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Last updated: May 13, 2026 at 5:42 AM UTC
All 208 Vulnerability 72 Breach 41 Threat 88 Defense 7

Instructure confirms ShinyHunters used Canvas XSS flaws to deface school login portals and pressure ransom

Instructure confirms that ShinyHunters exploited multiple cross-site scripting flaws in Canvas to deface school login portals on May 7, demanding the company and individual schools negotiate ransom by May 12. The flaws are in user-generated-content features of the free Free-for-Teacher Canvas environment and let the attacker grab authenticated admin sessions. This was a second hit following the original breach disclosed a week earlier that ShinyHunters claims netted 3.6 terabytes covering 8,809 educational organizations and 275 million student, teacher, and staff records. Instructure has taken Free-for-Teacher offline and applied additional safeguards; main Canvas has been restored since May 9.

Check
If your school uses Canvas, check whether students or staff saw the defaced login page on May 7. Review browser logs for any extension that interacted with injected ransom content.
Affected
Canvas instances accessed through the Free-for-Teacher environment between May 7 and Instructure taking it offline. The exploited cross-site scripting flaws sit in user-generated-content features that allowed JavaScript injection. Schools and universities running the paid Canvas LMS are also exposed to the underlying data breach that ShinyHunters used for extortion leverage.
Fix
Wait for Instructure's official statement on which XSS vulnerabilities were exploited and when Free-for-Teacher returns. For paid Canvas tenants, assume usernames, email addresses, course names, enrollment information, and direct messages were part of the 3.6TB leak and treat affected accounts as phishing targets. Force-rotate any API tokens issued for Canvas integrations and audit external integrations that accepted user-generated content.

TrickMo Android banker hides command-and-control inside Telegram's TON blockchain network to dodge takedowns

The TrickMo Android banking malware now routes its command-and-control through The Open Network (TON), the decentralized peer-to-peer network originally built around Telegram, making the C2 infrastructure much harder to identify or take down. ThreatFabric (which tracks this variant as Trickmo.C) has been watching it since January in campaigns hitting users in France, Italy, and Austria. The malware disguises itself as TikTok or streaming apps and steals banking credentials and crypto wallet keys via phishing overlays, keylogging, SMS interception, OTP suppression, and live screen recording. The new variant also adds SSH tunneling, port forwarding, and SOCKS5 proxy commands, turning infected phones into a pivot point.

Check
Check MDM logs for users in France, Italy, or Austria who side-loaded apps masquerading as TikTok or streaming services since January 2026. Flag corporate phones showing outbound TON network traffic.
Affected
Android devices belonging to users in France, Italy, and Austria that side-loaded apps disguised as TikTok or streaming services. Banking and cryptocurrency-wallet credentials, SMS-delivered OTPs, screen contents, and keystrokes are all at risk. The TON-based C2 means traditional domain blocking and DNS-based filters will miss this malware family entirely.
Fix
Confirm Google Play Protect is active and side-loading is blocked on all managed Android devices. For potentially infected users, perform a full factory reset, reinstall apps only from Google Play, and reset banking and cryptocurrency credentials from a known-clean device. Add TON .adnl traffic to egress monitoring - while you cannot decrypt it, unusual volumes from corporate networks are a signal.

GhostLock proof-of-concept abuses Windows file-sharing API to disrupt file access without encryption

A researcher at Israel Aerospace Industries published a proof-of-concept tool called GhostLock that uses a legitimate Windows API call to make files unreadable without encrypting anything. The technique abuses the dwShareMode parameter of CreateFileW - setting it to 0 grants the calling process exclusive access, so every other user or app trying to open the file gets a sharing violation. GhostLock automates this recursively across SMB shares from a standard domain user account, no elevation required. Researcher Kim Dvash frames it as a disruption attack, not destructive - data is not lost, but operational downtime can mirror a ransomware incident.

Check
Review your EDR and SIEM detection rules for behavior-based ransomware indicators. Verify they cover sharing-violation spikes and ShareAccess=0 file-open counts, not just mass file write or encryption activity.
Affected
Windows file servers and SMB shares in environments where any standard domain user account can authenticate. No CVE has been assigned - GhostLock abuses intended Windows file-sharing behavior, not a flaw. Behavioral detection systems focused on mass writes or encryption operations will not flag this attack pattern; the attack also requires no elevation.
Fix
Implement detection at the file server layer: monitor per-session open-file counts with ShareAccess=0 - the reliable signal Dvash identifies, which lives in storage platform management interfaces, not Windows event logs or EDR telemetry. Pull the SIEM queries and NDR rule from the GhostLock whitepaper as a detection template. Limit which domain user accounts have read or write access to critical shares.

Mr_Rot13 actor exploits cPanel CVE-2026-41940 to deploy cross-platform 'Filemanager' backdoor

QiAnXin XLab has tied the ongoing exploitation of cPanel's CVE-2026-41940 to a previously-quiet threat actor it tracks as Mr_Rot13, who has been operating since at least 2020. The attack chain exploits the cPanel and WHM authentication bypass to drop a Go-based infector that adds an attacker SSH key, plants a PHP web shell, and serves a fake login page to steal cPanel credentials (ROT13-encoded, exfiltrated to wrned[.]com). The final payload is a cross-platform backdoor called Filemanager that runs on Windows, macOS, and Linux. XLab counts over 2,000 attacker source IPs currently scanning for this flaw.

Check
Search cPanel and WHM authentication logs for unusual successful logins since April 28. Check /root/.ssh/authorized_keys on every cPanel host for unknown public keys, and search web roots for unfamiliar PHP files.
Affected
Any cPanel or WHM installation that was not patched against CVE-2026-41940 between disclosure on April 28, 2026, and now. Indicators of Mr_Rot13 compromise include the SSH public key added under root, the wrned[.]com credential exfiltration domain, the cp.dene[.]de[.]com infector source, and the wpsock[.]com Filemanager delivery domain.
Fix
If still unpatched, install the cPanel fix for CVE-2026-41940 immediately. On any host that was internet-exposed and unpatched, assume compromise: remove unknown SSH keys from root, sweep for unfamiliar PHP web shells, block the indicator domains wrned[.]com, cp.dene[.]de[.]com, and wpsock[.]com at egress, rotate cPanel and WHM root credentials, and check bash_history for evidence of attacker reconnaissance.

Critical Ollama flaw lets unauthenticated attackers read server memory - 300,000 instances exposed (CVE-2026-7482)

Researchers at Cyera disclosed a critical bug in Ollama, the open-source tool that runs large language models locally on laptops and servers. The flaw, called Bleeding Llama (CVE-2026-7482), lets anyone with network access send a malformed model file and read raw process memory back - which typically contains API keys, environment variables, system prompts, and other users' chat history. Ollama ships without authentication by default, so an estimated 300,000 instances are exposed on the internet. Ollama 0.17.1 fixes it. Separately, Striga disclosed two unpatched Ollama Windows desktop flaws (CVE-2026-42248 and CVE-2026-42249) that chain into persistent code execution at login.

Check
Inventory all Ollama instances across servers and developer laptops. Check whether any are reachable from outside their host or trusted network, and verify the running version.
Affected
Ollama versions before 0.17.1 on every platform (CVE-2026-7482, CVSS 9.1, unauthenticated heap out-of-bounds read in the GGUF model loader exploitable via /api/create and /api/push). Ollama Windows desktop client on all currently-released builds (CVE-2026-42248 and CVE-2026-42249, CVSS 7.7 each, unpatched). Internet-exposed and developer-laptop instances are at highest risk.
Fix
Upgrade all Ollama servers to 0.17.1 or later immediately to fix Bleeding Llama. Restrict the Ollama API to localhost or an internal network only - never expose port 11434 to the internet. Place an authenticating reverse proxy in front of any shared Ollama deployment. For Windows desktop clients, monitor for an update that addresses CVE-2026-42248 and CVE-2026-42249; consider blocking auto-update traffic until a patched build ships.

Mac malware campaign uses Google ads and 'Apple Support' Claude.ai chats to install infostealer

Hackers are buying Google ads that look like they go to claude.ai - and they do go to a real claude.ai page. But the page is a shared Claude chat dressed up as 'Apple Support' walking users through installing Claude on a Mac. The instructions tell people to paste a command into Terminal that quietly downloads MacSync, a Mac infostealer that grabs saved browser passwords, cookies, and contents of macOS Keychain (where Mac stores logins and keys). Because both the ad and the page are real claude.ai links, there is no fake domain to spot. Researcher Berk Albayrak first reported the campaign; BleepingComputer found a second active variant.

Check
Check macOS endpoint logs for Terminal executions of curl or base64 piped to bash in the last 7 days, and review who clicked sponsored Google results for 'Claude mac download'.
Affected
macOS users who searched Google for 'Claude mac download' or similar terms and ran a Terminal command from a shared Claude.ai chat attributed to 'Apple Support'. Two payload variants seen: a MacSync infostealer that exfiltrates Keychain and browser secrets, and a polymorphic in-memory shell payload that profiles the host and delivers a second stage via osascript.
Fix
Rotate browser-saved passwords and macOS Keychain credentials for any user who may have run the malicious command. Sign out and re-authenticate browser sessions to invalidate stolen cookies. Block the indicator domains customroofingcontractors[.]com and bernasibutuwqu2[.]com at network egress. Reinforce with users that they should never install software from chat or terminal instructions - only from official vendor download pages.

Zara confirmed in ShinyHunters Anodot fallout - 197,000 customer support records leaked

Zara is the latest big brand caught in the ShinyHunters extortion campaign tied to the March breach of analytics provider Anodot. The attackers - who got into Anodot in March and used that foothold to raid Snowflake-hosted data for at least a dozen downstream customers - have now published roughly one terabyte of files they say came from Zara's customer support system. Have I Been Pwned loaded 197,376 unique email addresses from the dump, along with product SKUs, order IDs, and the market each support ticket originated in. Zara's parent Inditex says no passwords or payment data were exposed.

Check
Search corporate email logs for a spike in phishing or fake order-status messages spoofing Zara customer service over the past 30 days, especially targeting users who shop with their work email.
Affected
Zara customers who contacted customer support are exposed via leaked email addresses, product SKUs, order IDs, and the market of origin (197,376 unique addresses confirmed by HIBP). Inditex has stated no passwords or payment information were included. Any organization whose data was held by Anodot remains part of this broader supply-chain campaign.
Fix
Treat the 197K leaked email addresses as confirmed-exposed for phishing targeting. Apply stricter inbound filtering for Zara order-status or return-label phishing lures. Educate employees who use work email for personal e-commerce. If your company uses Anodot, or routes data through Snowflake integrations exposed by the Anodot breach, follow the remediation Anodot and Snowflake published in April and rotate any tokens shared with Anodot.

AI merchant data platform Woflow leaked - 447,000 records exposed in ShinyHunters extortion

Woflow, an AI-driven platform that maintains menu and product data for restaurants and merchants on delivery apps, is the next named victim of ShinyHunters' extortion campaign. The group has published over 2 terabytes of files it says came from Woflow, including names, phone numbers, physical addresses, and email addresses. Have I Been Pwned loaded 447,593 unique email addresses from the dump. The exposed data appears to cover both Woflow's direct customers and the end customers of those merchants - so the breach radius is wider than Woflow's own user list, reaching the customers of every business that relies on Woflow's data.

Check
Check whether your restaurant chain, merchant operations, or delivery integrations rely on Woflow to maintain menu, product, or location data, and review customer service tickets for phishing referencing Woflow-handled records.
Affected
Direct Woflow customers (restaurant chains, merchant networks, delivery-app operators) and the end consumers of those merchants. Leaked fields confirmed by HIBP include names, email addresses, phone numbers, and physical addresses - 447,593 unique email addresses total. No passwords or payment details have been reported in the published dataset.
Fix
If you are a Woflow customer, contact your account team for the official IoC list and impacted-record scope. Notify your own customers if their data was passed through Woflow. Apply stricter inbound filtering for phishing impersonating restaurant brands, delivery platforms, or order confirmations. Rotate any API keys or shared credentials your team exchanged with Woflow integrations in the past 18 months.

Hackers replaced installers on the official JDownloader website with a Windows remote access trojan - third 'trusted software website hijack' in a month

JDownloader's official website was compromised between May 5-7 and the alternative Windows installer plus the Linux shell installer were replaced with malware. The Windows payload is a Python-based remote access trojan; the Linux installer establishes root persistence and pulls additional binaries. Attackers exploited an unpatched flaw in the website's CMS that let them change download links without authentication. macOS downloads, Flatpak/Winget/Snap packages, and the main JDownloader.jar weren't touched. Third 'trusted software site' hijacked in 30 days after CPUID (CPU-Z, HWMonitor) in April and DAEMON Tools last week.

Check
Audit endpoints for JDownloader installations made between May 5 23:55 UTC and May 7. Check Programs and Features for publishers signed by 'Zipline LLC' or 'The Water Team' rather than 'AppWork GmbH'.
Affected
Windows endpoints that downloaded JDownloader through 'Download Alternative Installer' between May 5 23:55 UTC and May 7. Linux endpoints that ran the shell installer in the same window. Acute risk: any host running the malicious installer should be considered fully compromised. Unaffected: macOS users, Flatpak/Winget/Snap installs, in-app updates, and the main JDownloader.jar.
Fix
Reinstall the operating system on any host that ran a malicious JDownloader installer - the developers explicitly recommend this rather than scan-and-clean. Reset every credential entered on the host since installation: browser-stored passwords, SSH keys, cloud tokens. For corporate fleets running JDownloader: switch to Winget or Flatpak distribution channels.

A fake OpenAI repository on Hugging Face reached the trending #1 spot before getting caught - 244,000 downloads delivered an infostealer that grabs browser passwords, crypto wallets, and Discord tokens

HiddenLayer disclosed a malicious Hugging Face repository called Open-OSS/privacy-filter that typosquatted OpenAI's legitimate Privacy Filter project. The repo copied the original model card almost verbatim and shipped a loader.py file that, on Windows, fetched and executed an infostealer. The repo briefly hit Hugging Face's trending list at #1 and accumulated 244,000 downloads before the platform pulled it on May 7. The loader runs in an invisible PowerShell window, escalates privileges, adds itself to Microsoft Defender exclusions, and deploys Sefirah - a Rust-based infostealer that targets browser credentials, Discord tokens, cryptocurrency wallets, and SSH keys.

Check
Search proxy and DNS logs for connections to Hugging Face repository 'Open-OSS/privacy-filter' or downloads of 'loader.py' tied to it since April. Hunt Windows endpoints for sefirah.exe and unfamiliar Microsoft Defender exclusions.
Affected
Windows machines whose users downloaded from Open-OSS/privacy-filter between late April and May 7. AI/ML developers are the highest-risk role. Acute risk: developers whose machines hold cryptocurrency wallets, Discord tokens, and SSH keys to production. Cryptocurrency holders specifically targeted by Sefirah's wallet-extraction modules.
Fix
Block Open-OSS/privacy-filter at the network egress layer. For machines that may have run the loader: rotate every browser-stored credential, Discord token, SSH key, and cryptocurrency wallet seed. Enforce signature verification for Hugging Face models pulled into production. Treat all Hugging Face repositories as untrusted by default. Apply HiddenLayer's published Sefirah IoCs.