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Last updated: May 14, 2026 at 10:49 AM UTC
All 219 Vulnerability 76 Breach 45 Threat 91 Defense 7

CISA adds four more flaws to KEV - SimpleHelp authorization bypass (CVSS 9.9), Samsung MagicINFO, and the D-Link DIR-823X bug already powering fresh Mirai botnets

CISA added four flaws to KEV on April 24 with a May 8 federal deadline. The headline is CVE-2024-57726 (CVSS 9.9), a missing authorization in SimpleHelp RMM that lets a low-privileged technician mint API keys above their role and escalate to server admin; companion CVE-2024-57728 (CVSS 7.2) chains a path traversal for RCE. SimpleHelp featured in DragonForce and Akira ransomware campaigns last year. CVE-2024-7399 (CVSS 8.8) is a Samsung MagicINFO 9 path traversal with a public PoC since 2024. The fourth, CVE-2025-29635, is the D-Link DIR-823X bug we covered last week.

Check
Inventory exposed instances of SimpleHelp, Samsung MagicINFO 9 Server, and any remaining D-Link DIR-823X routers. SimpleHelp is the priority - it sits inside the IT trust boundary.
Affected
SimpleHelp before 5.5.8 against CVE-2024-57726 and CVE-2024-57728 (chained to RCE as the SimpleHelp server user). Samsung MagicINFO 9 Server unpatched against CVE-2024-7399. D-Link DIR-823X firmware 240126 and 24082 against CVE-2025-29635 - the product line is discontinued and no vendor patch exists.
Fix
Upgrade SimpleHelp to 5.5.8+ and rotate every API key issued by every technician account, since unprivileged techs could have minted privileged keys during the vulnerable window. Audit SimpleHelp session logs for anomalies. Patch Samsung MagicINFO and remove its internet exposure. For D-Link DIR-823X, replace the hardware - there is no fix. Treat May 8 as your own deadline.

Over 10,500 Zimbra servers still vulnerable to actively-exploited XSS as CISA gives federal agencies just three days to patch (CVE-2025-48700)

Shadowserver scan data published Friday shows over 10,500 Zimbra Collaboration Suite instances still unpatched against CVE-2025-48700, a Classic-UI XSS that Synacor fixed in June 2025 but CISA only added to KEV on April 20. Exposed servers split nearly evenly between Asia (3,794) and Europe (3,793). The flaw triggers when a victim simply views a crafted email - no clicks - and runs JavaScript inside their authenticated session for mailbox theft and MFA backup-code retrieval. Zimbra is a recurring APT target: Russia's Winter Vivern, APT29, and APT28 have all run Zimbra-XSS campaigns against NATO and Ukrainian targets.

Check
If you run Zimbra anywhere - including subsidiaries, acquired companies, and overseas regional offices - confirm patch status against CVE-2025-48700 today.
Affected
Zimbra Collaboration Suite 8.8.15, 9.0, 10.0, and 10.1 without the June 2025 security patches. Exploitation requires a user to view a crafted email in the Classic UI; servers using only the Modern UI are not exposed via this specific flaw, but related issues are addressed by the same patch. CVSS 6.1.
Fix
Apply the June 2025 patches across all instances. Where immediate patching is impossible, switch users to the Modern UI as a stopgap and remove webmail from direct internet exposure. Audit the past 60 days of mailbox audit logs for unusual TGZ archive creation, MFA backup-code retrieval, application-password generation, and bulk address-book access. Rotate application passwords issued during the vulnerable window.

LMDeploy LLM-serving SSRF (CVE-2026-33626) exploited within 13 hours of disclosure - attackers used the vision-language image loader as a generic port-scanner against AWS metadata, Redis, and MySQL

Sysdig observed the first in-the-wild exploitation of CVE-2026-33626 against its honeypot fleet 12 hours and 31 minutes after the GitHub advisory went live on April 21. LMDeploy is Shanghai AI Laboratory's open source toolkit for serving vision-language and text LLMs. The flaw is in load_image() in lmdeploy/vl/utils.py: it fetches arbitrary URLs from the image_url field without validating link-local, loopback, or RFC1918 ranges. CVSS 7.5. The attacker used LMDeploy as a generic SSRF primitive over an eight-minute session - port-scanning AWS IMDS, localhost Redis, MySQL, and an admin interface. v0.12.3 fixes it.

Check
If your team runs LLM-serving infrastructure (LMDeploy, vLLM, TGI, Ollama, Ray Serve), audit it this week for unvalidated URL fetching and put proper egress filtering in place.
Affected
LMDeploy versions before 0.12.3 with vision-language support enabled. Cloud GPU inference deployments are at acute risk because the SSRF directly targets the metadata service - on a misconfigured node this yields IAM credentials with broad access to S3 model artifacts, training data, and cross-account roles.
Fix
Upgrade LMDeploy to 0.12.3+. On every cloud-hosted inference node, enforce IMDSv2 with token requirement (this alone defeats IAM exfil). Restrict outbound egress from GPU nodes to required destinations only. Block 169.254.169.254 from inference containers without a use case. Apply the same logic to vision-LLM image loaders, agent tool-use endpoints, and RAG fetchers. Block 103.116.72[.]119 at the edge.

New extortion group 'BlackFile' running seven-figure ransom campaigns against retail and hospitality via vishing-driven SSO compromise and Salesforce/SharePoint scraping

Palo Alto's Unit 42 and the Retail & Hospitality ISAC outed a new financially-motivated group tracked as BlackFile (CL-CRI-1116, UNC6671, Cordial Spider) running data-theft extortion against retail and hospitality since February 2026 with seven-figure ransoms. The playbook: spoofed-VoIP vishing, attackers posing as IT helpdesk, victims routed to phishing pages capturing Microsoft Entra/Okta/Google SSO credentials, attackers then register their own devices to bypass MFA and pivot into Salesforce and SharePoint. Unit 42 links the group to 'The Com' and notes it has used swatting against non-paying victims. TTPs overlap heavily with ShinyHunters and Scattered Spider.

Check
Brief IT helpdesk staff this week on the BlackFile vishing pattern and run a tabletop on a help-desk-driven SSO compromise of one named individual.
Affected
Retail and hospitality are named target sectors but the playbook is industry-agnostic. Acute risk: any organization where helpdesk staff can re-enroll MFA devices over the phone without out-of-band caller verification. SaaS environments where users can perform bulk Salesforce report exports, SharePoint downloads, or Microsoft Graph queries without secondary controls.
Fix
Require manager confirmation on a separate channel for any MFA or password reset on high-privilege accounts. Disable phone-based helpdesk MFA reset for accounts with bulk-data access. In Okta and Entra, alert on new device registrations from unseen locations. In Salesforce, scope bulk export rights via Permission Set Groups and alert on Bulk API usage outside business hours.

Lazarus 'Mach-O Man' macOS malware kit hitting fintech and crypto execs through fake Telegram meeting invites and ClickFix terminal commands

ANY.RUN and Dark Reading published research on Mach-O Man, a new macOS malware kit Lazarus is deploying against fintech and crypto executives. The chain begins on Telegram with what looks like a legitimate meeting invite from a known contact, leading to a fake Zoom/Teams/Meet page that displays a fake 'connection issue' and instructs the executive to copy-paste a command into Mac Terminal. That ClickFix command grabs credentials, browser sessions, and Keychain data and exfiltrates over Telegram bot APIs. Lazarus has used the same template across the Drift and KelpDAO compromises, totaling more than $500M stolen in two weeks.

Check
Brief executive, finance, and treasury staff who use Telegram for business communication this week. The lure is a meeting invite from someone they trust, not a cold approach.
Affected
macOS users in executive, finance, business development, and partner-relations roles - particularly those who use Telegram for business. The technique works because the user runs the command themselves, bypassing most preventive controls including macOS endpoint protection. Mach-O Man is not Lazarus-only; other criminal groups have already adopted the kit.
Fix
Train executives never to copy-paste a 'fix' command into Terminal at a meeting page's request, regardless of how legitimate the invite looks. Log and alert on Terminal launches that fetch and execute remote content via curl, wget, osascript, or bash. Hunt for processes in tight infinite loops with Keychain access. Consider Lockdown Mode for high-risk roles.

Kaspersky finds 26 'FakeWallet' apps on Apple's App Store impersonating MetaMask, Coinbase, Trust Wallet, and Ledger to steal crypto seed phrases

Kaspersky identified 26 malicious iOS apps live on the Apple App Store impersonating major cryptocurrency wallets including MetaMask, Coinbase, Trust Wallet, Ledger, TokenPocket, imToken, Bitpie, and OneKey. The campaign, named FakeWallet and linked to the SparkKitty operation, has been running since fall 2025. The apps used typosquatted names, cloned icons, and stub functionality (games, calculators, task planners) to pass App Store review. Some embed compromised viewDidLoad routines that scan the screen for mnemonic words as the user types and exfiltrate seed phrases via RSA-encrypted payloads. Apple removed 25 of the 26 after disclosure; the developer behind the 26th was terminated.

Check
Audit wallet apps installed on any iOS device that holds crypto credentials - your own and team members' devices used for treasury, payroll, vendor payments, or personal investing.
Affected
iOS users who downloaded any of the 26 FakeWallet apps between fall 2025 and the April 2026 takedowns, particularly those with Apple account region set to China. Anyone who entered a seed phrase must assume their wallet is compromised. Cold wallet users are not exempt - some variants embedded into companion apps.
Fix
Review every App Store download under any region, particularly wallet or crypto apps. Cross-check developer names against official wallet websites (MetaMask is ConsenSys, Trust Wallet is DApps Platform Inc., Ledger is Ledger SAS). Any wallet app that asks for your seed phrase is a thief. If exposed, transfer assets to a fresh wallet on known-clean hardware and treat the old seed as burned.

Tropic Trooper ditches Cobalt Strike for AdaptixC2 - new campaign against Taiwan, South Korea, and Japan uses trojanized SumatraPDF, GitHub C2, and VS Code tunnels for remote access

Zscaler ThreatLabz attributed a March 12 campaign to Tropic Trooper (APT23, Earth Centaur, KeyBoy, Pirate Panda), the China-linked group active since 2011. The new wave targets Chinese-speaking users in Taiwan plus targets in South Korea and Japan with AUKUS-themed lures. Two notable changes: a custom AdaptixC2 Beacon listener instead of Cobalt Strike, and GitHub Issues as the C2 channel. The dropper is a trojanized SumatraPDF reader that runs a TOSHIS-variant shellcode loader and drops AdaptixC2 in memory. For high-value victims, operators push VS Code and configure a tunnel ('code tunnel user login --provider github') for full remote access.

Check
Hunt your fleet for unexpected VS Code tunnel sessions from non-developer endpoints and block 'code tunnel user login' outside approved developer accounts.
Affected
Organizations with operations or staff in Taiwan, South Korea, or Japan working on Indo-Pacific security, defense policy, or AUKUS-adjacent topics. Any environment where VS Code is broadly installed (including non-developer roles) is exposed to the tunnel pivot. The trojanized SumatraPDF binary keeps the original signature structure intact in some samples.
Fix
Block .exe masquerading as documents at email and web gateways. Alert on encrypted POSTs to GitHub Issues from non-developer endpoints. Detect the VS Code tunnel pivot by alerting on 'code tunnel user login' from any account without a documented dev workflow. Audit corporate GitHub OAuth grants. Consider removing VS Code from non-developer endpoints entirely.

NASA OIG details how Chinese national Song Wu spear-phished aerospace software from NASA, Air Force, Navy, FAA, universities, and private firms over four years by impersonating colleagues

NASA's Office of Inspector General published a retrospective on April 24 detailing how Chinese national Song Wu, an engineer at a state-owned Chinese aerospace and defense conglomerate, ran a multi-year spear-phishing campaign from January 2017 to December 2021. Song impersonated real US engineers known to his targets and asked over email for copies of specific aerospace modeling software and source code that could design or modify weapons platforms. Targets included staff at NASA, US Air Force, Navy, Army, FAA, major universities, and private aerospace firms. Several victims, believing they were helping a friend, sent the requested software - inadvertently violating US export control laws.

Check
Use the NASA OIG release as a case study in awareness training for engineering and research staff who handle export-controlled or proprietary technical artifacts.
Affected
Aerospace, defense, advanced manufacturing, and dual-use research organizations are the named target set, but the technique generalizes. Any organization whose staff regularly share technical artifacts with external collaborators based on personal trust is at risk. Universities and contractors holding ITAR or EAR-controlled materials face both security risk and legal liability for export-control violations.
Fix
Brief engineering staff on the Song Wu pattern: the lure is an email from someone you actually know asking for software you actually have. Require a non-email verification step (voice or video call) for any inbound request for source code or controlled software. Tighten outbound DLP around CAD, source code, and simulation file transfers, with managerial approval above a defined threshold.

Iran operating like a criminal actor, ex-NSA director says - opportunistic credentials and amplification, not novel exploits

At the Asness Summit in Nashville on April 24, former NSA director Tim Haugh and Mandiant founder Kevin Mandia argued Iran's current cyber posture more closely resembles a criminal actor than a sophisticated APT - reliant on dark-web-purchased credentials, basic security gaps, and information operations to amplify modest intrusions. They cited the March 11 Stryker attack as the template: no malware, no zero-day, just legitimate credentials used to abuse MDM and delete data the attacker had permission to delete. Mandia's CISO advice: assume valid credentials for your staff are already on sale and build detection around their misuse.

Check
Run a credential-monitoring service against your domain this week and put alerts in place for impossible-travel and unusual-MDM-action patterns on admin accounts.
Affected
Any organization with US or Israeli ties, plus their suppliers and contractors, fits the Iranian targeting profile. Acute risk: organizations where MDM, RMM, or any endpoint-management platform can issue destructive commands without out-of-band approval; environments without credential-monitoring services watching dark-web markets for staff logins.
Fix
Subscribe to a credential-monitoring service (HaveIBeenPwned Enterprise, SpyCloud, Flare) and alert on staff credentials surfacing in stealer logs. Require step-up auth on any MDM or RMM destructive action (wipe, uninstall, mass-deploy). Brief comms staff that any Iran-claimed breach should be verified before public response - operators routinely overclaim to amplify modest access.

New 'PhantomRPC' bug lets any low-privileged Windows process become SYSTEM - all Windows versions affected, no patch from Microsoft

Kaspersky disclosed PhantomRPC at Black Hat Asia on April 24, an architectural flaw in how Windows handles a core internal communication system called RPC (Remote Procedure Call). When a privileged Windows process tries to talk to an RPC server that isn't running, the operating system doesn't check whether the thing answering is the real one - so a low-privileged attacker can stand up a fake RPC server, intercept the call, and inherit SYSTEM-level access. All Windows versions are affected. Kaspersky demonstrated five different exploitation paths and published the research tools on GitHub. Microsoft has not released a patch.

Check
Treat any unprivileged Windows process as a potential SYSTEM-escalation foothold and tighten EDR rules around suspicious RPC server registrations until Microsoft patches.
Affected
All Windows versions including Windows 10, Windows 11, and Windows Server, plus older builds. Acute risk on multi-user systems, terminal servers, and any host where untrusted code might run as a low-privileged service account such as NETWORK SERVICE - those are the easiest launch points for the technique.
Fix
There is no Microsoft patch yet. Use Kaspersky's public PhantomRPC tooling to audit your environment for exploitable RPC patterns. Tighten EDR detection on processes registering RPC endpoints with privileged-service UUIDs. On terminal servers, limit which low-privileged accounts can run code. Watch Microsoft Security Response Center for updates over the coming weeks.