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Last updated: May 14, 2026 at 10:49 AM UTC
All 219 Vulnerability 76 Breach 45 Threat 91 Defense 7

Hackers are stealing entire truckloads of cargo by phishing freight brokers - $725 million in losses last year alone, FBI warns

The FBI issued a public service announcement Wednesday warning that cyber-enabled cargo theft has surged 60% to $725 million in losses across the US and Canada in 2025. The pattern: criminals phish freight brokers and carriers via spoofed emails, install remote-monitoring software like ScreenConnect or Pulseway, then post fraudulent listings on freight load boards under the broker's identity. Real shippers respond, hand over high-value cargo, and the load is diverted to criminal-controlled drivers. The average theft is now $273,990 - a 36% jump from 2024. Cargo theft also funds drug trafficking and money laundering, not just direct resale.

Check
If your organization ships, brokers, or carries freight, verify every shipment request through a second channel (phone call to a known number, not an email reply) before releasing cargo or accepting a new load.
Affected
US and Canadian shipping brokers, freight carriers, and shippers using online load boards. Particularly acute for mid-sized brokers with limited IT staff - they're easier to phish and have less monitoring of remote access tools. Food, beverage, and consumer goods shipments are most targeted because they're easy to resell.
Fix
Verify shipment requests through a second channel. Enforce MFA on load board accounts and email accounts. Monitor for unauthorized remote-monitoring software installs (ScreenConnect, Pulseway, SimpleHelp) on broker workstations - these are the standard attacker toolkit. Audit email for suspicious mailbox rules that auto-forward or auto-delete. File incidents with IC3 alongside police reports.

Hackers compromised four official SAP developer packages and used them to steal credentials from any developer who installed an update

Attackers compromised four official SAP npm packages on Wednesday and replaced them with versions that quietly steal developer credentials when installed. The packages - mbt, @cap-js/sqlite, @cap-js/postgres, and @cap-js/db-service - are SAP's open-source tools for cloud application development. Anyone who ran 'npm install' between 09:55 and 12:14 UTC on April 29 had their machine grab GitHub tokens, npm credentials, and AWS, Azure, and GCP secrets, then dump them into public GitHub repositories on the victim's own account. The same attackers (TeamPCP) hit Trivy, Checkmarx, and Bitwarden earlier this year. The malware skips Russian-language systems entirely.

Check
Audit your CI/CD pipelines and dev machines for the four compromised SAP packages installed between April 29 09:55 and 13:46 UTC, and rotate every credential on those machines.
Affected
Any developer or CI/CD environment that ran 'npm install' on mbt 1.2.48, @cap-js/sqlite 2.2.2, @cap-js/postgres 2.2.2, or @cap-js/db-service 2.10.1. SAP enterprise shops running CAP are at acute risk because these are core SAP development packages.
Fix
Update to clean SAP versions: @cap-js/db-service 2.11.0, @cap-js/sqlite 2.4.0, @cap-js/postgres 2.3.0. Rotate every GitHub token, npm token, and cloud credential (AWS, Azure, GCP) on machines that touched those packages. Search GitHub for repositories with the description 'A Mini Shai-Hulud has Appeared' belonging to your developers and report them to GitHub.

GitHub patched a flaw in March that let any developer take over millions of repos with a single 'git push' - 88% of self-hosted GitHub Enterprise Servers still haven't installed the fix (CVE-2026-3854)

Update on the GitHub flaw covered yesterday: Wiz, who found the bug, published its full disclosure showing 88% of self-hosted GitHub Enterprise Servers were still unpatched at public disclosure on April 28. The bug let any user with push access to one repository run code on the GitHub server itself with a single 'git push'. On GitHub.com, the same bug exposed millions of public and private repositories belonging to other users sharing the same storage node. GitHub.com was patched within 75 minutes, but Enterprise Server installs need patching manually. Wiz found the bug using AI-augmented reverse engineering on closed-source GitHub binaries.

Check
If you run a self-hosted GitHub Enterprise Server, check today whether you're on a patched version and upgrade if not.
Affected
Self-hosted GitHub Enterprise Server instances on versions before the March 2026 patches. CVSS 8.7. Wiz data shows 88% of GHES instances were unpatched at disclosure. The bug needs push access to any repository, including one the attacker creates themselves. GitHub.com and Enterprise Cloud variants are already patched.
Fix
Upgrade to GHES 3.14.25, 3.15.20, 3.16.16, 3.17.13, 3.18.7, 3.19.4, 3.20.0, or later. Audit /var/log/github-audit.log for push operations with semicolons or unusual special characters in push option values - that's the exploit signature. Until patched, restrict push access and remove unnecessary repository creators.

A WordPress redirect plugin used on 70,000 sites was secretly running a hidden update channel that fetched code from an attacker-controlled server for five years

A WordPress security researcher found a backdoor that's been quietly running on 70,000 websites for five years. The Quick Page/Post Redirect plugin had a hidden self-updater added in 2020 that pointed not to WordPress.org but to anadnet[.]com, an attacker-controlled domain. In March 2021 that updater silently delivered a tampered version of the plugin - replacing the real plugin with one that included a passive backdoor. The backdoor only triggers for visitors who aren't logged in (so site owners never see it firing) and was used to inject SEO spam into pages served to Google's crawler. WordPress.org pulled the plugin pending review.

Check
If you run any WordPress site, list your installed plugins today and remove Quick Page/Post Redirect immediately - the directory pulled it but installs already on disk are still active.
Affected
Any WordPress site running Quick Page/Post Redirect plugin - 70,000 confirmed installs. Sites running versions 5.2.1 and 5.2.2 received the tampered build directly from anadnet[.]com. The pattern of buying a legitimate plugin business and quietly adding malicious code is increasingly common.
Fix
Uninstall and delete Quick Page/Post Redirect from every WordPress site you manage. Search wp-content/plugins/ on disk - removing via the dashboard alone may not catch every install. Block anadnet[.]com and w.anadnet[.]com at your DNS resolver. Audit your sites for SEO spam visible only to crawlers (compare 'fetch as Googlebot' against what regular visitors see).

North Korean hackers used Claude AI to add malicious npm dependencies to legitimate-looking projects and stole crypto wallet credentials from developers who installed them

North Korea's Famous Chollima group (also called Void Dokkaebi) is using Anthropic's Claude Opus to write malicious npm packages and slip them into developer environments. ReversingLabs found the group had registered a fake Florida LLC, set up a real-looking developer firm, and used Claude to add a package called @validate-sdk/v2 as a dependency to a legitimate-looking utility SDK. When developers installed the parent package, the dependency executed code that stole their cryptocurrency wallet credentials. The campaign progressed from simple JavaScript info-stealers (5KB) to full Node.js executables (85MB) bundling Claude-generated deception code.

Check
If your organization handles cryptocurrency, treat every npm or PyPI dependency as untrusted by default - particularly utility SDKs offered by unfamiliar publishers.
Affected
Cryptocurrency companies and developers, especially those whose machines hold wallet credentials, signing keys, or CI/CD access to crypto infrastructure. Web3 startups, blockchain developers, fintech engineers. The targeting is industry-specific, but the technique (AI-generated trojan dependencies inside legitimate-looking SDKs) will be copied by other groups.
Fix
Pin npm and PyPI dependencies to specific commit SHAs and require manual review for any new dependency added to a crypto-handling project. For high-risk developers, use ephemeral build environments that don't carry wallet credentials. Block ipfs-url-validator.vercel[.]app and the @validate-sdk publisher namespace. Treat any 'utility SDK' from an unfamiliar US LLC formed in the past 12 months with extra suspicion.

AI security tool finds 38 previously unknown bugs in OpenEMR, the open-source health records system used by 100,000 healthcare providers - two of them rated maximum severity

Aisle, an AI-driven application security firm, ran its analyzer over OpenEMR's source code and found 38 previously unknown vulnerabilities, including two with maximum severity (CVSS 10.0). OpenEMR is the open-source electronic health records system used by 100,000 healthcare providers serving 200 million patients. The two critical bugs let attackers reach into patient databases without logging in: CVE-2026-24898 lets any unauthenticated visitor receive the medical practice's API tokens by sending a single POST request, and CVE-2026-24908 is a SQL injection in the patient REST API. OpenEMR has now patched all 38.

Check
If your organization runs OpenEMR, upgrade to the latest patched build today and audit access logs for unauthenticated POST requests to MedEx recall/reminder endpoints.
Affected
OpenEMR deployments before the April 2026 security update. Particularly acute for any internet-reachable instance because CVE-2026-24898 is unauthenticated. The 100,000 OpenEMR healthcare providers are typically smaller US clinics and under-resourced settings worldwide - the segments least likely to have a fast patching process.
Fix
Upgrade OpenEMR to the latest 8.x patched release. Audit application logs for any POST to the MedEx recall/reminder endpoint and for unusual _sort parameter values in the patient REST API - those are the exploit signatures. Restrict OpenEMR's admin and API endpoints to internal management networks. Rotate API tokens issued before the patch was applied since they may have been exposed via CVE-2026-24898.

9-year-old Linux kernel bug 'Copy Fail' lets any user with shell access become root in seconds - works on every major distribution since 2017 (CVE-2026-31431)

Researchers at Theori and Xint disclosed Copy Fail yesterday, a Linux kernel bug introduced in 2017 that lets any unprivileged user with shell access become root in seconds. The exploit is a 732-byte Python script that works without version-specific tweaks on every major Linux distribution since 2017 - Ubuntu, Amazon Linux, RHEL, SUSE. Unlike previous kernel bugs (Dirty Cow, Dirty Pipe), Copy Fail has no race condition and no per-kernel offsets. It also leaves no trace on disk because it only modifies the in-memory page cache. The bug was found using AI-assisted reverse engineering and has been hiding in the open for nearly nine years.

Check
Update the kernel on every Linux server, container host, and CI runner you operate today, especially anything that runs untrusted code or hosts multiple tenants.
Affected
Every Linux distribution since 2017 with kernel 4.14 or later. CVE-2026-31431, CVSS 7.8. Acute risk: shared-kernel multi-tenant environments (Kubernetes nodes, Docker hosts), CI/CD runners that execute untrusted PR code (GitHub Actions self-hosted, GitLab runners, Jenkins agents), notebook hosts, and anything using Linux containers as a security boundary. Firecracker microVMs and gVisor are not affected.
Fix
Apply the kernel update from your distribution that includes commit a664bf3d603d. Until patched, blacklist the algif_aead module: 'echo "install algif_aead /bin/false" > /etc/modprobe.d/disable-algif.conf' then 'rmmod algif_aead'. The disable does not break dm-crypt, kTLS, IPsec, or SSH. For multi-tenant Kubernetes clusters, treat container boundaries as broken until patched.

SonicWall patches three SonicOS firewall flaws after CrowdStrike disclosed them - the worst lets attackers reach the management interface without logging in (CVE-2026-0204)

SonicWall released emergency firmware updates for Gen 6, Gen 7, and Gen 8 firewalls after CrowdStrike's research team disclosed three SonicOS flaws on April 29. The worst is CVE-2026-0204 (CVSS 8.0), a weak authentication bug in the management interface that lets an attacker on an adjacent network reach management functions without logging in - and from there change firewall rules, disable security protections, or open new holes. The other two are post-authentication: CVE-2026-0205 is a path traversal that breaks out of restricted directories, and CVE-2026-0206 is a buffer overflow that crashes the firewall. No public exploits yet.

Check
Patch every SonicWall Gen 6, Gen 7, and Gen 8 firewall to the latest firmware today, and confirm no SonicWall management interface or SSL-VPN is reachable from the public internet.
Affected
Gen 6 firewalls (TZ 300/400/500/600, NSA, SM, SOHO) running 6.5.5.1-6n or older. Gen 7 firewalls and NSv (TZ270-TZ670, NSa 2700-6700, NSsp, NSv on ESX/KVM/Hyper-V/AWS/Azure) running 7.0.1-5169 or 7.3.1-7013 or older. Gen 8 (TZ80-TZ680, NSa 2800-5800) running 8.1.0-8017 or older.
Fix
Upgrade to Gen 8 firmware 8.2.0-8009, Gen 7 firmware 7.3.2-7010, or Gen 6 6.5.5.2-28n. Until patched, disable HTTP and HTTPS firewall management on all interfaces, disable SSL-VPN, and restrict management to SSH only from trusted IPs. Take a full configuration backup before upgrading Gen 6 - downgrading from 6.5.5.2-28n deletes all LDAP users and resets MFA.

Hackers raced to exploit a critical LiteLLM flaw 36 hours after disclosure - any attacker who could reach the proxy could read all stored AI API keys (CVE-2026-42208)

LiteLLM, the popular open-source gateway used to centralize API access for OpenAI, Anthropic, and other AI providers, has a critical pre-authentication SQL injection bug that attackers started exploiting just 36 hours after the security advisory went public. The flaw lets anyone who can reach the proxy port read all the API keys stored inside - including master keys, virtual keys, and provider credentials. The bug was in the bearer-token check: the token was concatenated into a SQL query instead of passed as a parameter. Sysdig saw the first attack at 04:24 UTC on April 26, hitting three tables that hold the most valuable secrets.

Check
If you run any internet-facing LiteLLM proxy, patch to v1.83.7-stable today and treat every API key, virtual key, and stored provider credential as compromised.
Affected
LiteLLM versions 1.81.16 through 1.83.6, internet-reachable on the default proxy port. CVE-2026-42208, CVSS 9.3, pre-auth SQL injection. Blast radius is closer to a full cloud account compromise than a typical web app bug because LiteLLM holds OpenAI, Anthropic, and AWS Bedrock credentials.
Fix
Patch to LiteLLM v1.83.7-stable. If you can't upgrade, set 'disable_error_logs: true' under 'general_settings' as a workaround. Rotate every virtual key, master key, and upstream provider credential. Audit upstream provider billing for unexpected API calls since April 24. Block traffic from 65.111.27.132 and 65.111.25.67 (AS200373).

Critical GitHub flaw lets a single 'git push' run code remotely on the server - patched, but most self-hosted GitHub Enterprise instances haven't updated yet (CVE-2026-3854)

Researchers disclosed CVE-2026-3854, a critical GitHub Enterprise Server flaw that lets anyone with push access execute arbitrary commands on the GitHub server with a single git push. The bug is in how Enterprise Server handles repository hooks during push operations - a crafted commit message or filename bypasses the sanitization that normally prevents shell injection. GitHub patched it last week, but self-hosted instances need to apply the patch manually, and telemetry shows most haven't yet. Anyone with developer-level access to a vulnerable Enterprise Server can take over the entire instance, then pivot into every repository and CI/CD secret it hosts.

Check
If you run a self-hosted GitHub Enterprise Server, apply the latest patch this week and review push activity from any low-privilege accounts since the patch was released.
Affected
Self-hosted GitHub Enterprise Server instances on versions before the April 2026 patch. The bug requires push access to any repository, which means every developer with commit rights is a potential entry point. CI/CD secrets, signing keys, and source code are exposed. GitHub.com (the SaaS product) is not affected.
Fix
Upgrade GitHub Enterprise Server to the patched release per GitHub's advisory. Until patched, restrict push access to trusted accounts and require code review on all pushes. Audit Enterprise Server logs for unusual git operations or shell processes spawning from the GitHub system user. Rotate any CI/CD secrets, signing keys, and webhook tokens stored on the server.