Last updated: August 21, 2026 at 10:03 AM UTC
All 747 Vulnerability 290 Breach 129 Threat 321 Defense 7

Mount Royal University confirms attackers stole and then deleted its files

Mount Royal University in Calgary has confirmed that attackers breached its network in June, stole data from its file storage systems, and then deleted the files to hinder recovery, as the hackers now publicly claim the attack. The intrusion, detected around June 18, disrupted phones, the university website, and other systems. The affected storage held academic material such as assignments and research, but the university acknowledges some students and staff may have kept personal information there, and a separate departmental drive was also wiped. Mount Royal is notifying affected individuals and offering credit monitoring to current and recent employees, though not to students.

Check
Students and staff of Mount Royal University should watch for a notification, take up offered credit monitoring where eligible, and stay alert to phishing referencing the university or their information.
Affected
Mount Royal University students and staff whose academic and possibly personal data sat on the affected drives; the attackers both stole the data and deleted it, complicating recovery and raising extortion pressure.
Fix
Maintain tested, offline backups so deleted data can be restored, segment and monitor file storage, enforce phishing-resistant MFA, and prepare incident-response and communication plans for attacks that both steal and destroy data.

HalluSquatting registers the fake package names AI coding tools invent

Researchers have shown an attack, called HalluSquatting, that weaponizes the tendency of AI coding assistants to invent plausible-sounding names for software packages that do not exist. The attackers work out which fake names an AI reliably hallucinates, register those names first on a package registry or GitHub, and upload a trap that instructs the coding agent to install a reverse shell or runs code directly. When the assistant fetches the made-up dependency on a developer's machine, it runs the attacker's payload. Tested against nine AI coding assistants, the technique could let attackers pool compromised developer machines into a botnet for crypto mining, denial-of-service attacks, or ransomware.

Check
Review whether developers or AI coding assistants automatically install and run packages the AI suggests, and check that dependencies are verified against known-good sources before installation.
Affected
Developers using AI coding assistants that fetch and run packages; if the assistant hallucinates a package name an attacker has pre-registered, the developer's machine runs attacker code and can join a botnet.
Fix
Do not let AI coding agents install or run fetched packages without human verification, confirm each suggested dependency actually exists and is legitimate, pin known-good dependencies, and isolate agent execution from credentials.

Attackers phone Microsoft 365 users to walk them through fake passkey setup

Okta warns of a campaign that phones Microsoft 365 users and talks them through what looks like setting up a passkey, but is actually a phishing kit that hands their account to the attacker. Active since April, the operators register passkey-themed domains and call targets, exploiting unfamiliarity with how passkeys really work. The kit mimics Microsoft's passkey enrollment without registering a real passkey, and pushes the victim to "save a recovery key" that the attacker controls, capturing the access needed to take over the account. The campaign, aimed at extortion, notably targets the passkey adoption process itself, turning a security upgrade into a social-engineering opening.

Check
Tell staff that Microsoft passkey setup happens through a device system prompt, not a phone call or web form, and that anyone calling to walk them through passkey registration is suspicious.
Affected
Microsoft 365 users unfamiliar with passkey enrollment; a convincing phone call plus a look-alike registration page can trick them into handing over the access an attacker needs to take over the account.
Fix
Train users on the genuine passkey enrollment flow, restrict who can register new authentication methods and recovery keys, monitor Entra for unexpected authentication-method changes, and verify unsolicited passkey calls internally.

Fake payment SDKs on npm and PyPI steal developer and cloud credentials

Socket found a coordinated campaign of 17 malicious packages on npm and PyPI that impersonate the payment SDKs for Paysafe, Skrill, and Neteller to steal developer and cloud credentials. The fake libraries mimic real SDKs, returning success responses without contacting the real services, while quietly harvesting environment secrets such as Paysafe API keys, AWS keys, and GitHub and npm tokens and sending them to a server on AWS. Because these packages get pulled into build pipelines, a single one reaching a continuous integration runner can hand over the broad credentials those runners hold. The npm versions trigger when a payment key is present; the PyPI versions run on install regardless.

Check
Audit your dependency trees and continuous integration logs for the named fake Paysafe, Skrill, and Neteller packages, and search for the PAYSAFE_API_KEY variable appearing alongside unfamiliar package names.
Affected
Developers and CI/CD pipelines integrating Paysafe, Skrill, or Neteller that pulled the malicious packages; the fake SDKs steal payment API keys, AWS credentials, and GitHub and npm tokens from build environments.
Fix
Remove any affected packages, rotate exposed API keys, cloud credentials, and registry tokens, pin and verify dependencies against official SDK names, and limit the credentials and permissions available inside CI/CD runners.

Critical BeyondTrust flaws let attackers bypass authentication on remote-access appliances

BeyondTrust has patched two critical flaws in its Remote Support and Privileged Remote Access products that let an unauthenticated, network-positioned attacker bypass authentication and reach the appliance, including accounts with elevated privileges. The bugs, CVE-2026-40138 and CVE-2026-40139, both rated 9.2, sit in the authentication subsystem and depend on a specific authentication configuration being enabled. Cloud-hosted customers were patched automatically in April, but self-hosted deployments on version 25.3.2 or earlier need to update themselves. BeyondTrust has not reported exploitation, but its remote-support products have a history of being attacked, including flaws used to breach the US Treasury and to deploy ransomware, so internet-facing appliances should be patched quickly.

Check
Identify any self-hosted BeyondTrust Remote Support or Privileged Remote Access appliances, confirm their versions, prioritize internet-facing ones, and review whether the specific authentication configuration these flaws require is enabled.
Affected
Self-hosted BeyondTrust Remote Support and Privileged Remote Access appliances on version 25.3.2 or earlier (CVE-2026-40138, CVE-2026-40139); an unauthenticated attacker can bypass authentication and gain access, including to privileged accounts.
Fix
Apply the April security rollup or upgrade to Remote Support and Privileged Remote Access 25.3.3 or later, prioritize internet-facing appliances, and review authentication configurations and logs for unauthorized access.

Tenda routers ship a hidden backdoor password with no patch available

CERT/CC has warned that several Tenda router firmware versions contain an undocumented authentication backdoor that grants full administrative access to the web management interface. Tracked as CVE-2026-11405, the flaw lives in the login function of the router's web server: if normal password checking fails, the firmware compares the supplied password against a hidden value stored in the device configuration and, on a match, grants admin access regardless of the username. It affects models including the FH1201, W15E, AC10, AC5, and AC6, is baked into the firmware, and cannot be disabled from the interface. Tenda has not responded, so there is no fix, and public exploit tooling is already scanning for vulnerable devices.

Check
Identify any Tenda routers in use, especially the affected FH1201, W15E, AC10, AC5, and AC6 models, and check whether the web management interface is reachable remotely or from untrusted networks.
Affected
Users of affected Tenda router models (CVE-2026-11405); anyone who can reach the web management interface can log in as administrator using a hidden backdoor password, with no valid credentials needed.
Fix
With no patch available, disable remote management, change the default LAN IP, restrict management access to trusted hosts, monitor for scanning on UDP port 7329, and plan to replace unsupported devices.

Google patches Dialogflow flaw that let one chatbot hijack others in a project

Varonis disclosed a now-patched flaw in Google Cloud's Dialogflow CX, the platform many companies use to build customer-service, financial, and healthcare chatbots. Because all chatbots using the platform's custom-code feature in one Google Cloud project shared a single execution environment with a writable setup file and no isolation, an attacker who could edit one agent, needing only a single low-level permission, could overwrite that file and hijack every chatbot in the project. From there they could read live conversations, steal shared data, and make bots ask for passwords. Google reported no exploitation before fixing it and no customer action is now required, but the case shows how AI features inherit cloud risks.

Check
If you used Dialogflow CX with custom Code Blocks, review the Dialogflow audit logs for unexpected playbook updates, check who held the update permission, and confirm each agent's code blocks are approved.
Affected
Organizations that built Dialogflow CX agents with custom Code Blocks before Google's fix; an attacker with edit rights on one agent could take over every agent in the same Google Cloud project.
Fix
No action is needed now that Google has fixed the flaw, but review historical audit logs if you used the feature, and more broadly scope AI-platform permissions tightly and isolate sensitive agents.

Accenture confirms breach as attacker offers source code and keys for sale

Accenture, one of the world's largest IT consulting firms, has confirmed a data breach after a threat actor advertised stolen data for sale on a hacking forum. The seller claims to have taken about 35GB of source code along with RSA keys, SSH keys, Azure access tokens and storage keys, and configuration files, and shared a screenshot appearing to show them cloning an internal Azure DevOps repository. Accenture confirmed the breach but did not comment on the amount or type of data involved. If the stolen keys and tokens are valid, they could give attackers a path into Accenture's development systems or cloud infrastructure.

Check
Organizations that work with Accenture or share infrastructure with vendors should watch for supplier notifications, and check how their own source code, keys, and cloud tokens are stored and rotated.
Affected
Accenture and, potentially, its clients; stolen source code, SSH and RSA keys, and Azure tokens could let attackers reach development systems or cloud infrastructure if the credentials are still valid.
Fix
Rotate any exposed keys and tokens, keep secrets out of source code and repositories, enforce short-lived credentials and least privilege for cloud and DevOps access, and monitor development systems for unauthorized use.

A single GitHub issue can trick AI workflows into leaking private repository data

Researchers at Noma Labs showed that GitHub's new Agentic Workflows, which let an AI agent read issues and act on repositories automatically, can be tricked into leaking private code through nothing more than a public issue. The technique, GitLost, is indirect prompt injection: an attacker opens an ordinary-looking issue in an organization's public repository, buries plain-English instructions in it, and the agent, which often holds a token with read access across the org's repositories, follows them, fetches files from a private repo, and posts the contents in a public comment. No credentials, coding, or write access are needed. GitHub was notified, but researchers frame it as an architectural weakness.

Check
Review any GitHub Agentic Workflows or similar AI automations, and check whether their agents hold organization-wide or cross-repository read tokens while also processing untrusted content like public issues and pull requests.
Affected
Organizations using GitHub Agentic Workflows where the agent has broad cross-repository read access and reacts to public issues; an attacker can steer it into leaking private repository contents with one crafted issue.
Fix
Scope agent tokens to only the repositories a workflow needs, keep agents reading untrusted input away from private data, restrict which events trigger automation, and require human review before agents post publicly.

RedWing rents out ready-made Android banking malware through a Telegram bot

Zimperium found RedWing, an Android bank-fraud operation rented out on Telegram as a finished product, complete with subscription tiers, guides, and a bot that builds each buyer a custom malicious app on demand, so no coding skill is needed. It spreads through phishing links leading to fake app-store pages that convincingly imitate Google Play and other stores. Once installed and granted permissions, it overlays fake login screens on real banking and crypto apps, reads incoming texts and screen content to capture one-time codes, and can silently forward the victim's calls to defeat phone-based verification. It also offers live screen control, keylogging, and camera access.

Check
Remind users to install apps only from official stores, distrust app updates arriving by link or text, and never grant Accessibility or default-texting access to an app without a clear reason.
Affected
Android users who sideload apps and approve broad permissions; RedWing then overlays fake login screens, steals one-time codes from texts and the screen, and forwards calls to defeat phone-based verification.
Fix
Keep installs restricted to official app stores, avoid enabling unknown sources, review and limit Accessibility and default-messaging permissions, use app-based rather than SMS authentication, and deploy mobile threat defense on banking devices.