Last updated: August 19, 2026 at 1:47 AM UTC
All 741 Vulnerability 286 Breach 129 Threat 319 Defense 7

Google says hackers used AI to build first known zero-day for 2FA bypass in unnamed web admin tool

Google's Threat Intelligence Group says it caught the first known case of a real attacker using a large language model to find and weaponize a zero-day - a 2FA bypass in a popular but unnamed open-source web-based system administration tool. Google has high confidence the Python exploit was AI-generated, citing textbook code structure, abundant educational docstrings, and a hallucinated CVSS score in the script. The flaw was a high-level logic bug, the kind LLMs excel at spotting, rather than a memory corruption issue. Google rules out Gemini and warns that AI-assisted exploit development is being industrialized via account-pooling and proxy relays for premium models.

Check
Audit open-source web-based system administration tools your team self-hosts (Webmin, Cockpit, ISPConfig, etc). Check whether 2FA is the only barrier protecting admin access, and review recent admin logins for anomalies.
Affected
The specific affected product remains undisclosed - Google notified the developer and the attack was disrupted pre-mass-exploitation. Generally, any popular open-source web-based system administration tool with a 2FA implementation that relies on a semantic logic check rather than tightly-bound session validation is exposed to this class of AI-discovered logic bug.
Fix
Wait for vendor disclosure when Google's reporting names the product. In the meantime, layer additional controls in front of any web admin panel: place it behind a VPN or zero-trust gateway, require source-IP allowlisting, and rotate admin credentials. Treat 2FA-only protection on internet-exposed admin tools as a single point of failure regardless of the vendor.

Identity governance vendor SailPoint discloses GitHub repository breach - third-party app flaw to blame

SailPoint, the identity governance vendor used by many large enterprises, disclosed in a SEC 8-K filing that attackers gained unauthorized access to a subset of its GitHub repositories on April 20. The company's incident response team contained the intrusion the same day. SailPoint says no customer data in production or staging was accessed and its services were not interrupted. The root cause was a vulnerability in a third-party application, which has been remediated. SailPoint notified affected customers directly and says no further customer action is needed. The company has not disclosed what data was actually in the impacted repos.

Check
If you use SailPoint (IdentityNow, IdentityIQ, or related products), check whether you received a direct notification dated after April 20, 2026, and review the scope details in your account portal.
Affected
SailPoint customers who received a direct breach notification dated on or after April 20, 2026. The company has not publicly disclosed which products, repositories, or customer subsets were specifically named in the notifications. No customer data in production or staging environments was accessed per SailPoint's SEC filing.
Fix
Follow guidance in your direct SailPoint notification. As a precaution, rotate any API tokens or service-account credentials issued for SailPoint integration over the past 12 months. Review SailPoint integration audit logs for unexpected activity from April onward. Ask SailPoint for the name of the third-party application whose flaw caused the intrusion - your organization may use it elsewhere.

UK water company hit by Cl0p had hackers hidden in its network for nearly 2 years - ICO fines South Staffordshire Water 964K

The UK Information Commissioner fined South Staffordshire Water 963,900 pounds over a 2022 Cl0p ransomware breach that exposed 633,887 customer and employee records. The penalty notice reveals attackers were inside the network nearly two years before discovery - initial access happened September 2020 via a malicious email attachment, but they were not detected until July 2022 when IT performance issues triggered an investigation. The ICO found basic security failures: an unpatched ZeroLogon flaw on two domain controllers, no principle of least privilege, an outsourced SOC monitoring just 5 percent of the IT estate, and Windows Server 2003 boxes still running in production.

Check
Pull your most recent domain-controller vulnerability scan. If nothing exists in the last 90 days, that is itself a finding. Verify ZeroLogon (CVE-2020-1472) is patched on every DC.
Affected
Any organization where domain controllers run unpatched, where the outsourced SOC monitors less than the full IT estate, where legacy systems like Windows Server 2003 remain in production, or where vulnerability scanning has not been performed in over 90 days. Critical national infrastructure and regulated industries face especially harsh penalties for these gaps.
Fix
Patch ZeroLogon (CVE-2020-1472) on every domain controller now if not already done. Confirm your SOC contract requires monitoring coverage of 100 percent of in-scope assets, with endpoint telemetry and authentication logs integrated. Run quarterly internal and external vulnerability scans and retain the reports for regulator inspection. Retire any Windows Server 2003 boxes still in production - extended support ended July 2015.

Instructure confirms ShinyHunters used Canvas XSS flaws to deface school login portals and pressure ransom

Instructure confirms that ShinyHunters exploited multiple cross-site scripting flaws in Canvas to deface school login portals on May 7, demanding the company and individual schools negotiate ransom by May 12. The flaws are in user-generated-content features of the free Free-for-Teacher Canvas environment and let the attacker grab authenticated admin sessions. This was a second hit following the original breach disclosed a week earlier that ShinyHunters claims netted 3.6 terabytes covering 8,809 educational organizations and 275 million student, teacher, and staff records. Instructure has taken Free-for-Teacher offline and applied additional safeguards; main Canvas has been restored since May 9.

Check
If your school uses Canvas, check whether students or staff saw the defaced login page on May 7. Review browser logs for any extension that interacted with injected ransom content.
Affected
Canvas instances accessed through the Free-for-Teacher environment between May 7 and Instructure taking it offline. The exploited cross-site scripting flaws sit in user-generated-content features that allowed JavaScript injection. Schools and universities running the paid Canvas LMS are also exposed to the underlying data breach that ShinyHunters used for extortion leverage.
Fix
Wait for Instructure's official statement on which XSS vulnerabilities were exploited and when Free-for-Teacher returns. For paid Canvas tenants, assume usernames, email addresses, course names, enrollment information, and direct messages were part of the 3.6TB leak and treat affected accounts as phishing targets. Force-rotate any API tokens issued for Canvas integrations and audit external integrations that accepted user-generated content.

TrickMo Android banker hides command-and-control inside Telegram's TON blockchain network to dodge takedowns

The TrickMo Android banking malware now routes its command-and-control through The Open Network (TON), the decentralized peer-to-peer network originally built around Telegram, making the C2 infrastructure much harder to identify or take down. ThreatFabric (which tracks this variant as Trickmo.C) has been watching it since January in campaigns hitting users in France, Italy, and Austria. The malware disguises itself as TikTok or streaming apps and steals banking credentials and crypto wallet keys via phishing overlays, keylogging, SMS interception, OTP suppression, and live screen recording. The new variant also adds SSH tunneling, port forwarding, and SOCKS5 proxy commands, turning infected phones into a pivot point.

Check
Check MDM logs for users in France, Italy, or Austria who side-loaded apps masquerading as TikTok or streaming services since January 2026. Flag corporate phones showing outbound TON network traffic.
Affected
Android devices belonging to users in France, Italy, and Austria that side-loaded apps disguised as TikTok or streaming services. Banking and cryptocurrency-wallet credentials, SMS-delivered OTPs, screen contents, and keystrokes are all at risk. The TON-based C2 means traditional domain blocking and DNS-based filters will miss this malware family entirely.
Fix
Confirm Google Play Protect is active and side-loading is blocked on all managed Android devices. For potentially infected users, perform a full factory reset, reinstall apps only from Google Play, and reset banking and cryptocurrency credentials from a known-clean device. Add TON .adnl traffic to egress monitoring - while you cannot decrypt it, unusual volumes from corporate networks are a signal.

GhostLock proof-of-concept abuses Windows file-sharing API to disrupt file access without encryption

A researcher at Israel Aerospace Industries published a proof-of-concept tool called GhostLock that uses a legitimate Windows API call to make files unreadable without encrypting anything. The technique abuses the dwShareMode parameter of CreateFileW - setting it to 0 grants the calling process exclusive access, so every other user or app trying to open the file gets a sharing violation. GhostLock automates this recursively across SMB shares from a standard domain user account, no elevation required. Researcher Kim Dvash frames it as a disruption attack, not destructive - data is not lost, but operational downtime can mirror a ransomware incident.

Check
Review your EDR and SIEM detection rules for behavior-based ransomware indicators. Verify they cover sharing-violation spikes and ShareAccess=0 file-open counts, not just mass file write or encryption activity.
Affected
Windows file servers and SMB shares in environments where any standard domain user account can authenticate. No CVE has been assigned - GhostLock abuses intended Windows file-sharing behavior, not a flaw. Behavioral detection systems focused on mass writes or encryption operations will not flag this attack pattern; the attack also requires no elevation.
Fix
Implement detection at the file server layer: monitor per-session open-file counts with ShareAccess=0 - the reliable signal Dvash identifies, which lives in storage platform management interfaces, not Windows event logs or EDR telemetry. Pull the SIEM queries and NDR rule from the GhostLock whitepaper as a detection template. Limit which domain user accounts have read or write access to critical shares.

Mr_Rot13 actor exploits cPanel CVE-2026-41940 to deploy cross-platform 'Filemanager' backdoor

QiAnXin XLab has tied the ongoing exploitation of cPanel's CVE-2026-41940 to a previously-quiet threat actor it tracks as Mr_Rot13, who has been operating since at least 2020. The attack chain exploits the cPanel and WHM authentication bypass to drop a Go-based infector that adds an attacker SSH key, plants a PHP web shell, and serves a fake login page to steal cPanel credentials (ROT13-encoded, exfiltrated to wrned[.]com). The final payload is a cross-platform backdoor called Filemanager that runs on Windows, macOS, and Linux. XLab counts over 2,000 attacker source IPs currently scanning for this flaw.

Check
Search cPanel and WHM authentication logs for unusual successful logins since April 28. Check /root/.ssh/authorized_keys on every cPanel host for unknown public keys, and search web roots for unfamiliar PHP files.
Affected
Any cPanel or WHM installation that was not patched against CVE-2026-41940 between disclosure on April 28, 2026, and now. Indicators of Mr_Rot13 compromise include the SSH public key added under root, the wrned[.]com credential exfiltration domain, the cp.dene[.]de[.]com infector source, and the wpsock[.]com Filemanager delivery domain.
Fix
If still unpatched, install the cPanel fix for CVE-2026-41940 immediately. On any host that was internet-exposed and unpatched, assume compromise: remove unknown SSH keys from root, sweep for unfamiliar PHP web shells, block the indicator domains wrned[.]com, cp.dene[.]de[.]com, and wpsock[.]com at egress, rotate cPanel and WHM root credentials, and check bash_history for evidence of attacker reconnaissance.

Critical Ollama flaw lets unauthenticated attackers read server memory - 300,000 instances exposed (CVE-2026-7482)

Researchers at Cyera disclosed a critical bug in Ollama, the open-source tool that runs large language models locally on laptops and servers. The flaw, called Bleeding Llama (CVE-2026-7482), lets anyone with network access send a malformed model file and read raw process memory back - which typically contains API keys, environment variables, system prompts, and other users' chat history. Ollama ships without authentication by default, so an estimated 300,000 instances are exposed on the internet. Ollama 0.17.1 fixes it. Separately, Striga disclosed two unpatched Ollama Windows desktop flaws (CVE-2026-42248 and CVE-2026-42249) that chain into persistent code execution at login.

Check
Inventory all Ollama instances across servers and developer laptops. Check whether any are reachable from outside their host or trusted network, and verify the running version.
Affected
Ollama versions before 0.17.1 on every platform (CVE-2026-7482, CVSS 9.1, unauthenticated heap out-of-bounds read in the GGUF model loader exploitable via /api/create and /api/push). Ollama Windows desktop client on all currently-released builds (CVE-2026-42248 and CVE-2026-42249, CVSS 7.7 each, unpatched). Internet-exposed and developer-laptop instances are at highest risk.
Fix
Upgrade all Ollama servers to 0.17.1 or later immediately to fix Bleeding Llama. Restrict the Ollama API to localhost or an internal network only - never expose port 11434 to the internet. Place an authenticating reverse proxy in front of any shared Ollama deployment. For Windows desktop clients, monitor for an update that addresses CVE-2026-42248 and CVE-2026-42249; consider blocking auto-update traffic until a patched build ships.

Mac malware campaign uses Google ads and 'Apple Support' Claude.ai chats to install infostealer

Hackers are buying Google ads that look like they go to claude.ai - and they do go to a real claude.ai page. But the page is a shared Claude chat dressed up as 'Apple Support' walking users through installing Claude on a Mac. The instructions tell people to paste a command into Terminal that quietly downloads MacSync, a Mac infostealer that grabs saved browser passwords, cookies, and contents of macOS Keychain (where Mac stores logins and keys). Because both the ad and the page are real claude.ai links, there is no fake domain to spot. Researcher Berk Albayrak first reported the campaign; BleepingComputer found a second active variant.

Check
Check macOS endpoint logs for Terminal executions of curl or base64 piped to bash in the last 7 days, and review who clicked sponsored Google results for 'Claude mac download'.
Affected
macOS users who searched Google for 'Claude mac download' or similar terms and ran a Terminal command from a shared Claude.ai chat attributed to 'Apple Support'. Two payload variants seen: a MacSync infostealer that exfiltrates Keychain and browser secrets, and a polymorphic in-memory shell payload that profiles the host and delivers a second stage via osascript.
Fix
Rotate browser-saved passwords and macOS Keychain credentials for any user who may have run the malicious command. Sign out and re-authenticate browser sessions to invalidate stolen cookies. Block the indicator domains customroofingcontractors[.]com and bernasibutuwqu2[.]com at network egress. Reinforce with users that they should never install software from chat or terminal instructions - only from official vendor download pages.

Zara confirmed in ShinyHunters Anodot fallout - 197,000 customer support records leaked

Zara is the latest big brand caught in the ShinyHunters extortion campaign tied to the March breach of analytics provider Anodot. The attackers - who got into Anodot in March and used that foothold to raid Snowflake-hosted data for at least a dozen downstream customers - have now published roughly one terabyte of files they say came from Zara's customer support system. Have I Been Pwned loaded 197,376 unique email addresses from the dump, along with product SKUs, order IDs, and the market each support ticket originated in. Zara's parent Inditex says no passwords or payment data were exposed.

Check
Search corporate email logs for a spike in phishing or fake order-status messages spoofing Zara customer service over the past 30 days, especially targeting users who shop with their work email.
Affected
Zara customers who contacted customer support are exposed via leaked email addresses, product SKUs, order IDs, and the market of origin (197,376 unique addresses confirmed by HIBP). Inditex has stated no passwords or payment information were included. Any organization whose data was held by Anodot remains part of this broader supply-chain campaign.
Fix
Treat the 197K leaked email addresses as confirmed-exposed for phishing targeting. Apply stricter inbound filtering for Zara order-status or return-label phishing lures. Educate employees who use work email for personal e-commerce. If your company uses Anodot, or routes data through Snowflake integrations exposed by the Anodot breach, follow the remediation Anodot and Snowflake published in April and rotate any tokens shared with Anodot.