Change the Skoda online shop password and any other service using the same credentials, and enable MFA where available. Do not click links in emails or texts about Skoda orders; verify directly through the shop website.

Telehealth aggregator OpenLoop Health confirms 716,000 patient records stolen in a 24-hour intrusion in January - downstream consumer brands still unnamed

OpenLoop Health, an Iowa-based telehealth infrastructure company that supplies clinicians and prescription processing to dozens of consumer telehealth platforms, has confirmed via the HHS breach portal that a January 2026 incident affected 716,000 individuals. Attackers were inside its systems for only one day - January 7 to 8 - but exfiltrated names, addresses, email addresses, dates of birth, and medical information. Social Security numbers and electronic health records were not accessed. A threat actor called Stuckin2019 claimed responsibility and put samples on a hacking forum; OpenLoop reportedly paid them and the listing was taken down. Because OpenLoop is white-label, affected patients enrolled through many different consumer telehealth brands.

Check
Search HR and benefits records for employee enrollments in telehealth programs (weight loss, men's health, hormone therapy) that may run on OpenLoop's backend, and review supplier security questionnaires for any telehealth vendor.
Affected
Patients of any consumer telehealth platform that uses OpenLoop Health as its clinical infrastructure provider. 716,000 individuals confirmed via HHS OCR; threat actor Stuckin2019 claimed 1.6 million.
Fix
Affected individuals should enroll in the free IDX credit and identity monitoring OpenLoop is offering, and watch for medical-themed phishing for at least 12 months. Treat unexpected appointment reminders or prescription notices as suspect until verified.

Have I Been Pwned confirms two more ShinyHunters Salesforce extortion victims this week - financial-software firm Abrigo (711K) and insurer Canada Life (237K)

Troy Hunt's Have I Been Pwned added two new ShinyHunters victims this week. Abrigo - a Texas-based fintech that builds risk, compliance, and lending software for thousands of US banks and credit unions - had 711,099 unique email addresses and 1.75 million records lifted from its Salesforce environment in April after refusing to pay the ransom. The Canada Life Assurance Company, one of Canada's largest insurers, had 237,810 accounts confirmed in HIBP from a separate ShinyHunters Salesforce breach. Both fit the pattern of the months-long ShinyHunters mass-extortion campaign that already hit Zara, Woflow, and Instructure, with stolen data sitting in third-party Salesforce tenants rather than the victims' core systems.

Check
Check whether your company has a customer or vendor relationship with Abrigo or Canada Life, search your corporate email domains against Have I Been Pwned, and audit Salesforce Connected Apps and OAuth tokens granted to third-party integrations.
Affected
Customers, lenders, and partners of Abrigo (US community banks, credit unions, lenders) and Canada Life (Canadian insurance, savings, and retirement clients). Any organization with broad Salesforce access for third-party connected apps.
Fix
Rotate Salesforce passwords and API tokens where compromise is suspected, revoke unused Connected Apps in Salesforce setup, enforce MFA on every Salesforce user, and warn affected staff to expect impersonation phishing using the leaked PII.

Microsoft's May 2026 Patch Tuesday fixes 120 flaws and no zero-days for the first time since June 2024 - but a Word preview-pane bug and DNS Client RCE stand out as the priorities

Microsoft fixed 120 vulnerabilities on Tuesday - 17 Critical, no zero-days for the first time since June 2024. Two Word RCEs (CVE-2026-40361 and CVE-2026-40364) trigger just by viewing a malicious document in Outlook's Preview Pane and are rated 'Exploitation More Likely.' Windows DNS Client (CVE-2026-41096) lets an attacker-controlled DNS server execute code on any Windows machine resolving a hostile name - echoing SigRed. Other priorities: Netlogon RCE (CVE-2026-41089) and Microsoft SSO Plugin for Jira and Confluence (CVE-2026-41103, CVSS 9.1).

Check
Check Windows patch status for the May 2026 cumulative update. Confirm whether Outlook's Word Preview Pane is enabled - that's the exposure path for CVE-2026-40361 and 40364.
Affected
Unpatched Windows clients and servers. Priority targets: Outlook/Word (Preview Pane RCEs CVE-2026-40361/40364), domain controllers (Netlogon CVE-2026-41089), DNS-facing servers (CVE-2026-41096).
Fix
Deploy May 2026 cumulative updates fleet-wide. Prioritize DCs (Netlogon), DNS servers, and Outlook hosts. Disable Word Preview Pane as a compensating control until patched.

Fortinet patches critical unauthenticated RCE flaws in FortiSandbox and FortiAuthenticator - identity and threat-detection products that protect everything else (CVE-2026-26083, CVE-2026-44277)

Fortinet patched two critical RCE flaws Tuesday. CVE-2026-44277 in FortiAuthenticator (Fortinet's IAM/MFA platform) lets unauthenticated attackers execute code via crafted requests. CVE-2026-26083 (CVSS 9.1) in FortiSandbox's web UI lets unauthenticated attackers run code via HTTP requests. Neither is confirmed exploited yet, but Fortinet products have a long exploitation history - CISA flagged FortiClient EMS as actively exploited in April. FortiSandbox is the threat-detection backbone for many Fortinet-centric SOCs; FortiAuthenticator gates MFA and SSO.

Check
Inventory FortiAuthenticator and FortiSandbox versions. Confirm management UIs aren't internet-reachable. Check logs for unfamiliar admin sessions since early May.
Affected
FortiAuthenticator before 6.5.7, 6.6.9, 8.0.3. FortiSandbox 5.0.0-5.0.1, 4.4.0-4.4.8. FortiAuthenticator Cloud (FortiTrust Identity) is not affected.
Fix
Upgrade FortiAuthenticator to 6.5.7, 6.6.9, or 8.0.3. Upgrade FortiSandbox to 5.0.2+, 4.4.9+, or 5.0.6+ (Cloud). Restrict management UIs to trusted IPs.

SAP patches two critical CVSS 9.6 flaws in Commerce Cloud and S/4HANA - the ERP and e-commerce platforms behind most large retailers and global enterprises (CVE-2026-34263, CVE-2026-34260)

SAP's May Patch Day included two CVSS 9.6 critical flaws. CVE-2026-34263 in Commerce Cloud is a missing authentication check from improperly ordered Spring Security rules - unauthenticated attackers can upload configurations and inject code. CVE-2026-34260 in S/4HANA is a SQL injection in the ABAP Enterprise Search component that lets low-privilege authenticated users steal sensitive database records. Both land less than two weeks after four SAP npm packages were hit in the Mini Shai-Hulud attack, putting SAP customers under compounding patch pressure.

Check
Inventory SAP Commerce Cloud and S/4HANA instances. Check note application status in Solution Manager or SAP Support Portal. Search application logs for unusual configuration upload attempts.
Affected
SAP Commerce Cloud (all on-prem before patch) - CVE-2026-34263, CVSS 9.6. S/4HANA with ABAP Enterprise Search enabled - CVE-2026-34260, CVSS 9.6. Internet-facing Commerce Cloud is at acute risk.
Fix
Apply SAP Security Notes 3733064 (Commerce Cloud) and 3724838 (S/4HANA). Restrict Commerce Cloud admin endpoints to trusted IPs. Audit Enterprise Search query logs for SQL injection signatures.

TeamPCP supply-chain worm 'Mini Shai-Hulud' hits TanStack, Mistral AI, UiPath, OpenSearch, and Guardrails AI - 170 packages, 401 malicious versions, 518 million weekly downloads (CVE-2026-45321)

TeamPCP launched its largest supply-chain attack to date on May 11, compromising 170+ npm and PyPI packages with 518 million combined weekly downloads. The attackers chained three GitHub Actions vulnerabilities to publish 401 malicious versions carrying valid SLSA Build Level 3 attestations - cryptographically indistinguishable from legitimate releases. Affected packages include TanStack, Mistral AI (npm and PyPI), UiPath, OpenSearch, and Guardrails AI. The worm installs a persistent gh-token-monitor daemon that triggers 'rm -rf ~/' if tokens get revoked, and includes a probabilistic full-disk-wipe routine for Israeli and Iranian locales.

Check
Audit lockfiles for @tanstack/* (84 affected versions), @uipath/* (66 versions), @mistralai/*, opensearch-project/opensearch 3.5.3-3.8.0, guardrails-ai 0.10.1, mistralai 2.4.6.
Affected
Any Node.js or Python environment that installed compromised packages between May 11 and registry takedown. CI/CD pipelines, developer workstations, AI/ML environments. Crypto wallets and password managers (1Password, Bitwarden) are primary exfil targets.
Fix
Remove gh-token-monitor daemon BEFORE revoking tokens (~/Library/LaunchAgents macOS, ~/.config/systemd/user/ Linux) - removal first prevents triggering the wipe. Pin lockfiles to clean versions. Rotate all npm tokens, GitHub PATs, cloud credentials, and crypto wallet seeds.

Foxconn confirms cyberattack on North American factories - Nitrogen ransomware crew claims 8 TB stolen including Apple, Intel, Google, Dell, and Nvidia project files

Foxconn confirmed Tuesday that a cyberattack hit several North American factories, with its Wisconsin Mount Pleasant facility halting production for a week starting May 1. Workers were told to power off computers and revert to paper timesheets. Nitrogen ransomware group claimed responsibility, posting 8 TB of stolen data covering 11 million files - allegedly including project documentation tied to Apple, Intel, Google, Dell, AMD, and Nvidia. Foxconn says production is resuming. This is the fourth ransomware attack on a Foxconn entity since 2020.

Check
If your organization is a Foxconn customer sharing technical documentation, audit which projects had files staged at the Mount Pleasant facility between January and May.
Affected
Foxconn customers with data at the Wisconsin facility - Apple, Intel, Google, Dell, AMD, Nvidia, Cisco, Microsoft. Acute: organizations whose chip architecture or data center topology documents were shared for server or AI infrastructure production.
Fix
Contact Foxconn directly to confirm what was exfiltrated. Treat any technical documentation shared with Mount Pleasant since 2024 as potentially exposed. Rotate credentials, API keys, or signing certificates Foxconn held.

Instructure paid ShinyHunters' ransom to stop the 3.65TB Canvas data leak, and the US Congress launched an inquiry the same day

Update on the Canvas breach covered May 4, 8, and 12: Instructure paid an undisclosed ransom to ShinyHunters on Tuesday to stop publication of the 3.65 TB dataset covering 8,809 educational organizations and 275 million students and staff. Hours later, the US House Education Committee launched a formal inquiry requesting testimony from Instructure leadership about the breach and the decision to pay. This is the largest known education-sector ransom payment. The FBI's 'don't pay' guidance now collides with Congressional scrutiny of the payment decision.

Check
Contact Instructure for written confirmation your school's data is off the leak schedule. Check Canvas API logs for bulk exports between February and April.
Affected
8,809 schools, universities, and training organizations on Canvas. K-12 districts face state student-privacy obligations (NY 2-d, SOPIPA, ~130 statutes) independent of payment. Universities face FERPA obligations.
Fix
Issue COPPA and FERPA notifications per state timelines regardless of ransom payment - the data was already exposed before the deal. Rotate Canvas API keys and re-authorize integrations.

Checkmarx Jenkins AST plugin backdoored by TeamPCP - third Checkmarx supply chain hit since late March

TeamPCP, the group behind the March Trivy breach and Shai-Hulud npm worm, used credentials stolen in that March attack to publish a backdoored version of Checkmarx's Jenkins AST plugin to the Jenkins Marketplace. This is the third Checkmarx supply-chain hit since late March. The rogue version 2026.5.09 went up on May 9, outside Checkmarx's normal release process - no git tag, no GitHub release. Checkmarx says its GitHub repos are isolated from customer production and no customer data is stored there, but anyone who installed the bad plugin should assume their CI credentials are compromised, rotate them all, and hunt for lateral movement.

Check
Check whether your Jenkins instances have the Checkmarx AST plugin installed. If yes, verify the running version - anything dated 2026.5.09 in the version string is the malicious build.
Affected
Any Jenkins instance running the rogue Checkmarx Jenkins AST plugin version 2026.5.09, which was published to the Jenkins Marketplace on May 9, 2026, between then and Checkmarx's takedown. The plugin was outside Checkmarx's normal release pipeline and lacked both a git tag and a GitHub release.
Fix
Roll back to version 2.0.13-829.vc72453fa_1c16 published December 17, 2025, or any earlier officially-tagged build. Rotate every credential the Jenkins host had access to, including cloud API keys, source-repo tokens, deployment keys, and signing certificates. Hunt for lateral movement from the Jenkins host. Pull Checkmarx's published IoC list from their Support Portal and run it across your environment.