RSS
Last updated: May 13, 2026 at 5:42 AM UTC
All 208 Vulnerability 72 Breach 41 Threat 88 Defense 7

AI evaluation startup Braintrust got hacked - and is asking every customer to rotate their AI provider API keys because the breached AWS account stored them all in one place

Braintrust, an AI evaluation and observability platform recently valued at $800 million, confirmed Tuesday that an unauthorized actor accessed one of its AWS accounts on May 4. The breached account held org-level API keys that customers store with Braintrust to access OpenAI, Anthropic, and other AI providers. Braintrust has confirmed exposure of one customer and is investigating three more reporting suspicious AI-provider usage spikes. The pattern - a relatively small AI infrastructure provider becoming a credential warehouse for downstream customers - is what Nudge Security's Jaime Blasco called 'the new shape of supply chain risk.'

Check
If your organization uses Braintrust, log into the org-level settings page and check the timestamp of every stored AI provider secret. Audit AI provider billing dashboards for unexpected usage spikes since April.
Affected
Braintrust customers, particularly AI-forward companies that store provider API keys in Braintrust org-level settings. Public reports suggest the customer base includes Box, Cloudflare, Dropbox, Notion, Ramp, and Stripe. Beyond Braintrust: any AI eval, observability, or gateway tool that holds customer-issued provider keys is the same risk pattern.
Fix
Rotate every AI provider API key stored with Braintrust - go to org-level settings, delete existing secrets, configure new ones, verify timestamps. Apply the same rotation to keys stored in similar AI eval/observability/gateway tools. Switch from static API keys to short-lived OIDC-issued credentials where the AI provider supports it. Add SCPs that restrict which AI provider services your IAM keys can call.

cPanel patches three new flaws including two that let authenticated users run arbitrary Perl code on the server - on top of the active 'Sorry' ransomware wave still hitting unpatched systems

cPanel released patches Friday for three new vulnerabilities. The two worst (CVE-2026-29202 and CVE-2026-29203, both CVSS 8.8) let authenticated users execute arbitrary Perl code through the create_user API or escalate privileges via unsafe symlink chmod. The third (CVE-2026-29201, CVSS 4.3) lets authenticated users read arbitrary files. No exploitation observed yet. The disclosure lands while attackers are still mass-exploiting CVE-2026-41940 to deploy 'Sorry' ransomware against cPanel hosts, including a wave targeting government agencies and MSPs (covered May 5). Hosting providers face a compounding patch burden.

Check
Inventory cPanel and WHM versions. Check whether any servers are still on builds before the May 9 release. Search authentication logs for use of the create_user API or feature::LOADFEATUREFILE adminbin call by accounts that don't normally use them.
Affected
cPanel and WHM versions before 11.136.0.9, 11.134.0.25, 11.132.0.31, 11.130.0.22, 11.126.0.58, 11.124.0.37, 11.118.0.66, 11.110.0.116/117, 11.102.0.41, 11.94.0.30, 11.86.0.43. Legacy CentOS 6 and CloudLinux 6 customers must patch to 110.0.114. The CVSS 8.8 flaws require authentication, so internet-facing cPanel servers with weak password policies face acute risk.
Fix
Patch cPanel to a fixed version per the May 9 advisory. Apply the new patches alongside the existing CVE-2026-41940 (Sorry ransomware) fix. Tighten cPanel user account password policies and enforce 2FA for any account with API access. Restrict cPanel ports (2082-2087, 2095-2096) to trusted IPs to limit pre-auth attack surface.

Brand-new Linux 'Dirty Frag' bug lets any local user become root on every major distribution - PoC exploit is public, no patches yet

Researcher Hyunwoo Kim disclosed Dirty Frag yesterday after an unrelated third party broke the embargo five days early. The flaw chains two Linux kernel page-cache write bugs (xfrm-ESP and RxRPC) to give any local user root access on every major distribution - Ubuntu, RHEL, CentOS Stream, AlmaLinux, openSUSE Tumbleweed, Fedora. Like Dirty Pipe and last week's Copy Fail, it's a deterministic logic bug with no race condition required and no kernel panic on failure. PoC is public on GitHub. The ESP variant patch was merged into the netdev tree on May 7 but distribution kernels remain unpatched. No CVE assigned yet because the embargo broke early.

Check
Inventory Linux servers, container hosts, CI runners, and Kubernetes nodes that allow shell access or run untrusted code. Check whether esp4, esp6, and rxrpc kernel modules are loaded with 'lsmod | grep -E "esp4|esp6|rxrpc"'.
Affected
Every Linux distribution with kernel 4.10+ (ESP variant) and 5.x+ (RxRPC variant). All major distros confirmed: Ubuntu, RHEL, CentOS Stream, AlmaLinux, openSUSE Tumbleweed, Fedora. Acute risk: shared-kernel multi-tenant environments (Kubernetes nodes, container hosts), CI/CD runners executing untrusted PR code. Firecracker microVMs and gVisor are not affected.
Fix
Blacklist vulnerable modules: 'sh -c "printf \'install esp4 /bin/false\\ninstall esp6 /bin/false\\ninstall rxrpc /bin/false\\n\' > /etc/modprobe.d/dirtyfrag.conf; rmmod esp4 esp6 rxrpc 2>/dev/null; true"'. This breaks IPsec VPNs and AFS filesystems but stops the exploit. Apply distribution kernel patches as soon as they ship - AlmaLinux has early test patches. Treat container boundaries as broken until patched.

ShinyHunters is now extorting individual schools using stolen Canvas data - thousands of K-12 districts and universities receiving direct ransom demands

Update on the Instructure breach we covered May 4: ShinyHunters has shifted from extorting Instructure itself to extorting individual schools and universities with their own Canvas data. BleepingComputer and Krebs on Security report that 8,800+ institutions have received direct ransom demands referencing real student records, teacher accounts, and gradebook data from their own Canvas tenants. The campaign mirrors the 2025 PowerSchool aftermath. Some schools are receiving demands sized to the institution. Krebs notes affected schools are scrambling to comply with state student-privacy laws while negotiating with attackers.

Check
If your school uses Canvas, check whether you've received any direct extortion communications referencing real Canvas data since May 4. Audit Canvas API access logs for bulk data exports between February and April.
Affected
8,800+ schools, universities, and corporate training organizations using Canvas. K-12 districts face acute risk under state student-privacy laws (NY 2-d, California SOPIPA, ~130 similar statutes) plus COPPA for under-13 student data. Universities face FERPA exposure. Smaller institutions without legal counsel are most likely to pay rather than report.
Fix
Do not respond directly to extortion communications - report to FBI IC3 first and consult legal counsel before any contact. Notify affected students, parents, and faculty per state notification timelines (most require 30-60 days). Issue COPPA and FERPA notifications where applicable. Rotate Canvas API keys and re-authorize integrations. Track Instructure's response separately - many schools report the vendor unresponsive on individual cases.

RansomHouse claims the Trellix breach and posts screenshots showing it reached internal VMware, Rubrik, and Dell EMC dashboards - far more than the 'small portion of source code' Trellix originally disclosed

Update on the Trellix breach we covered May 2: RansomHouse claimed the attack on its leak site Thursday and published screenshots that suggest the intrusion reached well beyond the source code repository Trellix originally acknowledged. Cybernews researchers reviewed the dumped images and identified internal dashboards for VMware vCenter, Rubrik backup, and Dell EMC storage - the systems that hold backups, credentials, and virtual machine images for the entire company. RansomHouse says the intrusion happened April 17 and resulted in data encryption. Trellix told BleepingComputer it's 'aware of claims of responsibility' and looking into them. RansomHouse currently lists 170+ victims on its Tor leak site.

Check
If your organization runs Trellix endpoint, IPS, ePolicy Orchestrator, or email security, audit checksums of every Trellix update installed since April 17. Hunt for unusual outbound traffic from Trellix product hosts.
Affected
Trellix customers - 53,000+ enterprises and government agencies in 185 countries protecting 200M+ endpoints. Acute risk: organizations relying on Trellix for backup integrity (Rubrik exposed) or VMware management (vCenter exposed). Defense and federal customers face higher residual risk pending Trellix's full incident report.
Fix
Hold non-emergency Trellix product updates until Trellix releases a written incident report with concrete scope. Verify checksums for every Trellix agent updated since April 17 against Trellix's published values. Treat any Trellix-issued credentials, API tokens, or signing certificates from before April 17 as potentially compromised and request rotation. Demand a written incident report within 30 days.

NVIDIA confirms a regional GeForce NOW partner in Armenia got breached - millions of user records exposed but NVIDIA's own systems are intact

NVIDIA confirmed Friday that a third-party GeForce NOW Alliance partner based in Armenia (GFN.am) was breached. The hacker, using the ShinyHunters handle on BreachForums, claims to have stolen names, email addresses, dates of birth, membership status, and 2FA enrollment status of millions of users - and is selling the database for $100,000. NVIDIA says its own systems are unaffected and the regional partner is notifying impacted users. The actor is suspected to be a ShinyHunters impersonator rather than the original gang. The partner serves users in Armenia, Georgia, Kazakhstan, Moldova, Ukraine, and Uzbekistan.

Check
If you or staff use GeForce NOW from Armenia, Georgia, Kazakhstan, Moldova, Ukraine, or Uzbekistan, log in to gfn.am and check for breach notifications. Search inbox for GeForce NOW or NVIDIA-themed emails since May 5.
Affected
GeForce NOW users registered through GFN.am, the Armenia-based regional partner serving Armenia, Georgia, Kazakhstan, Moldova, Ukraine, and Uzbekistan. Records reported leaked include names, email addresses, dates of birth, membership status, and 2FA enrollment - but not passwords. Acute risk for users who reused the GFN.am password elsewhere.
Fix
Reset GFN.am passwords and any other accounts using the same password. Enable 2FA if not already on. Treat any inbound emails referencing your real NVIDIA or GeForce NOW account details as hostile - go to gfn.am directly. For organizations: regional alliance partners often have weaker security than the parent vendor - audit which third-party regional services hold employee or customer data.

New Linux backdoor 'PamDOORa' silently steals SSH credentials from every user logging into a compromised server - and erases its tracks from the logs

Group-IB and Flare disclosed PamDOORa, a new Linux backdoor for sale on the Russian-speaking Rehub cybercrime forum at $900 (down from $1,600). PamDOORa hijacks the Linux Pluggable Authentication Module (PAM) framework that handles SSH logins - so it intercepts every legitimate user's password as they authenticate, before any application-level logging fires. The backdoor injects a malicious pam_linux.so module into the authentication stack rather than replacing files. It also tampers with lastlog, btmp, utmp, and wtmp to erase attacker login traces - meaning incident response teams who SSH in to investigate will have their own credentials silently stolen. Group-IB notes the abuse method is not yet in MITRE ATT&CK.

Check
Audit /etc/pam.d/ for unfamiliar pam_*.so modules, particularly pam_linux.so. Compare loaded PAM modules against your distribution's default set. Hunt /tmp for files with random names containing XOR-encrypted credential captures.
Affected
All x86_64 Linux servers running OpenSSH for remote access. PamDOORa is post-exploitation, so attackers must already have root - but once installed it captures every SSH credential and persists invisibly. Acute risk: any Linux server compromised at any point in the past, regardless of remediation - PamDOORa survives standard cleanup unless PAM-specific auditing was performed.
Fix
Enable SELinux or AppArmor in enforcing mode to constrain PAM module loading. Install Auditd with DISA-STIG rules to alert on /etc/pam.d/ changes. Deploy rkhunter or chkrootkit for routine PAM rootkit detection. Treat any compromised Linux server as having fully exposed credentials - rotate every SSH key, password, and token.

28 fake apps on Google Play tricked 7.3 million Indian users into paying for fake call logs - charging up to $80 a year for fabricated data

ESET disclosed CallPhantom, a campaign of 28 fraudulent Android apps on Google Play that promised to reveal call histories, SMS records, and WhatsApp call logs for any phone number. Combined downloads: 7.3 million. After payment (weekly, monthly, or annual subscriptions up to $80), users receive fabricated phone numbers and names hardcoded into the apps. Targeting was India-focused (apps came pre-set with +91 country code and UPI integration via Google Pay, PhonePe, and Paytm) plus broader Asia-Pacific. Some apps embedded direct credit card forms, violating Play policy and making refunds harder. Google removed the 28 apps after ESET's report.

Check
If your organization issues Android devices to staff in India or APAC, check Google Play purchase histories for active subscriptions to call-history apps. Review corporate phone bills for unexpected UPI charges since November 2025.
Affected
Android users in India and broader Asia-Pacific, particularly those who searched Play Store for tools to retrieve call logs, SMS records, or WhatsApp histories. Indian users are the primary target due to UPI integration - 7.3M+ confirmed downloads. Corporate-issued Android devices used for personal app downloads face the same risk.
Fix
Cancel any active CallPhantom subscriptions through Play Store - Google has removed the apps. Request refunds via Play Store (subject to Google's time windows). For UPI-paid subscriptions, contact your UPI provider directly. Brief staff that no legitimate consumer app can reveal call logs of arbitrary phone numbers. For corporate fleets: apply MDM policies that block sideloading.

Two pro-Ukraine hacker groups appear to be teaming up to attack Russian companies - sharing servers and tools across phishing and espionage operations

Update on the Head Mare campaign we covered April 28: Kaspersky now reports that BO Team (also known as Black Owl) and Head Mare appear to be coordinating cyber operations against Russian organizations, sharing command-and-control infrastructure on the same compromised hosts. The likely division of labor: Head Mare phishes for initial access, then BO Team takes over for malware deployment. BO Team has shifted from destructive attacks to covert espionage, and in Q1 2026 hit 20 Russian organizations across manufacturing, telecoms, and oil and gas. The group uses BrockenDoor and Remcos backdoors. Earlier BO Team campaigns hit a Russian drone supplier and the federal digital signature authority.

Check
If your organization operates in Russia or has Russian subsidiaries, search proxy logs for BrockenDoor or Remcos C2 infrastructure since January. Hunt phishing emails referencing manufacturing, telecom, or oil and gas subjects with malicious documents.
Affected
Russian organizations across manufacturing, telecoms, and oil and gas - BO Team's Q1 2026 target list. By extension, Russian subsidiaries of Western multinationals operating in these sectors. The pattern of pro-Ukraine hacktivists coordinating with state-aligned operations means defenders cannot treat hacktivist incidents as opportunistic - they may be one stage of a longer espionage operation.
Fix
Block known BrockenDoor and Remcos C2 indicators per Kaspersky's published IoCs. Monitor for the phishing→malware deployment handoff pattern: phishing email landing followed within days by C2 traffic from a different actor. For organizations not in Russia: this is a template for how hacktivist groups in other regional conflicts may coordinate; expect the same pattern in Middle East and APAC tensions.

New 'TCLBanker' Android malware spreads itself by hijacking WhatsApp and Outlook to message every contact in the victim's address book

Researchers disclosed TCLBANKER, an Android banking trojan that adds worm-style self-propagation: once installed, it abuses Accessibility Services to read the victim's WhatsApp and Outlook contact lists and then send malicious download links to every contact as if from the victim. The malware targets banking and crypto-wallet apps with overlay screens that capture credentials, plus SMS-interception modules that grab one-time passcodes. Self-spreading via the victim's own messaging history defeats traditional URL-reputation controls. The campaign concentrates in Brazil, Spain, and Italy banking apps initially. Operators are renting access on Telegram for $1,500-3,000/month.

Check
Brief staff who manage Android devices that any 'app download' link sent through WhatsApp or Outlook from a known contact during business hours should be verified out-of-band before clicking. Review unfamiliar Android apps requesting Accessibility Services.
Affected
Android users in Brazil, Spain, and Italy initially - but worm-style spread will broaden the geography rapidly. Acute risk: anyone whose phone has Accessibility Services enabled for any third-party app. Banking and cryptocurrency app users face credential theft via overlay attacks. Contact networks of infected users get the lures next.
Fix
On managed Android devices: enforce MDM policies that block sideloading and require approval for any app requesting Accessibility Services. Disable Accessibility Services for apps that don't genuinely need it. Brief staff on the worm-spread pattern: contacts sending links to download apps is a hostile signal regardless of who the sender is.