Last updated: September 29, 2026 at 8:42 AM UTC
All 891 Vulnerability 357 Breach 144 Threat 383 Defense 7

FakeGit floods GitHub with fake AI skills and MCP servers that drop malware

Researchers at Island uncovered FakeGit, a campaign running roughly 7,600 malicious GitHub repositories from about 6,600 lookalike developer profiles, of which more than 800 pose as AI skills or Model Context Protocol servers. The fake projects borrow the names and workflows of familiar tools, covering Gmail and WhatsApp integrations through to Databricks, Jenkins, and Docker tooling, and their convincing README files walk a user or an agent from routine setup into downloading a malicious ZIP. That triggers a loader chain ending in SmartLoader, which establishes persistence and pulls further payloads such as the StealC infostealer.

Check
Treat AI skills and MCP servers on GitHub as untrusted code: verify the publishing account and project history before installing, and be wary of setup steps that download a ZIP release.
Affected
Developers and AI agents installing skills or MCP servers from GitHub; more than 800 fake repositories impersonate familiar tools, and following their setup instructions leads to SmartLoader and the StealC infostealer.
Fix
Install AI skills and MCP servers only from verified publishers, review repository history and profile age, scan packages before use, and restrict what credentials and systems an installed MCP server can reach.

HollowGraph hides commands and stolen files in Microsoft 365 calendar events

Group-IB detailed HollowGraph, a Windows implant that uses the calendar of a compromised Microsoft 365 mailbox as a two-way dead drop rather than contacting an attacker-owned server. Authenticating to the Microsoft Graph API with hard-coded tenant, client, and secret values stored in a file named to look like a log, it reads tasking from attachments on calendar events buried at a date in 2050, and exfiltrates by creating its own far-future events with encrypted attachments. A separate DNS tunnel refreshes its credentials. Because the traffic is genuine Graph activity, there is no vulnerability to patch and network controls keyed to attacker infrastructure see nothing.

Check
Hunt Microsoft 365 audit logs for calendar events dated far in the future and for automated calendar and attachment access by service principals rather than interactive users.
Affected
Microsoft 365 organizations where an account or registered application is compromised; the implant blends command and control into legitimate Graph API traffic, so perimeter controls and destination-based blocking do not see it.
Fix
Restrict and audit which client-credential applications can reach Graph, alert on newly created client secrets, monitor mailbox audit logs for anomalous calendar operations, and watch endpoints for the campaign's known artifacts.

NadMesh botnet scans for exposed AI services to steal cloud and cluster keys

Researchers at XLab detailed NadMesh, a Go based botnet spreading since early July that hunts exposed AI and automation services rather than raw computing power. A reconnaissance module queries a public device search engine for internet facing instances of tools like Ollama, ComfyUI, n8n, Open WebUI, Langflow, and Gradio, then works through more than twenty exploitation paths. What it ships home is credentials: cloud access keys pulled from environment variables, Kubernetes service account tokens, and the contents of files like .env and Docker configuration. Callable tool endpoints on AI integration servers sit at the top of the operator's priority list, above Kubernetes and exposed Docker APIs.

Check
Check whether any AI or automation services are reachable from the internet, especially Ollama, ComfyUI, n8n, Langflow, or Gradio, plus open Docker APIs, Jenkins consoles, and unauthenticated Redis.
Affected
Teams running self-hosted AI and automation tooling exposed online; NadMesh harvests cloud access keys, Kubernetes service account tokens, and AI integration tool access, targeting the credentials rather than the host.
Fix
Put AI and automation services behind authentication or off the public internet, scope cloud and Kubernetes credentials tightly, avoid long lived keys in those workloads, and rotate anything exposed.

SleeperGem backdoor skips build servers to plant persistence on developer machines

Researchers at StepSecurity documented SleeperGem, a supply chain attack in which malicious versions of three RubyGems packages were published over two days, including one impersonating Microsoft's Git Credential Manager. Each release is a loader that fetches a second stage from an attacker controlled server, then checks around thirty environment variables that continuous integration platforms set. If it finds any, it exits and does nothing; on a developer machine it drops a native daemon and installs persistence. The accounts behind the packages were ordinary ones that had gone dormant for years, which is what made them attractive to hijack, and the releases had no matching source repository tags.

Check
Check developer machines and lockfiles for the malicious gem versions published July 18 and 19, and look for unexpected daemons or persistence rather than relying on build system logs.
Affected
Developers who installed the malicious gem versions on their own machines; the loader deliberately skips continuous integration environments and instead drops a persistent native backdoor where credentials and source code live.
Fix
Remove the affected gem versions, rotate credentials on affected developer machines, treat dormant maintainer accounts and releases without matching source tags as risk signals, and monitor endpoints, not just pipelines.

ClickLock macOS malware kills apps in a loop until victims type their password

Group-IB detailed ClickLock, a macOS infostealer that coerces victims into handing over their login password. It arrives when a user is tricked into pasting a command into Terminal from a fake verification page, then shows a fake system dialog asking for the password. If the victim refuses, ClickLock begins killing core apps like Finder, the Dock, and browsers every 210 milliseconds, leaving only a password box on an unusable desktop, while also suppressing security notifications. Once the password is entered, it steals the Keychain, browser credentials, and cryptocurrency wallets and sends them to a Telegram bot. Group-IB counted at least 100 targets across 33 countries, over half in Europe.

Check
Warn Mac users never to paste Terminal commands from a website, and never enter a password to stop apps crashing; a Mac killing its own apps behind a password box is malware.
Affected
Mac users tricked into pasting a command from a fake verification page; ClickLock pressures them into entering their password by killing apps in a loop, then steals Keychain data and crypto wallets.
Fix
Only run Terminal commands you fully understand from trusted sources, treat app-killing loops and unexpected password prompts as attacks, and if infected, change passwords and wallet keys from a clean device.

New attack makes AI agents treat attacker data as trusted content

Researchers described Agent Data Injection, a new twist on prompt-injection attacks against AI agents. Rather than smuggling in fake instructions, it exploits the weak separation between trusted and untrusted data so that attacker-supplied content is mistaken for the agent's own trusted data, using deliberately ambiguous delimiters the model misreads. In tests against web and coding agents, this let an attacker steer an agent's clicks or actions, succeeding up to half the time even against defenses that block ordinary instruction injection. Some approaches helped: tagging page elements with random, unguessable identifiers roughly halved success, while strict tracking of where data came from stopped it but sharply reduced how many tasks agents completed.

Check
Review where AI agents in your environment consume untrusted content such as web pages, tickets, or logs, and check whether they clearly separate that data from trusted instructions and internal state.
Affected
Users and organizations running web or coding AI agents that act on external content; attackers can craft data the agent treats as trusted, steering its actions past defenses built for instruction injection.
Fix
Prefer agents that isolate and label untrusted data, use unguessable identifiers for page elements, track data provenance where feasible, keep a human in the loop for sensitive actions, and weigh usability costs.

Russian actor hides Starland malware in fake WebEx, Zoom, and dev-tool installers

Cisco Talos detailed a financially motivated Russian group, tracked as UAT-11795, that spreads a new backdoor called Starland RAT through trojanized installers for legitimate software including WebEx, Zoom, MobaXterm, DBeaver, and FaceIT. Active since at least mid-2025 and mainly hitting US victims, the campaign likely uses fake verification lures to deliver the installers. Once run, the malware sets up persistence, tries to escalate privileges, and detects sandboxes, then steals browser data and more than 40 kinds of cryptocurrency wallets, profiles the machine, and maps Active Directory. It can take screenshots, run shell commands, inject shellcode, and pull down further payloads, giving the operator broad control.

Check
Remind users to download software, especially collaboration and developer tools, only from official vendor sites, and watch for trojanized installers delivered through fake verification pages or paste-into-terminal style lures.
Affected
Users who install trojanized versions of tools like WebEx, Zoom, MobaXterm, or DBeaver; Starland RAT then steals credentials and crypto wallets, maps Active Directory, and gives the attacker persistent machine control.
Fix
Enforce software installation from trusted sources, use application allow-listing, block known indicators, monitor for suspicious HTA and installer activity and Active Directory reconnaissance, and hunt for Starland's persistence and shellcode behaviors.

Attacker ran an entire botnet through Google's Gemini CLI using plain-language prompts

Trend Micro documented a Russian-speaking attacker who used Google's open-source Gemini CLI as a hands-on hacking assistant to build and run a small botnet. Across more than 200 sessions, a jailbroken Gemini took the role of an "authorized pen tester," saved stolen credentials, and even suggested improvements dozens of times. Working from a roughly 5KB set of plain-text files holding a jailbreak prompt and a command-and-control playbook, the AI handled the operation through natural-language requests: at one point it migrated the entire command server to a new host with a Cloudflare tunnel in about six minutes and debugged its own errors. The malware itself was crude; the AI was the force multiplier.

Check
Consider how AI command-line tools and agents are used and monitored in your environment, and watch for jailbroken AI assistants and the credential theft and command-and-control activity they can drive.
Affected
Any organization where attackers can run AI coding assistants against its systems; a jailbroken AI CLI let a low-skill operator build, run, and repair botnet infrastructure through plain-language prompts.
Fix
Restrict and monitor AI agent and CLI usage, enforce guardrails that resist jailbreaking, apply least privilege and network controls so a compromised agent's reach is limited, and hunt for unusual command-and-control traffic.

AsyncAPI npm packages backdoored through a hijacked build pipeline

Attackers backdoored several widely used @asyncapi npm packages, together drawing around three million weekly downloads, by hijacking the project's GitHub Actions build pipeline rather than stealing a maintainer's npm token. Because the project's own release workflow published the malicious versions, they carried valid provenance signatures, which prove where a package came from but not that the code was trustworthy. The payload was hidden in normal runtime files behind trailing whitespace and ran when the module was imported, not on install, so defenses aimed at install scripts missed it. Once loaded, it fetched an encrypted second stage, stole credentials and cloud and registry tokens, and planted persistence, even in developer tool configuration files.

Check
Check whether your projects or CI pulled the affected @asyncapi versions, focusing on systems that imported the modules, not only installed them, and review developer and build environments for stolen tokens.
Affected
Developers and CI pipelines that imported the compromised @asyncapi versions; the malware steals credentials, cloud keys, and npm and GitHub tokens and adds persistence, and valid provenance signatures made them look trustworthy.
Fix
Downgrade to the clean @asyncapi versions, remove the bad ones from lockfiles, caches, and mirrors, rotate credentials reachable from affected machines from a clean system, and harden CI against untrusted pull-request triggers.

OkoBot malware injects fake seed-phrase prompts into real Ledger and Trezor apps

Kaspersky detailed OkoBot, a Windows malware framework active since 2025 whose standout module, SeedHunter, tricks hardware-wallet owners into giving up their recovery phrase. On an infected PC, the malware waits for wallet software like Ledger Live, Ledger Wallet, or Trezor Suite, sometimes until the device is plugged in, then displays a malicious page asking for the seed phrase from inside the wallet's own genuine app. Because the surrounding application is the real one the victim installed, the request looks legitimate, but anyone who types in the phrase hands over full control of their funds. Kaspersky counted hundreds of victims across more than 25 countries, and the framework remains active.

Check
Remind cryptocurrency users that hardware wallets never ask for the recovery phrase to be typed into a computer, and any prompt requesting it, even inside the real wallet app, is a scam.
Affected
Hardware-wallet owners on OkoBot-infected Windows PCs; the malware injects a fake recovery-phrase request into the genuine Ledger or Trezor desktop app, and victims who enter the phrase lose control of their cryptocurrency.
Fix
Never enter a wallet recovery phrase into any computer prompt, keep endpoints protected to catch OkoBot, and confirm sensitive actions on the hardware device's own screen rather than the desktop app.